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PREFACE 
This thesis is my final product for the IMPREST Master Programme Analysing Europe. Asa 
student of the Bachelor Programme in European Studies at the University of Maastricht, 1 
developed an interest in research in this area. in September 2005 1 enrolled in the IMPREST 
Master, which as a final project allowed me to embark upon a study of my own, resulting in this 
theüs. This thesis is a combination of the skills I have acquired in the past four years, and the 
topics that I came to like most in this period: EU policy-making and future exploration, and 
Tu kish accession. 
The idea for the topic of this thesis developed approximately a year ago, when I had the pleasure 
of 'peeking in' on some of the research done by one of my earlier instructors, Prof. van Asselt. in 
the same period I wrote a Bachelor paper about future exploration in the European Commission, 
anc became increasingly inquisitive about the topic, which is relatively new and has not been 
ıres!arched extensively, hence leaving a lot for me to explore. Consequently, when 1 was asked to 
cone up with a topic for this thesis, this was not a difficult choice. 
Tu·kish accession to the European Union is a very topical question today. in addition to making 
tthii the case study for my thesis, I was able to conduct a large part of my research at Doğuş 
llJriversity in Istanbul , while completing the second semester of the Master Programme there, 
ıal hwing me a perspective not many European Studies students have a privilege to. 
A ıumber of people have helped me in writing this thesis, and deserves special thanks. My thesis 
5uıervisors Prof. van Asselt at the University of Maastricht, and Dr. LaGro at Doğuş University 
lhaTe provided me with dedicated guidance by taking time to review my work regularly and 
ccriically and giving me advice on how to proceed. Mr. Martijn van der Steen from the 
JNc:herlands School of Public Administration (NSOB) provided me with guidance on my 
e~arch approach for which 1 anı grateful. Many thanks as well to Dr. Randeraad, who fulfilled 
ıa S)ecial role in keeping me 'in check' in the preparatory stage ofthe thesis by asking a 'plan' 
Jfrcn time to time. Furthermore, I wish to thank my interviewees, Mr. Özturk, Mr. Emerson, and 
JM. Missir di Lusignano, who took the time to answer my questions, and contributed enormously 
tto he research. 
in my four years of study leading up to this thesis many people ha ve contributed, to a greater or 
lesser extent, to the skills and knowledge that I needed to complete this Master Programme. They 
are too numerous to thank individually, but 1 want to stress my appreciation here for ali of them. 
Finally, thanks to my parents who 'saw it coming' for the past 22 years, and always allowed and 
encouraged me to pursue my interests. 
Writing this thesis has only increased my interest in conducting more research; I greatly enjoyed 
it. 1 hope this reflects in the final product, and hopefully you enjoy reading it as much as 1 liked 
writing it. 
Karin H.J. van der Ven 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The role of future exploration as a type of expertise in the policy-making process has increased 
in the past decades. Research about the relationship between future exploration and policy-
making is largely limited to national policy-making processes, and there has not been much 
research of the European Union in this context. The aim of this empirical study is to provide 
insights about future exploration and policy-making in the European Union structures. Its main 
focus is on the Turkey-EU accession dossier; a topical issue on the European agenda today, as 
well as one with certain presumed orientation towards the future, namely Turkish membership. 
On the basis of the Turkey-EU dossier, closely related to EU enlargement policy at large, the 
ambition ofthis study is to deri ve meaningful conclusions for the wider realm of European 
policy-making. The study focuses both on the forma! (institutionalized) methods of future 
exploration, as well as the informal ways in which the future plays a role in European policy 
making. Qualitative methods are employed to detect and analyse relevant policy-documents from 
the European Parliament, European Commission, and Council, as well as those from their sub-
units dedicated to enlargement policy. In addition, an inquiry of extemal future explorative 
bodies in the field of Turkey-EU relations is made to contribute to a comprehensive view of the 
existence of future explorations, as well as their role in policy-making. Interviews with three 
officials, active in the EU-Turkey policy-making process in different ways, serve to complement 
the analysis. Theoretical insights in relation to expertise and policy-making, as well as the more 
specific field future exploration and policy-making are employed to position the fındings within 
their proper fıeld . The realization that future exploration plays a very limited role in policy-
making regarding the Turkey-EU accession dossier is among the most important fınding of this 
study in relation to the forma! role of future explorations in the EU. Furthermore, the practice of 
future exploration seems to be closely intertwined with the actual policy-making process, and the 
involvement of extemal agencies is marginal. About the more in forma! relationship between 
future exploration and policy-making, it can be said in this dossier, the EU seeks toplan its 
future rather than explore it, primarily by establishing objectives and creating policy for the long-
term. 
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INTRODUCTION 
üne needs only to open a newspaper to see that the future is a popular topic. Although uncertain 
and obscure, the future seems to fascinate us. We fantasize about the future, anticipate it, have 
expectations about it, and plan for it. If only we knew what the future would look like ... . 
This is the car of the future 
Philippine Daily lnquire, May 27, 2006 Global warminı! 'proıound' threat to ıuture 
Daily Telegraph, May 10, 2006 
Technology jobs the way of the future 
Turkish Daily News, May 17, 2005 
Does NATO have a future? 
Economist, May 2, 2002 
Pondering the future for Microsoft 
Financial Times, April 30, 2006 Blair plays down talk about his future 
The Times, May 29,2006 
IJnion aims lor bit! role in ıuture ol Kosovo talks 
The European Voice, October 20, 2005 
This engagement with the anticipation of the future can be traced back to the earliest oracles in 
hunter and gatherer societies. 1 At the time it was mostly the weather which people sought to 
know. Since then, ways have been found to anticipate the weather, but other than that, the future 
seems as uncertain as it was centuries ago. 
The rise of capitalist societies and the simultaneous rise of the idea of change as inherent of life 
at the end of the !ast centuries invoked an increased interest in future exploration from policy-
makers.2 Since the 1960s the exploration ofthe future has been approached asa form of science. 3 
Today ways of exploring the future that breath a spirit of ' scientific ' have become very popular 
in the arena of policy-making. According to Schoonenboom it is the increased awareness of 
insecurity which has lead to the recent popularity of the practice.4 
1 Heilbroner, R. (1995). Visions ofthe Future: the Distant Past, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. p. l O. 
2 Van Asselt, M. , Van ' t Klooster, M.,& Notten, P. (2003). Verkennen in onzekerheid. Beleid en Maatschappij, 30, 
4, pp. 230-241. 
3 Van der Staal, P.M. (1988) . Toekomstonderzoek en wetenschap: over de grondslagen van wetenschappelijke 
methoden en technieken van toekomstonderzoek. Delft: Delft University Press. p. 1. 
4 Schoonenboom, I.J . (2003). Toekomstscenario's en beleid. Beleid en Maatschappij, 30, 4, p. 213. 
Examples of ways in which future exploration and policy-making ha ve becomes intertwines are 
apparent in the Netherlands, where a number of planning bureaus systematically engage in future 
exploration on a wide range of issues, from demography to environment, as a basis for 
govemment policy. 
The relationship between future exploration and policy-making has been the topic of academic 
research, especially by Dutch authors such as Schoonenboom, Van Asselt, and van der Staal. in 
their publications they explore the roles future exploration could have in the policy-making 
process, problems to be expected, and occasionally how to counter these. The topic of their 
research is however almost always the Netherlands. 
A consideration of the relationship between future exploration and policy-making on the !eve! of 
the EU seems to lag far behind. in the European Journal of European Public Policy, Journal of 
European Social Policy, and Journal of European Studies, as well as European Union Politics, 
an inquiry of articles on the topic in the past three years did not yield a single result. 
it cannot be said that the future is not topical on the level of the EU. Europa. Quo vadis? has 
been an important question throughout the recent history of the Union. The Convention on the 
Future of the European Union attempted to answer it in 2004. In 2005 , the European Parliament 
organized a debate on the future of Europe. And in March 2006, a special Eurobarometer on the 
future of Europe was convened by the European Commission to find out what the European 
citizens had to say about it. 
The future of Europe has also been a topic of inquiry outside of the EU structures. As early as 
1977, Peter Hali published Europe 2000, in which he considered a number of scenarios for 
Europe as the beginning ofthe next century.5 More recently, in 2001 , Duff and Williams 
produced European Futures 2020, in which as number of altemative long-term futures for the 
5 Hali, P. (1977). Europe 2000. The European Cultural Foundation. 
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Union are considered.6 The Dutch Central Planning Office came up with Four Futures of 
Europe.7 
Stili this does not reveal if and how the European Union makes use of future exploration in 
policy-making. This is the question this study will attempt to answer. 
The realm of policy-making ofthe European Union is Iarge, and becoming ever Iarger as the 
Union 'deepens'. it would therefore be impossible to consider this question for the entirely of 
European policy-making. The focus of the study is therefore one specific dossier: the Turkey-EU 
accession dossier. 
If the future is not topical enough today, then Turkey's possible accession to the European Union 
is. On 5 October 2005, the two parties engaged in negotiations towards accession. Association 
between Turkey and the EU dates back to 1963, and since then possible accession has been on 
and off the agenda asa topic. The outcome of the negotiations is officially open-ended, which 
means that eventual membership is stili nota given prospect. Whether Turkey should or will 
become a member remains a topic of discussion to date. Hopes are high from both the official 
Turkish and European sides. On the !eve! of the public, the belief in Turkish accession is Iess 
strong. Turkish writer Orhan Pamuk prophesizes: ' A union will never be realized. Turkey ' s place 
is in a continuous flux. This limbo is what Turkey is and will stay for ever. This is our way of 
life here'. The future will teli whether he is right. 
The focus of this study is not the content of the debate on Turkish accession, but rather the role 
of the future in the policy-making on the topic. in general , the study evolves around two main 
questions. Firstly, it aims to evaluate the forma! role of future exploration within European 
policy-making. This involves the investigation of possible future explorative bodies and 
references to future explorations in policy-documents. Secondly, it aims to find out how, apart 
from the forma! structures, the future is a topic of discussion in the EU policy-making bodies. 
6 Duff, A.,& Williams, S. (2001) . European Futures: Alternative scenariosfor 2020. London: The Federal Trust for 
Education and Research. 
7 Central Planning Office (2004). Four futures of Europe. The Hague: Central Planning Office. 
3 
ln addition to choosing as specific area of European policy-making, a specific type of ' future ' is 
also delineated for the study. The future is a wide open space, from tomorrow to eternity. This 
means that in essence ali policy is aimed at the future. The research questions become ali the 
more interesting when talking about the long-term future , approximately 20 years ahead. 
The core of the research concerns empirical qualitative research. The aim is not to test a 
hypothesis, but rather to explore a new field of expertise, using existing theories as a frame of 
reference. This frame of reference will first be explored, before coming to the actual empirical 
findings ofthe research. The next two chapters will serve to give an overview of prior work in 
relation to expertise in general, future-exploration, and policy-making. Then, the niche within 
EU-policy making that is researched is further laid out in chapter 3 and 4, which will elaborate 
on EU enlargement policy in general, and the Turkey-EU dossier. Chapter 5 will set out the 
methodology that was used to acquire the data and interpret them. These will consequently be 
presented in chapter 6 and 7. Conclusions and suggestions for further research will be presented 
in the !ast chapter. 
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1. EXPERTISE AND POLICY-MAKING 
'Behind the headlines of our tim es stands an unobtrusive army of science advisors. ( ... ) They 
predict the course of the economy and set standards far high-way design. They compare 
strategies far exploring Mars and assess the future of genetic engineering. in sum they advise 
the govemment on nearly every area of policy, playing an indispensable role in modern 
states' .8 
The relationship between knowledge and policy-making is two-directional. Research knowledge 
can be a product of politics in the sense that the funding system ofresearch is controlled by 
policy-making powers and decides who participates in it, and what network relations are 
maintained. Most research is supported by government funding; the balance of knowledge 
among fields is a political product. Moreover, the assumptions and worldviews of science are 
shaped by expectations conveyed through the funding system and by the access it allows to 
various social groups. Funding preference determines what is real, important, and less 
important. 9 in this not only the govemment, but also industry and public opinion play a role. 
Although this relationship is of less interest to this chapter, it is important to remember the 
possible implications of in on the European level , far example that the European institutions play 
an active role in determining what expertise is created on the European level, either through 
funding or commissioning it. 
In the opposite direction, research knowledge can alsa have a prominent role in policy-making. 
Scientists are important actors in the shaping of the problem definitions and procedures through 
which contemporary policies operate. This is the facus of this chapter. 
The traditional ethos of science assumes a 'complete separation between science and politics' .10 
In this view scientists are considered producers of objective knowledge. This older, positivist 
understanding assumed that good science produced truth and that truth-producers deserved a 
special role in politics. Scientists would argue from this perspective that they should have 
8 Hilgartner, S. (2000). Science on stage: expert advice as public drama. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. p. 
3. 
9 Cozzens, S.,& Woodhouse, E. (1995). Science, Government and the Politics ofKnowledge. In: S. Jasanoff, G. 
Markle, J. Peterson & T. Pinch. (Eds.), Handbook of Science and Technology Studies . (pp. 533-553). Landon: Sage 
Publications. p. 540. 
1 o Ezrahi, Y. ( 1971 ). 'The political resources of American science'. Science Studies, 1, pp. 117. 
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substantial influence over a range of government decisions by virtue of their claims to 
specialized knowledge, as long as science is separate from politics, hence used as a base for 
political decisions only. Politicians equally appreciate science in the regulatory arena asa neutral 
mediating force. 
in the past two decades, this clear-cut separation has broken down. Social constructivist 
tendencies have come to look upon science and expertise as socially constructed. Scientific 
knowledge is treated asa negotiated product of human inquiry. According to the more sceptical 
version of this trend, scientists are now perceived as hired brains of special interests and 
lobbyists for their own. Boundaries established between science and politics are artificial, 
temporary, and moreover, subject to political preferences. it may serve a politician to claim 
separation of policy-making and scientific knowledge. The point of social constructivists is not 
only that political uses of science are inevitable, but rather that it is not even possible to think 
about what science is apart from its various constructions. Social constructivism rejects any 
claim for science to guardianship. Collingridge and Reeve go as far as the claim that science is of 
no use to policy now that it has become politically charged itself. 11 
STS (Science and Technology Studies) has, asa relatively new branch of study supported the 
constructivist assumptions through two major trends. lnterest theory traces how the concems of 
various actors are embodied in knowledge and social constructionism demonstrates how actors 
attribute objectivity or fact status to the resulting knowledge through social processes. STS has 
various subfields, which share a number of assumptions: 
1. The recognition that what we take to be matters of fact about the physical world are 
significant social achievement that may vary from one historical setting to another. 
2. The understanding that supposedly inanimate technologies actually incorporate social 
beliefs and practices, such as legal rules and cultural judgements of fairness . 
3. The idea that the capacity to produce particular forrns of scientific knowledge and 
understanding is indissolubly linked with other kinds of social and political capacity. 12 
11 Collingridge, O.,& Reeve, C. (1986). Science speaks to power: the role of experts in policy-making. London: 
Pinter. 
12 Ezrahi, Y. ( 1990). The descent of Icarus: Science and the transformation of contemporary democracy. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
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Whereas on an academic !eve! social constructivist tendencies have become more popular, they 
are stili largely mistrusted by policy-makers and scientists equally for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, STS in the minds of policy-makers and scientists has become associated with relativism 
and deconstruction of everything that is produced as knowledge. As such it is viewed with 
incomprehension by scientists and policy-makers, who stili have a pre-constructivist view and 
whose focus is on the creating of new facts and rules. For scientists deconstruction has become 
equalled with 'moral nihilism'. 13 
Secondly, STS has failed to meet the test of social relevance. 14 Instead of going into ways in 
which societies establish and maintain boundaries between scientific and political authority, STS 
has limited itself mainly to studies on the nature of knowledge and reality. Moreover, according 
to Jasanoff, few in the world of public policy intuitively understand a field whose very object 
seems to be the question the supremacy of scientific rationality. 
The role of STS is, however not doomed. Asa proponent of the discipline, Jasanoff argues that 
STS should position itself in a more positive light by focussing on construction rather than 
deconstruction and emphasizing itself relevance to current policy-making issues. STS has the 
potential to provide a more nuanced account of the boundary between policy-making and 
science. Furthermore, STS has a potential in training policy-makers in constructivism in order to 
make them more critical toward scientific evidence. There is a close link between the ideas 
policy-makers have of how science is created and how this knowledge is used in politics. STS 
can be particularly helpful with regard to the first question and thereby also influence the 
perception of the second. As a prominent proponent of STS, Jasanoff argues that the political 
function of good science is ' to certify that an agency' s scientific approach is balanced .. . and that 
its conclusions are sufficiently supported by the evidence'. 15 
it seems that policy-makers and scientists have not yet come to terms with constructivism, but at 
the same time are forced to deal with the reality of it. Constructivist tendencies have had an 
impact on their relationship as becomes apparent in what is called a shift from 'knowledge' to 
13 Jasanoff, S. (1999). STS and Public Policy. Getting Beyond Deconstruction. Science, Technology & Society, 4, 1. 
pp. 67. 
14 Jasanoff, S. (1999). STS and Public Policy. Getting Beyond Deconstruction. Science, Technology & Society, 4, 1. 
Pfj;:a·noff, S. (1990). Thefifth branch: science advisors as policy-makers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. p. 241. 
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'information' asa basis for policy. 16 The transition from knowledge to information asa more 
socially inclusive means of knowing facts or accounting for, and guiding action has been a 
response to the need to keep knowledge objective or technically valid in context. By comparison 
with knowledge, information is more detached from the theoretical context in which it was 
produced, systematically conceptualized and justified. Because it tends to be more mechanical, 
information seems more accessible, and less dependent upon mediation. Policy-makers and 
scientists do de-contextualize knowledge in an attempt to make it more neutral and useful in 
policy-making. Ezrahi takes this argument as far as to say that to politicians, science is not the 
resource it once was, with which policies and public choices could be legitimized as impersonal, 
technical and objective. As a result, he argues, scientists are much less in demand by those who 
seek to legitimize their argument before an informed public. Instead the provision of information 
has become more important. De Wilde adds onto this by stating that the democratic force for 
objectivity has led to a relation between the status of professional experts and the extent to which 
they use quantitative methods. Experts are no longer believed because they are experts, but rather 
because they produce numbers. Here again one can see a shift from knowledge to information in 
de Wilde ' s views. 17 In practice however models do not give much more certainty than qualitative 
dara, because they also depend essentially on the definitions of the date put into them. 
This recognition of the declining role of the scientists is also emphasised by Brickman, who 
argues that ' European political processes tend to place ' considerably lower demands upon the 
role of scientific evidence ... [where] both ' experts' and partisan interests are typically 
represented in a single deliberative forum .. . [and] scientific uncertainties can be papered over in 
the drive fora political compromise ' among the most powerful groups concemed with an issue. 18 
Scientists have become one among many to defend their case to policy-makers, and no longer 
have a recognition to guardianship. 
16 Waterton, C. & Wynne, B. (2004). Knowledge and political order in the European Environmental Agency. ln: S. 
Jasanoff (Ed.), States of Knowfedge . (pp. 88). New York: Routledge. p. 18. 
Ezrahi: Y. (2004). Science and the political imagination in contemporary democracies. ln: S. Jasanoff(Ed.), States 
of Knowfedge. (pp. 257). New York: Routledge. 
17 De Wilde, R. (2000). De Voorspellers : een kritiek op de toekomstindustrie. Amsterdam: De Balie. 
18 Brickman, R. (1984) cited in Cozzens, S.,& Woodhouse, E. (1995) . Science, Govemment and the Politics of 
Knowledge. ln: S. Jasanoff, G. Markle, J. Peterson & T . Pinch. (Eds .), Handbook of Science and Techno/ogy 
Studies. (pp. 533-553). London: Sage Publications. 
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On the other hand, one cannot ignore the tendency of policy-makers on the EU !evet to establish 
'neutral' expertise in an effort to maintain their separatist position and the traditional positivist 
idea of science. A characterizing example of this can be found in the case of the European 
Environmental Agency, as described by Waterton and Wynne. The European Environmental 
Agency was conceived in the mid- 1980s formally independent of the European Commission yet 
designed to ful fil the objectives of the European Treaty commitments. The agency's main 
constitutional responsibility was to provide 'objective, reliable and comparable' information 
about ali aspects of Europe's environment, in order to inform the Commission, the EU member 
states, the European Parliament, other policy actors and the wider public. While it was expected 
that the EEA would provide information so as to be relevant to and effective for EU 
environmental policy, it was nevertheless also expected that this new institution would avoid 
trespassing into areas of policy prescription or advocacy. The European Commission had 
assumed that it would be possible for the Agency to provide information without directly 
influencing policy. This assumption became the root cause of many conflicts between the EEA 
and the DG Environment. The offıcial role of the EEA was to provide only basic <lata on the 
state of the environment. The DG attempted to keep it away from any policy-influencing role. 
Furthermore, the EEA had no public axis. The DG opposed the idea that the EEA should 
generate information for the public and argued the DG should be the one to disperse this 
information. Likewise, it rejected the idea that knowledge sources such as NGO's, loca! 
authorities, or even university scientists outside the editorial control and sanction of central 
govemments should be treated by the EEA as legitimate interlocutors for an 'independent' 
agency. In this scheme, proper information for environmental policy should pass from official 
scientific sources through officially controlled channels to the EEA, which is to render them 
reliable, objective and comparable, to then pass it on to European policy officials. Waterton and 
Wynne observe that the DG Environment' s interpretation of the EEA regulation conformed more 
to a politically conservative and positivistic notion of information provision, with no imagined 
corresponding influence over policy or policy networks. The European Parliament, NGOs and by 
actors within the EEA hada far more ambitious view of the role of information in society. 
Waterton and Wynne touch upon the idea that within one policy-making structure, divergent 
ideas can exist of the relationship between science and policy. 
In a case study on policy-making on the European !eve! in relation to the North Sea, Elliot and 
Ducrotny also conclude that decision-makers stili have positivist tendencies. Generally, there is a 
9 
demand far over-simplification of reality (this can also be seen as an emphasis on infarrnation) 
and intolerance when environmental experts cannot give precise answers. Decision-makers 
according to the authors prefer to remain ignorant to variability. 19 
Clearly, there is no single model far the role of expertise in policy-making. Based on the 
different views above, three general relationships can be established to serve as a basis far 
further reflection in this paper. 
Competitors: The relationship of experts and policy-makers may be deterrnined by a system of 
competition in which the scientists are placed on equal faoting with other stakeholders outside of 
the policy-process, such as NGOs, in one forum as stated by Brickman. in this relationship the 
claim to guardianship of science is denied and a more constructivist pos iti on is assumed. Science 
on the other hand may also have to compete with the policy-maker himself in controversial 
policy-issues. Here, the policy-maker will have to clarify itself to the public and justify its 
decisions by countering contradictive arguments. 
Cııstomers: The policy-maker can ful fil the role of customer in that it uses the infarmation 
produced by experts as a basis for its policies. Here the more positivist assumption is apparent in 
that science and policy-making are separate domains. In this relationship variations may exist 
based on whether the expert works on the wing of the policy-maker, or is completely 
independent, as well as the extent to which expertise is used far political purposes (pick and 
choose) or farmalized. 
Partners: Policy-maker and expert may be partnersin their responsibility to create sound and 
grounded policies that are legitimized to the public. Here both a positivist and constructivist 
point of view can be maintained. The dispersion of knowledge to public both by policy-maker 
and experts can be a way in which this partnership is realized. 
19 Ducrotoy, J.P., & Elliott, M. (1997). Interrelations between Science and Policy-making: The North-Sea Example. 
Marine Pollution Bu/lelin, Vol. 34, No. 9, pp. 686-701. Elsevier Science. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter concisely described the relationship between expertise and policy-making as it is 
being set out in academic literature. Positivism and social constructivism each have a different 
view of what this role should be like, and what science can contribute to policy-making. in 
general, the definition between expertise and policy-making can be described as partners, 
customer, or competitors. üne the bas is of this literary review an interesting question comes up 
which should be taken into consideration in the course of the empirical research. 
1. Can the relationship between future exploration and policy-making in the EU be 
described along the !ine of partners, customers or competitors? 
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2. FUTURE EXPLORATION AND POLICY-MAKING 
Literature on future exploration and policy-making is not available excessively. This is nota 
negative point, because although existing literature may not be sufficient to establish a 
theoretical framework for this study, it leaves plenty of room for new insights and 
interpretations. The aim of this chapter is therefore not to establish a framework for 
interpretations, but rather to give an overview of existing research which may come in handy in 
the positioning of later findings, as well as give insight to my own earlier insights. 
The limited amount of literature available on the topic leads one to consider also the studies of 
national cases. Among these, the Netherlands seems to be the most studied. The relationship 
between future exploration and policy-making was established in the Netherlands in the 1970 
and has since then been institutionalized. 
The first section ofthis chapter will consider different kinds of future exploration. Much ofthe 
literature on the use of future exploration and policy-making and the challenges involved 
however focuses on one specific type, namely scenarios. The focus of the study is on long-term 
future explorations. Within this field, it allows fora more general approach to the relation 
between future exploration and policy-making and does not seek to maintain this distinction al 
along. In many cases it is possible to generalize to ali long-term future explorations. 
2.1 What is future exploration? 
Van der Staal describes the practice of future exploration as 
'the research of facts and knowledge about important developments in the environment, 
society and science, in order to make reasonable statements about possible developments 
based on specified methods and expertise, which, under certain conditions and with a certain 
probability will take place ata specified point in the future, with the eventual aim of reducing 
uncertainty about the future' .20 
20 Van der Staal, P .M. ( 1988). Toekomstonderzoek en wetenschap: over de grondslagen van wetenschappelijke 
methoden en technieken van toekomstonderzoek. Delft: Delft University Press. p. 3. 
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Van Asselt puts if more simply by stating that future explorations try to imagine the uncertain 
and unknown future in a consistent manner. 21 Future exploration can take place along a wide 
spectrum of time-horizons; the future is by definition endless. Van Asselt distinguishes between 
three main types of future explorations, namely long-term explorations, essayistic 
contemplations, and diagnoses of today. The !arter can be used asa base ofthinking about the 
future, but make no statements about the future themselves. The focus of this study is on long-
term explorations, so the first two will be left aside for the moment. 
It is important to distinguish between two types of future explorations: 
• Scenarios: A scenario is a consistent view ahead on potential future developments. Not one 
single development is anticipated, but rather a number of altematives are positioned next to 
each other. A scenario comes into existence by elaborating on how a number of existing 
trends will develop and possibly influence each other in the future. Scenarios by definition 
look into the far future, so decades ahead, and asses developments over a broad domain. 
• Forecasts: Generally speaking, forecasting takes as its point of departure the development of 
a relatively small number of very issue-specific factors. With this it implies the existence of 
closed systems. 
Godet argues that forecasting studies do not do justice to the complexity of our society. 
Organizations and systems never stand in isolation of the rest of the world. According to Godet, 
scenario studies have become more popular recently because they are the answer to the questions 
forecasting has left untouched, namely those related to the bigger picture. 22 
in addi ti on, one can distinguish between explorative and normative methods of exploration. in 
general, explorative studies have the aim of objectively exploring the future through trend 
analysis. At large, they are value-free, and meant asa tool for awareness rather than policy-
making. In the normative approach, a wished for situations is taken as a point of departure for the 
development of scenarios. These thus have as their objective to realize a certain goal. Among the 
literature on scenarios, use ofthe 'term' normative is somewhat confusing. Godet refers to 
normative in relation to scenarios that take an envisaged point as their point of departure, 
21 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Van Asselt, M. (2005). Houdbaarheid verstreken: 
Toekomstverkenning en beleid. Den Haag. p. 11. 
22 Godet, M. ( 1991 ). Actors' Moves and Strategies: the Mactor Method. Futııres Julyl August 1991, pp. 605-622. 
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whereas others also use it for scenarios which serve asa basis for strategic policy-choices. Van 
Notten argues that normative scenarios are more suitable for application in policy-advice.23 Most 
scenarios show normative and explorative tendencies. 
De Wilde makes a similar distinction in his differentiation between ' passive' and 'active' 
exploration. Passive explorations are expectations about the future which have no intention of 
changing it. The simplest version of this is the weather forecast. Active exploration is apparent in 
promises, wishes and prophecies. Active exploration is also referred to in relation to exploring 
the future in order to sustain a certain agenda, for example in order to receive funds for research. 
Even more so, explorations as a basis for policy-making are also referred to as active, because 
even though the exploration in itself may be passive, the aim ofthe study is to lead the 
discussion on the future ofa certain policy area.24 
A future exploration is thus a construct of thought about a reality that has not come into 
existence yet.25 Such a construct of thought may be created in a number of ways. The approach 
toward the acquired information as part of the research is determined beforehand and 
characterised by rationality and objectivity.26 The method of coming to a future exploration may 
be more forma! or intuitive. Intuitive methods creative thinking and panel discussion play a big 
role. An example of this is the Delphi method in which a panel of experts was asked to make a 
number of statements about the future and come to a consensus about them. The idea behind this 
method is that explorations created by a group of experts are more trustworthy than those created 
by individuals.27 A more structured intuitive method is one used by the Dutch Bureau of 
Economic Policy Analysis in creating long-term future explorations. First, the policy-question is 
determined. Then, uncertainties which are important in order this question are acquired. Various 
possibilities for these uncertain factors are then combined along a 2, 2 axis system and 
accordingly, a number of scenarios are developed. 
23 Van Notten, P. W. F. (2005). Writing on the Wall: Scenario development in times of discontinuity. Boca Rotan, 
FL: Dissertation.com. 
24 De Wilde, R. (2000). De Voorspellers: een kritiek op de toekomstindustrie. Amsterdam: De Balie. p. 17. 
25 Vlaamse Overheid. (2005). Verkennen van de toekomst met scenarios. Brussels. 
26 Van der Staal, P.M. (1988). Toekomstonderzoek en wetenschap: over de grondslagen van wetenschappelijke 
methoden en technieken van toekomstonderzoek. Delft: Delft University Press. p. 3. 
27 De Wilde, R. (2000). De Voorspellers: een kritiek op de toekomstindustrie. Amsterdam: De Balie. p. 62. 
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The more forma! methods of coming to a future exploration are grounded in structured trend 
analysis and scenario development. In this case trends are schematically depicted through 
systematic analyses and given a grade on the basis of their relation to each other. Often here the 
cross-impact matrix is used, which calculates on the basis of matrices a number of most likely 
combinations of developments. These then form the basis far scenarios. 
The difficulty about future exploration remains that the future is obscure by definition, no matter 
what efforts are made to forecast it. A shared aim of future explorations is to reduce or address 
this uncertainty, in most cases to serve policy.28 In reality, it is never possible to eliminate 
uncertainty about the future; future explorations are not predictions, they are explorations of 
possibilities.29 A large number of decisi ve factors may ha ve been taken into account, but it is 
impossible to predict which factor will carry the most weight in future developments. Van Asselt 
wams that even those studies which seem ' scientific', 'consistent' and ' quantitative' do not by 
definition offer more certainty about the future. 
Closely related to the problem of uncertainty about the future is the lack of proof far the 
effectiveness of future exploration. There is no proof that conducting future exploration leads to 
berter policy-making. in his evaluation of explorations produced by the Dutch Central Planning 
Office, Hers concludes that the amount of studies which later turns out to be true is rather 
disappointing. 30 Van der Staal refers to a study conducted by Ascher in which he states that in 
general most future explorations do not !ive up to empirical testing. 31 
2.2 The (potential) role of future exploration in policy-making 
The use of scenarios in the public sector started in the 1960s. 32 Schoonenboom argues that 
scenarios have become more important to policy-making in the !ast three decades. A policy-
making sector that wants to be on the map has to be involved in creating scenarios. An increased 
28 Schoonenboom, I.J. (2003). Toekomstscenario 's en beleid. Beleid en Maatschappij, 30, 4, p. 216; Van Asselt, M., 
Van 't Klooster, M.,& Notten, P. (2003). Verkennen in onzekerheid. Beleid en Maatschappij, 30, 4, p. 234. 
29 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Van Asselt, M. (2005). Houdbaarheid verstreken: 
Toekomstverkenning en beleid. Den Haag. 
30 Hers, J.F.P. (1993). De voorspelkwaliteit van de middel-lange termijn prognoses van het CPB. The Hague: 
Central Planning Office. 
31 Van der Staal, P.M. (1988). Toekomstonderzoek en wetenschap: over de grondslagen van wetenschappelijke 
methoden en technieken van toekomstonderzoek. Delft: Delft University Press. p. 3. 
32 Ringland, G. (2002) . Scenarios in Public Policy. Chicester: Wiley. 
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sense of insecurity seems to be at the root of this. Ringland equally states that 'scenarios have 
become well-established in the public sector' .33 in a general guidebook for using scenarios in 
public policy, she even goes as far as to say that strategy based on the knowledge and insight of 
scenarios is more likely to succeed, encouraging policy-makers to take up interest in the future. 
According to Schoonenboom, in the non-profit sector, scenarios can be specifically used as input 
in the policy-making process by giving impulses to policy-change. in addition scenarios may be 
used to explore the social basis for a range of policy issues, or to bring together stakeholders in 
the discussion of these issues. In this latter case, the scenario then hasa communicative or even 
consensus-building function . Scenarios can contribute to interactive policy-making by 
strengthening dialogue and debate. 34 They can also be used as an educational tool to help policy-
makers think outside the box. Obviously the demands placed on a scenario depend on the 
function it has.35 The goals that future explorative research can serve according to the Stuurgroep 
Toekomstonderzoek en Strategisch Omgevingsbeleid are: agenda-setting and generating options; 
coalition shaping; vision shaping; prior anticipation of policy effects; enlarging the leaming 
capabilities of the organization; and changing the ideas the organization has about its own role. 
2.3 Challenges of future exploration in policy-making 
Although the use of scenarios by policy-makers has become more popular, according to 
Schoonenboom, they fınd very little resonance in policy.36 In the literature different possible 
reasons are brought forward for this. A number of difficulties in the compatibility of future 
explorations and policy-making come to the fore. 
The use of long-term scenarios requires policy-makers to thinking ahead and taking decisions 
which might not pay off until a long time ahead. In a dissertation on the use of long-term 
scenarios in the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Dobbinga concludes that the use of scenarios 
requires taking risks, and is a daring choice. Dobbinga touches upon the selective sharing of 
information, and the fact that this does not combine well with the fact that for scenarios, 
collective thinking is needed to get a bigger picture. According to Dobbinga, information is only 
33 Ringland, G. (2002) . Scenarios in Public Policy. Chicester: Wiley. 
34 Schoonenboom, I.J. (2003). Toekomstscenario 's en beleid. Beleid en Maatschappij, 30, 4, pp. 212-218 
35 Schoonenboom, I.J. (2003). Toekomstscenario' sen beleid. Beleid en Maatschappij, 30, 4, pp. 212-218 
36 Schoonenboom, I.J. (2003). Toekomstscenario 's en beleid. Beleid en Maatschappij, 30, 4, pp. 212-218. 
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shared if this will help an individual advance politically. Politicians are always subject to 
electoral pressures, which make them unlikely to make path breaking decisions and risk their 
image of reliability. 
This links up directly with another point made by Schoonenboom who touches upon the second 
methodological challenge by stating that policy-makers do not want uncertainty, but rather a 
foundation for current policy based on arguments. In essence policy-makers always choose the 
plan that brings along the least change. These observations are based ona report of the 
Stuurgroep Toekomstonderzoek en strategisch Omgevingsbeleid, in which the effect of future 
studies on policy-making is evaluated. 37 Schoonenboom argues that scenarios often have no 
relation to today, and expect policy-makers therefore to ignore the current state of affairs. For 
policy-makers to make path breaking decisions the realization is needed that 'one cannot 
continue like this' . 
Another postulated incompatibility between future explorations and policy-making arises from 
the mode of policy-making, which has shifted in recent years from classical steering to condition 
setting steering. In scenario-thinking a bird 's eye view of society is assumed. In order to properly 
use scenario, a similar way of steering society should be used. An example of classical steering 
can be found at the hasis of Kahn and Wiener's early work on the topic in The year 2000. Here 
they state that ' the aim of policy research is not only to ant icipate the future and make the 
desirable more likely and the undesirable less likely, but also to deal with whatever future 
actually arises, to be able to alleviate the bad and exploit the good. At the bas is of this statement 
is the classical view of steering, implying that governments are able to change society 
completely with policy-decisions. The answer to the uncertainty about the future according to 
these authors is therefore also ' flexibility in programs and systems'. According to de Wilde, top-
down classical steering is no more, and has been replaced by a system in which society has 
become self-regulating. The task of policy-makers is to set the conditions for this self-regulation, 
but it simply no longer has the influence to change society as a whole. The creatability of society 
has become a contested concept. 38 Even more so, because national policy-making has become 
increasingly entangled between higher (EU) and lower (regional) levels of policy-making. On 
37 Stuurgroep Toekomstonderzoek en strategisch Omgevingsbeleid. (2000). Terugblik op toekomstverkenningen. 
W erkdocument 1. Den Haag. 
38 Creatability is a translation by author ofthe Dutch concept 'maakbaarheid'. 
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the EU !eve!, policy-making is subject to national and regional agendas in tum. De Wilde argues 
there is no hope for future-thinking now that we have left the domain of classical steering. 
According to de Wilde, the general shift to more quantitative information in expertise used for 
policy-making is also apparent in future explorations. References to numbers and models here 
are also asa rhetorical device to create an image of future explorations being scientifically 
grounded. 39 Dammers on the other hand states the opposite, namely that scenarios are often 
formulated in qualitative and general terms, and insufficiently meet the needs of those who need 
to make policy and find supporting arguments for it. in the case of the energy scenarios 
researched by Dammers, VNO hardly took the scenarios into account precisely because of the 
lack of attention these scenarios paid to the cost aspect of the different energy-options, which 
made the discussion too non-committal and not suitable to function as a basis for real 
conclusions.40 The Stuurgroep Toekomstonderzoek en Strategisch Omgevingsbeleid makes yet 
another observation, namely that politicians prefer a ' foggy ' playing field and are less interested 
in objective, quantitative methods as a basis for creating clarity around political issues. A ' foggy' 
playing field is more attractive for the political game. 
Different authors claim that the world of policy-makers is inherently different from the world of 
future explorers. Future explorers are too focused on the pseudo-scientific character of their work 
by attending to logical consistency and plausibility, while at the same time focusing on the long 
term. Policy-makers on the other hand are more interested in supporting existing or intended 
policy in the short run.41 
Schoonenboom argues that future explorations are too holistic, and that by trying to take into 
account a broad spectrum, the interface with the policy-issue at hand becomes ever smaller.42 On 
the one hand, the creators of future exp lorations state that too little use is made of the 
39 De Wilde, R. (2000). De Voorspellers : een kritiek op de toekomstindustrie. Arnsterdam: De Balie. p.19. 
40 Dammers, E. (2000). Le ren van de toekomst. Over de rol van scenario 's bij strategische beleidsvorming. 
Dissertation Universiteit Leiden. Delft: Uitgeverij Eburon. 
41 Bakker, Wieger (2003). Scenario's tussen rationaliteit, systeemdwang en politieke rede. Beleid en Maatschappij, 
2003, nr. 4, pp. 219-229. 
42 Schoonenboom, I.J. (2003). Toekomstscenario 's en beleid. Beleid en Maatschappij, 30, 4, pp. 212-218. 
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explorations in policy. On the other hand, policy-makers find that future explorations remain too 
general and have too little relations with the actual policy-issue at hand. 43 
More structural specificities of future explorations may alsa account fora certain extent 
incompatibility between policy-making and future exploration. Future explorations are generally 
different from ' normal ' expertise in that they examine a situation that is not existent yet. 
Schoonenboom states that the weakness of many of these studies is that this shortcoming is 
insufficiently recognized by suggesting too much certainty of what is explored.44 Van Asselt 
touches upon three methodological challenges of future explorations, namely uncertainty, 
discontinuity, and the plurality of images.45 it is argued that recognizing these challenges and 
exploring ways to incorporate them into research would improve the usefulness of the studies. In 
her paper, she poses that these challenges are insufficiently met, and that instead a tendency 
toward certainty, continuity, and single images is apparent. She does not go as far as to suggest a 
relationship between these shortcomings and the role future explorations seek in policy-making, 
but it is not unthinkable, especially with regard to uncertainty and plurality of images that 
meeting these challenges would imply widening the gap between policy-making and future 
exploration. Looking at it from the other side, largely positivist policy-makers might be turned 
off by the availability of plurality and uncertainty, and find it difficult to unite this kind of 
expertise with their view of ' science ' . 
2.4 Who explores the future? 
A large part of the relationship between future exploration and policy-making is determined by 
the actual agencies and institutions conducting these two practices. Above, it is implicitly 
assumed that future explorations are conducted by bodies independent of the policy-maker. In 
the Netherlands on which most of the literature is based, this is the case, but it should not be 
taken as a given. The policy-maker himself may also very well engage in creating scenarios. The 
policy-maker may assume a number of roles with regard to future exploration. it may ensure the 
practice of future exploration by instating independent bodies and setting their agenda. Secondly 
43 Dammers, E. (2000). Leren van de toekomst. Over de rol van scenario 's bij strategische be/eidsvorming. 
Dissertation Universiteit Leiden. Delft: Uitgeverij Eburon. 
44 Schoonenboom, I.J. (2003). Toekomstscenario's en beleid. Be/eid en Maatschappij, 30, 4, p. 213 . 
45 Van Asselt, M., Van ' t Klooster, M.,& Notten, P. (2003). Verkennen in onzekerheid. Beleid en Maatschappij, 30, 
4, pp. 230-241. 
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it may give direct impetus for future exploration when a problem arises. According to Scapolo, 
foresight exercises are often undertaken when a govemment faces a specific challenge.46 This 
implies a commissioning role ofthe policy-maker in the creating of future explorations. And 
thirdly, the policy-maker may conduct the future explorations himself, or include a future 
explorative body directly into the policy-making cycle. 
A better integration of future exploration and policy-making may sol ve a number of the above 
issues. Schoonenboom argues that the solution to the gap between both lies in the integration of 
policy-makers in the future explorative process. With this he does not imply that policy-makers 
should conduct this practice themselves. Van der Staal goes even further by suggesting that in an 
ideal situation, the policy makers would conduct al! future research themselves; since they are 
best aware of the purpose the study will serve.47 According to him, it is only due to their lack of 
time and expertise that they pass the task to experts. However, it is arguable that the positive side 
of this is a certain degree of neutrality of the study, although especially when studies are 
conducted for the sake of policy this should not be overestimated. 
2.5 Prior insights 
In earlier research on the topic I myself developed some insights on the relationship between 
future exploration and policy-making on the bas is of case studies of the Netherlands, Belgi um 
and the European policy-making system. This research was very limited and explorative, and 
therefore not suited to serve asa serious theoretical hasis for this study. However, since it 
inspired me to investigate the topic in more detail in this study, and therefore to some extent 
serves as a point of departure, it is only fair to share these insights. 
The objective of this study was to investigate how anticipation ofthe future is part ofthe policy-
making process on European and national !eve! and what kind of reflection it receives in policy-
documents. For this, I explored for the three case studies which bodies conduct future 
exploration and how these future explorations are in tum reflected in policy-papers. 
46 Scapolo, F. (2005). Far Learn. IPTS, Seville Spain. 
47 Van der Staal , P .M. ( 1988). Toekomstonderzoek en wetenschap: over de grondslagen van wetenschappelijke 
methoden en technieken van toekomstonderzoek. Delft: Delft University Press. 
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I found that future explorative studies in two of the EU member states, Belgi um and the 
Netherlands were very well institutionalized in independent bodies receiving their mandate from 
the policy-maker (i .e. the government) and producing future explorations far the sole purpose of 
founding policy. This can be described through a linear model. 
Fig. 2.1 Linear model future anticipation - policy-making 
Incentive: Institution: Institution: 
Legislation Independent Policy maker 
Historical ' habit ' forecasting Exploration 
Policy maker aQencv document 
.. 
-~ 
Process: Process: 
Future Policy 
exploration preparation for 
narliament 
Within the European Commission however, this practice does not seem to be the same. Instead 
policy-making and the practice of future exploration seem to be more intertwined, as depicted in 
the model below. 
Fig. 2.2 Intertwined model future anticipation - policy-making 
Institution : 
Policy maker 
Process : 
Policy preparation 
fo r parliament 
Exploration document 
Institution: 
Policy maker 
Process : 
Future exploration 
In these two models, three variables in the relationship between policy-making and future 
exploration come to the fore. 
1. Who conducts future explorations? 
2. What is the incentive for future exploration? 
3. Where in the policy-making process do they take place? 
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With regard to the Dutch and Belgian case, future explorations were conducted mainly by 
extemal agencies, whose mandate came directly from the policy-maker. The studies themselves 
took place either by specific request, or based ona research agenda for periodical future 
explorations. The order of events was such that future exploration was always conducted prior to 
policy-making. 
In the case of the European Commission, the impression was at least invoked that the process of 
future exploration and policy-making is more cyclical. Firstly, the incentive to conduct future 
explorations seems to result more from a direct need for this, so when specific policy issues 
arise. Future exploration does not necessarily take place at the beginning of policy-making, but 
can be requested as one of the stages in the process itself. Secondly, future exploration was often 
not contracted out to other parties. in many cases they took place within the policymaking unit 
itself. 
The findings of this prior study are not sufficient to serve asa bas is for this study. To a certain 
extent this study seeks to re-examine more thoroughly this relationship on the European !eve!. 
What we can take from this prior study is the three abovementioned questions as a basis for 
further research. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The focus of this study is on the role of long-term future explorations in policy-making. This 
chapter brought forward that there are different kinds of long-term future explorations and that a 
variety of methods are used to establish them. The role of future exploration in the policy-
process depends on the relationship between the creators of the two; which can be captured in a 
single or two different entities. There are a number of challenges in the relationship between 
future exploration and policy-making, based on incompatibilities between modes of policy-
making, demands placed on in put for policy-making and specific characteristics of future 
explorative studies. On the bas is of the above, one additional question comes to mind which 
might be considered in the course of the analysis: 
1. Although perhaps only shortly elaborated upon it may be interesting to find out whether 
different forms of future exploration (scenarios, forecasts, foresights) are differently used 
in the policy-process. 
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3. ENLARGEMENT 
in the earliest stages of the European Community, enlargement was already an important 
objective: 
The high contracting parties, determined to !ay the foundation for an ever-closer union among the peoples of 
Europe, resolved to ensure the economic and social progress oftheir countries by common action to eliminate the 
barriers which divitle Europe . .. and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join their 
efforts. (Preamble to the Treaty ofRome) 
The EU Treaty specifies the basic procedure for enlargement, and the EU developed the specific 
rules to conduct accession negotiations in its subsequent enlargements. Since the field that this 
study seeks to explore is policymaking in the field of EU enlargement, the aim of this chapter is 
to give an overview of the playing field and identify the main actors and processes involved in 
enlargement. 
3.1 A special kind of policy 
EU enlargement policy is different from any other kind of EU policy. in essence, it is nota 
policy in its own right and it does not have a single location in the policy process. The EU's 
enlargement policy has very particular characteristics. it is a broad policy framework that draws 
on policies in a broad range of issue areas. This is what Sedelmeier refers to asa 'composite 
policy' .48 A composite policy has two dimensions: a ' macro-policy', and a range of distinctive 
' meso-policies '. The macro-policy concems the overall objectives and parameters ofpolicy. in 
the case of enlargement, this would be decisions about the broad framework and which 
instruments to use. The meso-policies translate these broader objectives into substantive policy 
outputs. This dimension concems specific decisions about the 'setting' of the policy instruments 
in the various policy areas that are part of the composite policy. in the case of enlargement, these 
decisions set for example the extent and speed of trade liberalization in particular sectors or the 
length of transition periods in particular areas. A key characteristic of composite policy is that 
different groups of policy-makers have the lead for its different components. The policy-makers 
responsible for the macro-policy include officials in the Commission's DG for Enlargement and 
48 Sedelmeider, U. (2005) . Eastem Enlargement: Towards a European EU? In H. Wallace, W. Wallace, & M. 
Pollack. (Eds.), Policy-making in the European Union. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 402. 
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its Commissioner, as well as the officials of the Member States foreign ministries. These make 
the major decisions conceming enlargement. Decision-making competences for the various 
meso-policies rest with sectoral policy-makers. 
The focus of this study is the macro-policy of enlargement. This chapter, as well as the rest of the 
study will therefore focus on the process and players on this !eve!, while only occasionally 
referring to the meso-level. The chapter on methodology will elaborate further on how the data 
were selected on the hasis on this distinction. 
Another distinct characteristic of EU enlargement policy is that the decision-making takes place 
on the intergovemmental !eve!. The Commission mainly plays an advisory, and to a limited 
extent initiating role, but the important decisions lie with the Council. Consequently, domestic 
foreign policy considerations of the Member States play an important role in the process. Hu bel 
rightly observes that the policy with regard to enlargement is a three-level game. On the first 
!eve!, the public and the policy objectives within the Member States have an important role in 
determining the stance of the Member State, which is brought forward on the second level, of 
Member States and EU institutions. Only when on this second level a certain degree of 
consensus is reached, results can be booked on the third level, between the EU and its 
candidate.49 Far the sake of simplicity this study focuses on the second and third level, and 
leaves the domestic considerations of the Member States aside, treating them as a black box. 
This it can do, because it is not primarily concemed with the outcome of the negotiations, but 
more with the process as such. The chapter on methodology will further elaborate on this. 
3.2 Why enlarge? 
Aside from the ideological motive for enlargement of creating an ever-closer union and 
spreading progress on the European continent, there are more practical reasons why the EU 
chooses to enlarge, and why non-members seek for membership, hereby giving up part of their 
cherished sovereignty. 
Far the EU, the following benefits are worth highlighting: 
49 Hubel, H. (2004). The EU's Three-level Game in Dealing with its Neighbours. European Foreign Ajfairs Review, 
9, pp. 347-362. 
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• Enlargement offers economic opportunities for the EU and its member states. New member 
states add to the internal market of the EU, and allows for better allocation ofresources. 
• The EU's role and weight asa global actor are enhanced by enlargement. A wide Europe 
possesses a larger internal market and a greater share of world trade and thus has a larger 
voice in international commercial and economic affairs. 
• Enlargement makes the EU more secure by spreading stability and prosperity to its 
neighbours. 
For the candidate, the following factors often play a role in the application: 
• Accession to the EU in many cases is expected to bring economic advancement, resulting 
from the EU's four freedoms (free movement of goods, persons, services and capital). 
• The EU is also perceived to bring security guarantees. 
• EU membership allows participation in the decision-making of the major force in Europe, 
which is not available through trade agreements alone . 
• The accession process to the EU often serves as an anchor for domestic reforms and the 
improvements of social standards. 
in addition of the above, there are the costs of non-enlargement, which are generally more 
applicable to the candidate than to the EU. As more neighbours join the EU, the disadvantages 
of being outside the Union will increase.50 
3.3 Process and players 
The enlargement process is anchored in the basic provisions of the EU treaties and established by 
the experience of pervious enlargements. Initially, the expansion ofthe Community was subject 
only to the condition that applicants be 'European'. It was Article 49 of the 1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty which added as further membership conditions the criteria mentioned in Article 6.1 TEU, 
i.e. the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
the rule of law. It, however, neither provides a defınition of Europe, nor attempts to define 
Europe ' s geographical boundaries. Beyond the respect for basic democratic and human rights 
50 Henderson, K. (2000). The Challenges of EU Eastward Enlargement. Jnternational Politics, 37, pp. 1-17. 
25 
principles, it also does not specify the political and economic conditions for membership. These 
conditions were first defıned by the June 1993 Copenhagen summit, which declared: 
'Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities; ... a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive 
pressure and market forces within the Union; [and] the ability to take on the obligations of 
membership including adherence to the aims ofpolitical, economic and monetary union'. 51 
[and] 
'The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European 
integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the 
candidate countries' . 52 
Nor, except in a very imprecise fashion, do the EU treaties specify the formal procedures of the 
enlargement process. The procedures ha ve evolved over the course of successive enlargements, 
however, and are by now well established. 
Box l: Enlargement - the procedure in short 
• Application submitted to the Council of Ministers 
• Commission opinion on candidate 
• Unanimous Council decision to start accession negotiations 
• First phase of accession negotiations ( conducted by the Commission): screening of 
the candidate ability to apply the acquis and identifying potential controversial 
issues for negotiations. 
• Council conducts accession negotiations on the basis of common positions by 
Council and Commission 
• Endorsement of accession treaty by Council (unanimity), Commission, and EP 
(simple majority) 
• Ratifıcation of accession treaty by applicant and member states. 
The enlargement process begins with the forma! application for membership ofa non-member 
state. As specified in Article 49 of the TEU, this application is made to the Council of the 
5 1 European Commission, Directorate General for Information. (1995). ' European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 
June 1993: Presidency Conclusions', in The Eııropean Coııncils, Conclıısions ofthe Presidency, 1992-1994. 
Brussels. p. 86. 
52 Commission ofthe European Communities. (1993) Bulletin ofthe Eııropean Communities, Vol. 26, No. 6. p. 13 . 
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European Union (see Box 2). The decision to apply is an autonomous decision of the applicant 
country. After forma! application, the next major step is the Commission Opinion (avis). The 
Opinion is a detailed analysis of the preparedness of the applicant country for membership, 
especially its ability to take on the acquis communautaire. it furthermore identifies any problems 
for the EU that might result from the applicant country's membership. The Opinion is nota legal 
prerequisite for beginning accession negotiations but is meant to assist the Council is making its 
own decision on the application. However, it is customary for the Council to wait for the 
Commission to deliver its Opinion before deciding to open negotiations. Because it identifies the 
main issues to be dealt with in the accession negotiations, the Opinion can also exert an 
important shaping influence on the negotiations. After receiving the Commission's Opinion, the 
Council can decide by unanimity to open accession negotiations with the applicant state. This is 
a crucial decision, since the opening of accession negotiations involves a substantial commitment 
of resources by the EU and its Member States. The decision to begin entry negotiations also 
launches a politically diffıcult process, as attention now shifts to concrete issues, problems and 
interests. 
Box 2: The European Council 
The European Council, which meets in nine different configurations and is made up of the 
ministers of the member states of the subjects being examined, has the most decision-making 
power in the accession process. The Member States are the parties to the accession 
negotiations on the EU side. The Council of General Affairs and Extemal Relations 
(GAERC) is responsible for enlargement issues. The other configurations may discuss 
specific topics during the negotiation process. The most important decisions in the process, 
such as the commitment to start accession negotiations, and the final decision to accept the 
Accession Treaty, are made at the !eve! of heads of states and governments. 
The European Council is also represented in the Association Council which is sometimes part 
of the Pre-accession strategy. 
in order to ease the path to accession the Council may decide to develop a pre-accession strategy. 
The pre-accession strategy targets support towards the specific needs of the candidate country as 
it prepares for accession. in this way, the EU focuses support towards the priorities identified by 
the Commission and the candidate. The key instruments of the pre-accession strategy are 
Association Agreements, Accession Partnerships, National Programmes for the Adoption of the 
Acquis and pre-accession financial assistance instruments. Association Agreements in particular 
may already be concluded with a third state even if accession is nota defined objective yet. in 
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the preparation and execution of these instruments from the side of the EU, the Commission 
plays an important role. 
The accession negotiations are essentially an intergovemmental conference between the Member 
States and the individual applicant country. They are therefore different from other EU 
negotiations with third parties, which are usually led by the Commission acting on a negotiating 
mandate granted by the Council. Before beginning the 'Accession Conference', the Council 
adopts forma! negotiating procedures. These procedures have become fairly standard. The 
Council is responsible for developing ' common positions' on ali problems posed by the 
accession negotiations. These common positions are decided by the Council by unanimity, on the 
basis of proposals submitted by the Commission (see Box 3). For matters related to CFSP and 
JHA - since these are intergovemmental pillars not involving a forma! policy role for the 
Commission - the Member State holding the Presidency makes the basic proposals for common 
positions, although the other Member States and the Commission are invited to submit proposals 
as well. Much of the work in preparing common positions is actually done by the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER). 
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Box 3: The European Commission 
The European Commission carries out the screening exercise with the applicants, conducts 
the negotiations and draws up draft negotiating positions for the Member States. The 
Commission also monitors the progress made by candidate countries and checks whether the 
commitments they made during negotiations have been followed in practice. The Council has 
requests the Commission to provide detailed annual assessments of the candidate state's 
progress towards fulfilling the accession criteria, the 'Regular Reports'. 
The European Commission is involved in the enlargement process with the following sub-
divisions: 
• The Directorate General for Enlargement 
The DG Enlargement is the unit within the Commission politically responsible for 
enlargement. To a large extent the documents brought forward by the Commission with 
regard to enlargement are produced by this DG. If they are not produced directly by the 
DG, in many cases they're a product ofa close cooperation between this DG and others. 
• Delegation of the Commission to the Candidate Country 
On the diplomatic and political !eve! the Delegation represents the Commission and 
serves as a contact point between authorities of the candidate country and the decision-
makers at the Commission headquarters in Brussels. it is the channel for day-to-day 
relations between the Commission and the candidate, and reports to Brussels on the latest 
political, economic and commercial developments. The Delegation monitors the 
implementation of the reforms undertaken by the Turkish govemment in the light of the 
EU acquis and the accession partnership's short- and medium-term priorities. it also gives 
support to the establishment and development of the ful! operational capacity of the 
structures required for the management of EU-funded extemal assistance. 
The other DGs of the Commission are also involved in shaping specific policy in the process 
of enlargement. Depending on the stage of enlargement and pre-accession, the various DGs 
develop policy-tools in their own area, such as trade liberalization. These other DGs are part 
of what Sedelmeier refers to as the meso-structure. 
Negotiating sessions of the Accession Conference are generally held at the level of govemment 
ministers or ambassadors and are chaired by the EU presidency. Before the conference begins, 
there is an agreement on the specific chapters of the acquis communautaire that are to be 
negotiated. 
The accession negotiations have two main phases. The first, the analytical or 'exploratory' phase, 
involves an intensive screening of the acquis communautaire that is carried out by the 
Commission together with the applicant country. The purpose of this screening process is to 
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determine the extent to which the applicant can apply EU laws and regulations and what 
adjustments by the applicant might be necessary. The second, 'substantive' phase of the 
negotiations involves actual intergovemmental bargaining on the terms of entry and possible 
derogations and transitions. 
The two phases of the negotiations may overlap. As soon as the screening of one chapter of the 
acqııis is completed, the candidate countries submit their negotiating positions. The Commission 
then prepares a draft common position and submits it to the Council, which unanimously adopts 
a common position and decides, unanimously, to open the negotiation chapter. The negotiation 
of one chapter may thus start while the screening of other chapters is stili to be initiated. It is 
customary far the EU to start negotiations on those chapters of the acqııis which are considered 
easiest. 53 
The negotiations conclude with an agreement between the EU and the applicant country on a 
Draft Treaty of Accession, which is submitted to both the Council and the European Parliament. 
At this point, the Commission delivers another Opinion, in this case on the Accession Treaty. 
The Council must approve the treaty by unanimous vote, and the European Parliament (see Box 
4) must give its assent by simple majority. ünce these steps have occurred, the treaty is formally 
signed by the member states and the applicant country. The member states and the applicant 
country must then ratify the treaty - each according to its own constitutional rules and 
procedures. After final ratification, the treaty comes into effect in the appointed day of accession, 
on which date the applicant country officially becomes a member state of the EU. 
53 Falkner, G.,& Nentwich, M. (2001). Enlarging the European Union: The short-term success ofincrementalism 
and depoliticisation. In J. Richardson (Ed). , Power and policy-making. London and New York: Routledge. p. 260. 
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Box 4: The European Parliament 
Parliament's most significant power in respect of enlargement is to give its assent (Article 49 
TEU) before any country joins the EU. This power is exercised only at the final stage, once 
the negotiations ha ve been completed. However, in view of Parliament's key role, it has been 
in the interest of the other institutions to ensure its participation from the beginning, and 
especially the Commission has the' role to keep the European Parliament informed about the 
important stages of the accession process. The constitutional bas is for the cooperation 
between the European Parliament and the Commission is the Framework Agreement on 
relations between the European Parliament and the Commission, which was signed by the 
Presidents of the two institutions on 5 July 2000. 
Parliament also has a significant role to play with regard to the financial aspects of accession 
in its capacity as one ofthe two arms of the budgetary authority ofthe EU. in the European 
Parliament, it is the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which is responsible for coordinating the 
work on enlargement and ensuring consistency between the positions adopted by the 
Parliament and the activities of its specialist committees, as well as those of the joint 
parliamentary committees. 
Apart from adopting resolutions on the enlargement process, the progress of the candidates 
and the preparation and conclusions of the European Council, the European Parliament is 
involved in the enlargement process through the following: 
• The work ofthe Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and 
Defence Policy (AFET) 
AFET is the committee politically responsible for the institution's work on enlargement. 
This means that it produces drafts for the large majority of resolutions and 
recommendations of the Parliament. The committee coordinates the work of the EP 
Delegation to the Joint Parliamentary Committee. 
• The work of the Joint Parliamentary Committees established by the European Parliament 
Members of the European Parliament meet ona regular bas is with their counterparts from 
the candidate country within the Joint Parliamentary Committees. The relevant country 
rapporteur of the Foreign Affairs Committee attends the meetings. The JPC meetings take 
place twice a year in order to exercise parliamentary oversight of ali aspects of bilateral 
relations and to examine in detail the progress in the accession preparations and 
negotiations. Each JPC meeting is concluded by joint Declarations and Recommendations 
which reflect the progress achieved and the commitments for future work. 
• The work of the specialist committees 
The EP specialist committees nominate individual members to follow sector-specific 
enlargement issues. Their opinions are incorporated into the enlargement resolutions. As 
the negotiations move towards tackling the most difficult negotiating chapters, the various 
specialist committees of the European Parliament become increasingly involved in 
monitoring the process of negotiations in the policy areas for which they are responsible 
and the administrative capacity of the candidates to implement the acquis. Som etim es, 
committees send delegations on fact-finding missions to a candidate country, or organize 
a special hearing ona specific issue. 
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The outcome of the accession process is essentially predetermined: full acceptance of the acquis 
by the applicant country, with the possibility of only limited derogations or transition periods for 
particular aspects of EU legislation. in addition, new member states are expected to the EU's 
evolving CFSP (acquis politique) and its long-term political union objective (jinalite politique).54 
The only altemative is premature ending of the negotiations and hence losing the perspective of 
accession. This brings us to one ofthe key characteristics of what Preston calls the EU's classical 
enlargement method, namely the inclination to shift adjustment burdens to the new members.55 
Due to the fact that member states have a major say in the process, there is a conservative bias 
against changes that are unfavourable to existing members. This is why the candidate can only 
enlist for incremental adaptation of the EU's institutional structure and does not really have the 
option to reformulate or renegotiate existing policies or instruments. According the Henderson 
this process, in which the discussions focus only on how and in what time-span the candidate is 
to adopt the rules of the EU, is highly un fit for the word 'negotiation' .56 
The length of accession negotiations may vary considerably. The most important factor affecting 
it is the preparedness of the applicant country. in a descriptive paper on enlargement, the 
European Parliament states that ' progress in the negotiations goes hand in hand with progress in 
incorporating the acquis into national legislation and actually implementing and enforcing it'.57 
Another factor is the nature and diffıculty of the issues to be negotiated by the Member States 
and the applicant. The intemal negotiations among the member states that are a precondition for 
negotiations with the applicant country are also. The EU's common positions in the accession 
negotiations must be decided by unanimity, and taking into consideration the variety of national 
agendas, this allows for lengthy negotiations among the member states. 
3.4 Challenges of enlargement 
Enlargement is hardly ever a smooth transition from non-membership to membership. The 
following two challenges are apparent in every enlargement. 
54 Baun, M.J. (2000). A Wider Europe. The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement. Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. p. 14. 
55 Preston, C. (1997). Enlargement and lntegration in the European Union. London: Routledge. 
56 Henderson, K. (2000). The Challenges of EU Eastward Enlargement. International Politics, 37, pp. 1-17. 
57 European Parliament (2003). The European Parliament in the Enlargement Process - an Overview. Brussels. 
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• Widening vs. deepening. 
Along with enlargement, or 'widening', 'deepening', or the intensification of integration of the 
EU's member states is a key dynamic of EU growth and development. The two concepts are 
not mutually exclusive, although many debates on the topic focus on a 'wider vs. deeper' 
discourse. 58 Ih fact, according to Mayes, deepening is needed to facilitate widening, as changes 
in the EU' s structures, decision-making and finances are needed to prevent it from becoming 
unworkable and unaffordable with the addition of new member states. 59 The accession of new 
member states puts strain on the existing structures of the EU, and in anticipation of this, 
deepening often takes place prior to a new enlargement. 
• The EU as a moving target. 
in the course of the EU' s existence, significant developments ha ve occurred within in the 
Union itself, making ita moving target for the outside world. The Union a candidate country 
applies to today is not longer the Community it was thirty or so years ago. The latest 
developments of the Union into a political entity have increased adaptive pressures on national 
politics and state structures in applicant countries.60 Due to the incremental nature of the EU, 
the target of membership becomes ever more demanding on the applicant. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The Enlargement policy of the EU is ofa special nature. This chapter has identifıed the main 
bodies on the macro-level in this process as the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament, 
and their sub-units specifically focused on enlargement (DG Enlargement, AFET, JPC, and 
GAERC). The process takes place at various levels, of which the 'European' levels will be 
considered further in this study. Furthermore it has given an overview of the process of 
enlargement and some of the motivations and challenges that play a role. 
On the basis of this chapter, some interesting questions arise which may be an addition to the 
main objectives of this study. 
58 Brainbridge, T. (2002). The Penguin Companion to European Union . (3'd. ed.). London: Penguin. p. 161. 
59 Mayes, D. (1998) . EU Enlargement. in A. El-Agraa, (Ed.), The European Union: History, Jnstitutions, Economics 
and Policies. London: Prentice Hali. p. 527. 
6
° Falkner, G.,& Nentwich, M. (2001) . Enlarging the European Union: The short-tenn success ofincrementalism 
and depoliticisation. in J. Richardson (Ed)., Power andpolicy-making. London and New York: Routledge. p. 263 . 
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1. Do the different bodies involved in the Enlargement process deal differently with 
exploration of the future or with the long term future in general? 
2. Do considerations about the future (forma! and informal) in relation to earlier 
enlargements play a role in the current enlargement? 
While proceeding into the analytical part of this study it might be interesting to keep these 
questions in mind. 
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4. THE TURKISH ACCESSION DOSSIER 
On October 3rd 2005, the European Council took time in its own hands by stopping the clocks. A 
promise made a year earlier to start accession negotiations on this very date made the approach 
of October 4 th an unacceptable future, since Turkish foreign minister Gül had not yet arrived at 
the scene. ünce he did, negotiations were started, and time was allowed to proceed again.61 
The start of accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey was a watershed in the relations 
between these two parties. in the light of the topic of this study, namely the Turkey-EU dossier 
in its entirety, this chapter seeks to explore the developments between Turkey and the EU 
leading up to this important watershed. in doing so, it will alsa address the most important 
documents in this dossier, as well as the considerations that lie at the heart of the debate. As the 
topic of research in confined to the European Union, this chapter will restrict itself largely to the 
European side of the story, leaving for example the structure ofthe Turkish negotiation team and 
the Turkish considerations for and against membership within the public and on diplomatic !eve! 
untouched for deliberate reasons. 
4.1 Chronology and important documents 
Turkey hasa history of association with Western values, which started in the !ast century of 
Ottoman reign and continued with the establishment of the Turkish republic. The lndependence 
War which took place after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was a political and military 
operation against the Westem states but was not against the Westem value system. Ataturk 
started radical revolutions to make Turkey a modem state and parallel to this, directed Turkey' s 
foreign policy towards the West. After the Second World War, when political, economic and 
social organizations started to take shape, Turkey pursued this orientation through membership 
ofthe Council ofEurope and OECD, and as one ofthe founding members ofNATO. Turkey 
alsa became a party to the European and most of the major UN human rights conventions, such 
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
61 Kanii, Y. (2005, October 9). Walls ofVienna couldn't stop Turks on the third attempt. Turkish Daily News, p. l . 
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Official relations between the EU and Turkey date back to 31 July 1959, when Turkey applied 
for associate membership under Article 237 ofthe Treaty of Rome of what was then the EEC, 
consisting of the six founding states. The application was accepted on 11 September of that same 
year, which indicates that the application was welcomed by the Community members. 
In March 1960 negotiations between the two entities started. After an incident of domestic 
turmoil following a coup d'etat in 1960, negotiations were resumed in 1962 and completed in the 
following year. The resulting Ankara Agreement was signed on 12 September 1963, resulting in 
Turkey being one of the first countries to be associated with the Community. The Association 
Agreement was an intemational agreement, based on the equality of both sides, and was signed 
by the EC as well as the individual Member States, and Turkey. The agreement contained both 
an economic and political vision. Asa comerstone, it aimed at the establishment of the customs 
union by 1995, and in three phases (Art. 2). In addition, it set the goal of free movement of 
persons, services and establishment by 1986 (Art. 12). Politically, it foresaw the possible 
accession of Turkey to the European Union in the future (Art. 28). 
The three stages envisaged in the establishment of the customs union were: 
• A five-year preparation period 
• A transition period (two separate periods of 12 and 22 years as of 1973) 
• A final period 
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Box 4.1: Turkey-EU accession dossier, most important events 
July31, 1959 Turkey applies for associate membership of the EEC (application 
accepted on September 11, 1959) 
September 12, 1963 Ankara Agreement (enters into force on December 1, 1964) 
November 13, 1970 Additional Protocol signed and annexed to the Ankara Agreement 
January 1982 European Community freezes relations with Ankara as result of 
military coup in 1980 
September 1986 Relations between EC and Turkey resumed 
April 14, 1987 Turkish application for full membership of the EEC 
December 18, 1989 Commission rejects Turkish application for fult membership, but 
recommends completion of the Customs Union 
December 31, 1995 EC and Turkey Customs Union agreement ( enters into force on 
January 1, 1996) 
December 12, 1997 Luxembourg summit - Turkey is not named asa candidate country (as 
a result Turkey suspends its political dialogue with the EU) 
December 1 O, 1999 Helsinki su mm it - Turkey is formally recognized as a candidate for 
membership 
March 8, 200 l EU-Turkey Accession Partnership adopted by Council 
December 12, 2002 Copenhagen summit - EU leaders agree to set a date for start of 
accession negotiations in December 2004 (a date fora date) 
December 17, 2004 Council decides to open accession talks with Turkey on October 3, 
2005 
October 3, 2005 Official start of negotiations (phase 1: screening) 
The Customs Union was thus originally agreed upon in the Ankara Association Agreement 
(1963), and the specifıcities of how it should unfold were elaborated upon in the Additional 
Protocol (1971 ). Furthermore, it excluded agricultural goods and only applied to industrial 
goods, and industrially processed agricultural goods. Asa result ofthe establishment of the 
Customs Union, Turkish foreign trade policy became subject to that of the EU. 
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With the Ankara Agreement, an Association Council that meets periodically to discuss matters 
involving the partnership was also formed, thus institutionalizing the partnership. The 
Association Council is made up of members of the Turkish govemment, the European Council, 
and the European Commission. The EU and Turkey each have one vote in decisions taken. 
With the ending of the preparation peri od, the responsibilities of the two sides were determined 
in an Additional Protocol which was signed in 1970 and took effect in 1973. The Additional 
Protocol envisaged the free movement of goods, people and services, Turkey' s harmonization 
with the EC's Common Agricultural Policy, and legislation on issues such as transportation and 
economy. With the signing of the Additional Protocol, Turkey accepted abolishing customs 
duties on the EU's industrial exports and adopting the common extemal tariff of the EC that is 
applied to third countries in stages assigned to different time periods. At the time, Turkey's 
economy was far from being capable of withstanding the competitive pressures that would arise 
out of the customs union. The transition period was therefore instated to allow Turkey to 
gradually bridge the gap between its economy and that of its new partnersin the Community. 
The EC on the other hand unilaterally abolished its tariffs for Turkey. A transition period of 12 
years for lifting tariffs on industrial goods and a 22-year-long tariff removal calendar for weak 
industrial sectors were foreseen. The customs union was to be attained by the end of the 
transition period, in 1995. 
The ' final period' was to be the period in which the customs union would be operating in full. 
The agreement was, however not entirely clear on what else this ' final period ' would include. 
About this, one diplomat comments the following: 
'The Ankara Agreement stated that once the customs union was completed, the association 
between Turkey and the Community would reach its "final stage"; in other words, it would 
be replaced by something else which could only be membership' .62 
To the goal of membership we will retum ata later stage. 
In December 1976, Turkey froze its responsibilities arising from the Additional Protocol 
(reduction of tariffs, customs, in order to facilitate customs union). Due to the worldwide 
economic situation (oil crisis), Turkey could not manage to meet its responsibilities toward the 
62 F. Öztürk, personal interview, April 4, 2006. 
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Protocol, because at this time, customs duties formed its main sources of income and hence the 
country could not afford to reduce these. 
During the transition period, Turkey thus did not fulfill its responsibilities arising from the 
Additional Protocol, and tariff removal halted entirely between 1978 and 1988. Following 
another military coup in 1980, the European Community decided to defer the Ankara Agreement 
officially and hereby froze the political relations with Turkey. The European Parliament also 
decided not to renew the European wing of the Joint Parliamentary Commission until a general 
election was held anda parliament established in Turkey. 
In September 1986, the Turkey-EEC Association Council met and relations between the EC and 
Turkey resumed. During this meeting, Turkey signaled its intentions to go ahead with its long-
expected application for full membership, opening a new chapter in the relations. In April 1987, 
Turkish Prime Minister Özal made the bid for membership. The European Council referred the 
application to the Commission for an opinion in accordance with the routine procedure. The 
European Commission's opinion on Turkey' s Request for Accession acknowledged Turkey' s 
eligibility for membership, but stressed that the enlargement for Turkey and other potential 
candidates could be contemplated only after the 1992, when the single market had come into 
operation. Moreover, a detailed analysis of Turkey' s economic and social development stated 
that - in spite of important progress since 1980 in restructuring and opening the economy to the 
outside world - a major gap stili existed in comparison with EC levels of development. The 
Commission recommended the completion ofa customs union stating that progressive 
completion of the customs union would give the Community the opportunity to associate Turkey 
more closely with the opera ti on of the single market. 
EU-Turkey relations followed this recommendation in 1993 with the start of Customs Union 
negotiations. After two years of negotiating, the EC and Turkey entered into a forma! customs 
union agreement on 31 December 1995, which entered into force the very next day. This 
agreement formalized the EC' s first substantial functioning customs union with a third state, 
thereby creating the closest economic and political relationship between the EU and any non-
member country.63 Turkey took the position that the Customs Union could not be regarded as the 
63 Çarkoğlu , A.,& Rubin, B. (Eds.) . (2003) . Turkey and the European Union. London: Frank Cass. p. 5. 
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ultimate stage in Turkey-EU relations; rather it should be completed by Turkey's admission to 
the European Union asa full member.64 
In the Additional Protocol it was anticipated that even aft:er a gradual transitional lowering of 
tariffs, the implementation of the Customs Union might lead to an imbalance in trade, and hence 
to possible negative financial consequences for Turkey.65 In the CU Protocol, financial assistance 
was planned for Turkey to cope with these negative forces. This promise however was not kept 
by the Union, due to a Greek veto against it. This 'breach' of the Union's financial commitment 
led to discontent on the Turkish side in the political sense.66 Consequently the short-impacts of 
the Customs Union put larger strain on the Turkish economy than originally anticipated.67 
At the Luxembourg summit in 1997 the European Council excluded Turkey from the list of 
forma! candidates. Turkey responded to this declaration by denying further political dialogue 
with the EU in the two years to follow. 
In the second Regular Report on Turkey which was published by the EU Commission on 13 
October 1999, giving Turkey a membership perspective was recommended, and consequently at 
the Helsinki Summit which met in December 1999, Turkey was given the status of candidate 
country for the EU membership. The EU Council decision at Helsinki reads: 
'The Council welcomes the recent positive developments in Turkey and Turkey' s 
willingness to continue its reforms in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a 
candidate country on the road to joining the Union based on the same criteria applied to the 
other candidate countries' .68 
The decision taken at Helsinki is a tuming point in EU - Turkey relations. Following the Helsinki 
Summit, Turkey was taken into the pre-accession strategy directed towards encouraging and 
supporting reforms. 
64 Turkey and European Integration (1997). Istanbul: Intermedia. 
65 EC-Turkey Association Council. (1970). Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol, signed at Brussels, 23 
November 1970. Ojjicial Journal ofthe European Communities, 24.12.73. Brussels. 
66 Turkey and European Integration (1997). Istanbul: Intermedia. p. 42. 
67 in the first year ofthe Customs Union, the EU exports to Turkey expanded significantly, resulting in a doubling of 
the balance of trade deficit from 5$ to l 0$ billion. Turkey and European Integration ( 1997). Istanbul: Intermedia. p. 
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68 European Council. (1999). Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11December1999. (Nr: 
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The Association Council met for the first time in three years on April 2000. A number of 
important political decisions were taken by the Council. The first was about the establishment of 
eight sub-committees within the framework of the Association Council, and the second focused 
on starting negotiations foran agreement to be made for mutually opening EU and Turkish 
markets and the libenliization of services. 
The Accession Partnership, which was officially adopted by the EU Council on 8 March 2001, is 
a road map for Turkey for determining the priorities for the progress that needs to be undertaken 
towards meeting the EU's accession criteria. The purpose ofthe Accession Partnership is to 
bring together under a single framework the priority areas that need to be worked on, which were 
described in the Commission's 2000 Regular Report conceming the progress Turkey had made 
on the road to European Union membership, the financial opportunities provided to Turkey for 
implementing these priorities and the conditions for this assistance. in the light of this Accession 
Partnership the Turkish Govemment adopted on 19 March 2001 the National Programme for the 
Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). Turkey's National Programme was revised and published in the 
Official Gazette of 24 July 2003 within the framework of the latest developments. in the revised 
National Programme which was made public, short-term and medium-term targets were clearly 
stated. 
The Programme sets forth a broad-ranged agenda of political and economic reform. At the same 
time an agreement about implementation, coordination and follow-up of the NPAA was signed. 
At the European Council held at Gothenburg on 15-16 June 2001 the National Programme was 
described as a positive development, and Turkey was encouraged to realize the Accession 
Partnership which is the milestone of the pre-accession strategy. 
in 2001, Turkey made major alterations to its legislation, in order to align it with the EU acquis. 
Among these are 34 amendments to the Constitution, including partial abolishment of the death 
penalty and the authorization of greater use of languages other than Turkish in public life. in 
addition, amendments are made to the Turkish Pena! Code and other legislation, affecting the 
freedom of expression and the press, the activities of associations, the closure of political parti es 
and the prevention oftorture. A year later, Turkey implemented a total abolition of the death 
penalty, the allowance of broadcasting in different languages, and improved educational 
possibilities for minorities. 
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At the Copenhagen Summit in 2002, the European Council seemingly appreciated these efforts 
by taking the following decisions: 
• Preparation ofa revised Accession Partnership; 
• Concentration of work on the harmonization of legislation; 
• Development and deepening ofthe Customs Union; 
• Signifıcantly increasing financial cooperation; and 
• Inclusion of financial assistance to Turkey in the accession budget. 
Furthermore the European Council announced that it would evaluate whether Turkey met the 
Copenhagen political criteria in December 2004, in which case the EU would open accession 
negotiations 'without delay' .69 
The Commission report in 2004 gave cautious support to opening the negotiations.70 Not all 
thirty commissioners backed the negotiations and President Prodi emphasized that the approval 
implied no guarantees that the negotiations would succeed.71 
Nevertheless, on 17 December 2004, the European Commission decided to open accession talks 
with Turkey as of 3 October 2005 , provided that Turkey bring into force six pieces of legislation 
on political reforms.72 In June 2005, this condition was fulfılled, and the Commission presented a 
draft framework for accession negotiations, setting out the method and the guiding principles of 
the negotiations in line with the December 2004 European Council conclusions, as well asa 
Communication on the civil society dialogue between the EU and its candidate countries. Along 
with the Copenhagen criteria and the implementation of the acquis, civil society dialogue is an 
important pillar against which Turkish accession will be evaluated. The framework was adopted 
by the Council of Ministers on 3 October 2005. The EU-Turkey Intergovernmental Conference 
met for the fırst time on this date. In parallel, the Commission launched the analytical 
examination of the acquis (screening) which forms the fırst phase of accession negotiations. This 
process allows candidate countries to familiarize themselves with the acquis and allows the 
Commission and the Member States to evaluate the degree of preparedness of candidate 
69 European Council. (2002) . Council Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council 12-13 December 
2002. Brussels. 
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countries before deciding whether a chapter can be opened for negotiations. In the first, so-called 
' analytical screening' stage, the Commission explains its acquis to Turkey, while in the second, 
'detailed or bilateral screening' stage it is Ankara's tum to explain its laws. The screening 
process is scheduled to !ast for approximately a year. 
The Council adopted, in December 2005, the revised Accession Partnership for Turkey. 
The process toward membership is ongoing. At the time of writing approximately half of the 35 
chapters of the acquis ha ve been screened, and forma! negotiations have been opened ona 
number of chapters, such as Science and Research, and Education and Culture.73 
4.2 The 'promise' of membership 
Turkey has been the longest associated country to the EU, short of accession, as well as the one 
with the oldest application for accession. This gives adequate reason to assume that Turkish 
accession is at least somewhat problematic. Before going into the actual content of the discussion 
about the accession, it is worth noting that the actual 'promise' of EU membership to Turkey is 
also a source of conflict, between and within both sides. The possibility of membership was first 
mentioned in the Ankara Agreement of 1963. in this regard, Turkey ' s eligibility asa member 
was fırst stressed here. To what extent this mention of membership should be the basis of further 
obligations on the side of the EU is the topic of debate. As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
some understand that the ' final phase ' of the Customs Union is indeed membership and that 
hence this is a logical and determined step in the relations between the two. The !ast 
Commissioner Verheugen may not have been referring to this agreement, but was stressing a 
certain kind of obligation of the EU to take in Turkey when he said 
'This decision to accept Turkey was made long ago. For decades, Turkey has been told that it 
has prospects of becoming a full member. it would have disastrous consequences if we now 
teli Turkey: actually we did not mean this at ali '. 74 
73 In the case of Turkey, the Acquis Communautaire, which originally consisted of 31 chapter, was re-divided into 
35 chapters for practical reasons in order to better implement the negotiations. No issues were added. 
74 Müftüler-Sac, M. (2002). Enlarging the European Union: Where does Turkey Stand? Istanbul : Tesev 
Publications. p. 5. 
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The statement that Turkey has been waiting for accession for more than forty years is commonly 
heard within Turkey. Commission representative Missir di Lusignano states however, that 'we 
don't buy this argument'. Turkey officially didn't apply for membership until 1987, and did not 
start real political preparations until 2001. Furthermore, the wording ofthe Ankara Agreement 
was 'when the time comes', but did not specify a deadline. According the Missir di Lusignano, a 
broad, vague perspective for membership is all that can be distilled from this. In an article 
published in November 2004 in 15 European Dailies, former French President Giscard d'Estaing 
held that 'the promises made in the 1960s were related to the question ofwhether Turkey would 
enter the Common Market which was exclusively economic.' These promises were 'fulfilled 
when the EU signed a customs Union with Turkey in 1995' .75 
4.3 The future 
it is not the aim ofthis paper to speculate about the future of EU-Turkey relations from here on. 
Practical considerations ask fora limited time-frame, which will be elaborated upon later. 
Nevertheless, a paper that is inquisitive about the future can hardly go without a short glance on 
what might happen next. The aim of the current negotiation process for both sides is ful! 
membership of the Union. Even so, in a nod to public scepticism continuous emphasis is put on 
its open-endedness, which in effect allows fora variety of outcomes in the end.76 There are thus 
three thinkable futures for EU-Turkey relations: 
• An unconditional ' yes' to Turkish membership 
• Privileged partnership between Turkey and the EU. This would mean continuing on the same 
footing as before the start of membership negotiations. 
• A 'no' to Turkish membership. 
In this last case, it is conceivable that Turkey develops a feeling of betrayal and consequently an 
agenda of association with other countries. About this, Bernard Lewis states that 'should the 
Turkish people feel rejected by Europe, given that they have striven to join it for more than a 
century, there is a strong possibility that they might turn to the other side' .77 In 2004, Turkish 
75 A berter European bridge to Turkey. (2004, November 25). Financial Times. 
76 Üçer, E. (2005). Turkey's accession to the European Union. Futures, 38, p. 199. 
77 Lewis, B. (2001). The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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prime minister implied a similar course of events: 'If the EU does not give the expected go-
ahead, it will not be difficult far Turkey to channel its huge potential in another direction' .78 
Although membership negotiations ha ve started, it is yet unclear if and when Turkey will 
become a member of the European Union. in any case, the completion of the negotiations and 
the eventual accession to Turkey to the EU will probably not take place in the next ten to twenty 
years. This assumption is supported by the fact that Turkey has not been included in the EU 
budget until 2014. As the Commission puts it: 'Turkey 's accession is certainly not far tomorrow. 
[ . .. ] it will be a lengthy and difficult process that could take a decade or more ' . 79 
4.4 Challenges and key issues 
In its 1999 Regular Report, the European Commission highlighted the major problems towards 
accession: the political Copenhagen criteria (stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights and the protection ofminorities);justice (emergency courts system, training 
of judges, witness protection, creation ofa Pena! Code, abolition of the death penalty); the 
military has important influence through the National Security Council; human rights; political 
rights; protection of minorities (Kurds); functioning of market economy; economic structural 
refarms in certain fields .80 Since then, the European Commission has recognized that Turkey has 
sufficiently met ali of the Copenhagen criteria. Nonetheless, this does not mean that there are no 
more challenges to face in the light of accession negotiations. Far an EU perspective on the 
challenges Turkey stili faces, it is best to have a look at the latest Regular Report of the European 
Commission. This report stresses that the Copenhagen criteria, which in earlier reports were stili 
considered bigger hurdles far Turkey, have been met in terms of legislation, but that enfarcement 
remains a problem, primarily with regard to : 
• Civil-military relations. Turkey has a long history of assigning a !eve! of political power to 
its military. According to the Commission, although the govemment has reasserted control 
on the military on paper, armed farces continue to exercise power through a number of 
infarmal mechanisms. 
78 Turkish Daily News, 5 May 2004 
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• Corruption. Turkey has become a member ofthe European Agency fighting corruption, 
GRECO, and legislative developments have taken place, but despite that corruption remains 
prone in almost ali areas of the economy and public services. 
• Human Rights. Although the death penalty was abolished and torture is no longer 
systematic, numerous cases of ill-treatment including torture still continue to occur 
and further efforts will be required to eradicate such practices. Discrimination and 
violence against women, including 'honor killings', remain a major problem. 
• Minority rights. The Turkish Constitution was amended to lift the ban on the use of Kurdish 
and other language, but considerable restrictions remain in the area of broadcasting and 
education. 
• Market economy: Financial sector supervision has been strengthened. The banking sector's 
surveillance and prudential rules should continue to be aligned with intemational standards. 
The Regular Report of 2004 stated that sufficient progress had been booked with regard to the 
Copenhagen criteria, and that now the emphasis lies with the correct implementation of the 
acquis. With regard to implementation of the acquis 'Turkey [ .. . ] remains at an early stage for 
most chapters. Major points of attention in this regard were: 
• The four freedoms: On the free movement of goods, overall transposition of the acquis is 
advancing steadily, but is not complete, while implementation remains uneven. No progress 
has taken place conceming the free movement of persons, and overall legislative alignment is 
stili at a very early stage. Alignment remains limited with the acquis on the free movement of 
capital. 
• Comparıy law: In the area of company law, the alignment with the acquis remains very 
limited. 
• Agriculture: Little progress can be recorded since the previous Report in the area of 
agriculture, and overall alignment with the acquis remains limited. Progress has taken place 
conceming in particular veterinary, physiosanitary and food, but transposition and 
administrative capacity are still insufficient to ensure effective implementation. 
• Taxation: As regards taxation, there has been limited progress in the area of indirect taxation, 
while no progress could be reported on direct taxation, or administrative co-operation. 
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• Regional policy: The acquis conceming regional policy is relevant for the implementation of 
Structural and Cohesion Funds. Very limited development has been made and the overall 
!eve! of alignment with the acquis is limited. 
• Environment: Overall transposition of the environment acquis remains low. Administrative 
capacity needs further reinforcement and improved co-ordination among the administrations 
involved. The most intense efforts are needed for horizontal legislation, air and water quality, 
waste management, nature protection, industrial pollution and risk management. 
Moving ahead further, the Progress Report of 2005, the first report to be compiled after the start 
of accession negotiations, already identified further progress in these areas, but noted that the 
pace of reforms had slowed in 2005 . it recognized that implementation of the main legislative 
instruments had taken place, but that enforcement in many areas is stili lacking. Main areas of 
attention in this regard were identified to be human rights, civil-military relations, minority and 
women 's rights. In the economy, the Progress Report identified significant progress in the 
banking sector and recognized the increase of FDI. it states that further attention should be 
directed to a berter allocation of resources. With regard to the transposition of EU law, a lot of 
work was said to remain in the areas of agriculture, environment and other sectoral policies.8 1 
With the start of negotiations, the main controversies about Turkish accession on the level of 
European officials have died down. The Commission has been cautiously supportive of 
membership. The former enlargement Commissioner Verheugen often emphasized that there is 
no alternative to full membership for Turkey as long as the country fulfils the Copenhagen 
political criteria. Responding to questions regarding a ' privileged partnership ' with Turkey, he 
stated that 'Turkey is eligible for membership. it does not matter that Turkey is so big, that 
Turkey is so far, that Turkey is so poor and that Turkey is a country with a Muslim population' .82 
A vigorous debate about Turkish accession is, however, continued at the !eve! of the European 
public, the Member States, media, and academics. The issues in this debate are more diverse than 
those addressed within the official Community structures. The fact that Member States largely 
depend on their public for their position towards Turkey, and are perhaps tom between these 
public concems and those of the European Union, makes it useful to address them here. In this 
81 European Commission. (2005). Turkey 2005 Progress Report. (COM (2005) 561 final). Brussels: European 
Commission. 
82 Interview with Gunther Verheugen, 16 April 2004. Retrieved February 20, 2006, from 
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vein, some of the issues discussed earlier on the EU !eve! will be elaborated on here as well, to 
give an idea of the discussion asa whole, and to emphasize that the debate that takes place 
within the Member States until recently prevailed on the EU !eve! as well. Not ali of these 
challenges are on the 'plate' of Turkey, but ali play a role in the debate on her membership. 
Civilizational and identity issues 
• Europeanness: This first item relates directly to the most basic requirement for EU 
membership, namely that the candidate be ' European'. Walter Hallstein, the President of the 
EEC Commission at the conclusion ofthe Ankara Agreement, made clear this was not an 
issue as he declared 'Turkey is part of Europe'. Valeria Giscard-D 'Estaing on the other hand, 
a known opponent of Turkish accession, stated that 'Turkish is a country that is close to 
Europe, an important country, but it is not a European country ... lts capital is not in Europe, 
and 95 percent of its population is outside' .83 Turkey is an Asian, nota European country. 
• Obstacle ta identity: There are widely shared counter-arguments against the Turkish 
membership for its expected negative impact on the EU' s vision of creating a European 
demos. European history often points out to ' the Turk' as the 'other ' with fundamental 
differences from the Europeans. It is too hard to digest the cultural/religious traits of ' the 
Turk' within a common European identity. Huntington stresses this ' indigestibility' of 
Muslims in Europe.84 On the other hand, it may be argued that precisely this ' othemess' 
makes Turkey European, since the Ottomans (if not the relatively young Turkish Republic) 
were instrumental in the self-identification of Europe.85 
• Turcophobia: Many of the arguments against Turkish accession can be captured under the 
term ' they are just too different'. Valeria Giscard-D 'Estaing, on the eve of the decision 
regarding the date for starting accession negotiations with Turkey, stated that Turkey does 
not have a place in the EU since ' it hasa different culture, a different approach, a different 
way of life ' .86 For these reasons, he claimed that admitting Turkey would be the end of the 
European Union. According to Schimmelfenning et al. Kemalism, the statist and nationalist 
doctrine of the Turkish state is partially based on values ali en to westem liberal democracy 
83 The Guardian, 9 November 2002. 
84 Huntington, S. ( 1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and 
Schuster. 
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and has engendered domestic political practices in conflict with core European democratic 
and human rights norms. 87 
• Islam: Many Europeans conceive of the European Union asa project rooted in Christian 
values. Tekin mentions that 'for many European politicians, Europe is nota geographical or 
political culture, but a modern reincarnation of the ancient Christianity' .88 On the other hand, 
Üçer argues that the admission ofTurkey asa country whose majority of population is 
Muslim, could create advantages by convincing certain circles in the Muslim world which 
conceive of the EU asa ' Christian club' and asa threat to Islam to stop looking foran 
alternative to Western ideology.89 Javier Solana, Secretary General of the European Council, 
stated 'the developing culture in Europe encompasses ali civilizations. We have, in the EU, 
millions of citizens or residents who recognize in themselves both the values of Europe and 
those oflslam' .90 
• Culture: Apart from religion discussions concerning Turkey's application for membership 
have also centered on the opinion that there are differences between ' European Culture' and 
Turkey' s ' Oriental Culture ', and that these differences have negative effects.91 Former 
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt reiterated his well-known view that the ' fundamental 
cultural differences' with Turkey are of 'decisi ve importance' .92 Others argue that Turkish 
accession will strengthen multicultural characteristics of the European demos and indicate its 
inclusiveness of people with different beliefs and persuasions.93 
Political considerations 
• Power: Due to the current institutional set-up of the European Union, the population of 
Turkey is of great concern to the Member States of the European Union. Turkey would be 
the second most influential country in the decision-making mechanisms of the Union, 
especially in the Parliament. Concerns are often expressed that such a latecomer should not 
ha ve such an important place in the decision-making which affects the future of ali the EU 
Member States. 
87 Schimmelfennig, F., Engert, S., & Knobel , H. (2003). ' Costs, Commitment and Compliance: the lmpact of EU 
Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia amd Turkey'. Journal of Common Market Studies, 41, pp. 495-518. 
88 Tekin, A. (2005). Future ofTurkey-EU relations: a civilisational discourse . Futures, 37, p. 293 . 
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93 Tekin, A. (2005). Future ofTurkey-EU relations: a civilisational discourse. Futures, 37, p. 291. 
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• The Cyprus issue: The Cyprus question has become closely linked with the Turkey-EU 
accession process. The most important issues at stake are the lifting of the embargo on the 
Turkish-Cypriot part and the recognition of the Turkish Republic ofNorthem Cyprus. It has 
become a touchy issue on the side of the Turks, as the EU has expressed it wished for it to be 
solved before accession, but is unable to make demands in this direction officially, since this 
would imply EU interference in Turkish foreign policy, next to the fact that the issue that is 
officially under UN mandate. Therefore, instead of making a solution to the issue apre-
requisite for accession, the EU can only hope that the accession process will function as a 
catalyst in ending the conflict. Opponents of Turkish accession have argued that through 
Turkish accession the EU is importing conflicts which could easily be left outside. 
Economic considerations 
• Migration: Concerns about migration seem to be at the heart of public opinion on Turkish 
accession. With a relatively poor population, mass migration is expected from Turkey to 
especially the Westem EU countries. It is expected that the income differential will not 
equaled out even in the medium-term and that therefore it will remain a strong incentive for 
migration from Turkey to the EU.94 it is feared that the immigrants will depress wages and 
boost unemployment. Proponents of accession address this fear by stating that free 
movement will not become effective directly upon accession and that it shou ld therefore not 
be such a strong argument against. Furthermore, Flam argues that this concem only makes 
sense in the case of homogenous labor, which in the case of the EU and Turkey is not the 
case. He therefore argues that highly differentiated labor supplies and demands will 
complement each other.95 
• Funding: Turkey's size, its large agricultural sector, and low income would make it the 
largest net recipient from the EU budget in the current setting. The present net recipients 
from the EU budget have feared that they will be the ones to bear a disproportionate share of 
the cost and the net contributors that they will be required to raise their contributions, unless 
the basis for expenditure is altered. Calculations made by the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office in 1992 that Turkey would have been a recipient on the then rules of 
some 12 billion ECU per year, which would have been equivalent to 15 percent of the 
94 Flam, H. (2004). Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics of Accession. CESifo Economic Studies, Vo/. 50, 1, 
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country's GDP, and 5 percent ofthe total budget ofthe EU.96 Likewise, although Germany 
has officially backs Turkey's bid, the Christian Democrats, who are currently in Germany's 
govemment, argue that Turkey's admission could be 'political suicide', alleging that 
Turkey's membership would 'overtax' the EU's capacity for integration and hinder economic 
growth within the bloc.97 
Note needs to be taken here that the European public, of which in 2005 52 percent did not 
welcome Turkish accession98 , is generally not well-informed about enlargement issues99. Öztürk 
even suggests that ' in some polis in the Netherlands, some people said that Turkey was a 
member of the EU already, because of the discussion of Turkey-EU' .100 Moreover perceptions 
are largely shaped by factors emanating from intemal social and economic problems of the EU, 
such as xenophobia due to high unemployment and illegal migration and the perception of Islam 
asa threat. 101 Nevertheless, these ambiguities will have to be addressed ata certain point in time, 
if Turkish accession is to be pursued. According to Falkner and Nentwich, there has been a 
tendency so far to keep the controversy of Turkish accession out of the public debate, 
specifically in election campaigns, leaving the topic to opposition parties. This in tum brings into 
danger the entire objective of enlargement, and further indicates a discrepancy between what is 
discussed on EU level and on the national level, in the long run bringing the EU further away 
from citizens rather than closer. 102 This brings an important task to Turkey to win the hearts and 
minds of the people. 103 In the meantime Turkey continues to present the EU with difficult 
dilemmas and to rece ive a mix of ambivalent signals from the EU' s member govemments. 104 
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Note should be taken as well that these issues have not always been at the center of the debate 
about Turkish accession. As has been states with regard to the point of Europeanness, this was 
not an issue in the mind of Walter Hallstein. in fact, such principle issues only came to the fore 
in 1997, when ata Conference of Christian Democrat Party leaders from European Member 
States, Chancellor Koh! announced that: 'The EU is a Christian Club, Turkey cannot join' 105 and 
Jacques San ter, the then President of the Commission states that Turkey did not ha ve a seri o us 
chance of joining the European Union. 106 On the basis of sources of such objections found, it is 
hard to deny the idea that these have become more prominent as time passed. Furthermore, the 
EU's incremental nature has lifted the slat for Turkey, making membership more demanding for 
Turkey, or any candidate, as time passed. Based on these considerations some scholars argue that 
if had not been for domestic and intemational issues, and had Turkey been able to move in a 
steady pace since 1963, membership would have been attained long ago. 107 A more recent 
example of this type of reasoning is the fact that while for the CEEC enlargement wave the mere 
adoption of acqııis was enough, now the emphasis is laid on the implementation of it for current 
negotiating states. The EU is leaming by doing. 108 
The issues above are largely those which cause opposition of Turkish accession. In the overview 
above, only limited attention is paid to the counter-arguments to these concems. For the sake of 
balance, below you find as short excerpt ofa Turkish paper advocating membership, and its 
ideas on the benefits of accession for the EU: 109 
• Turkey hasa large and dynamic market which could contribute to the intemal market of the 
Union. 
• The benefits from increased trade as a result of higher incomes in Turkey are hard to 
quantify, yet are likely to be very substantial over time. 
• Regional stability and security will be consolidated. The incorporation of Turkey into the EU 
will help stabilize the situation in a large and potentially volatile region extending from the 
105Cited in Güney, A. (2005) . The Future ofTurkey in the European Union. Futures, 37, pp. 303-316 
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Balkans to the Caucasus. Due to this stability, the EU is likely to experience economic as 
well as political benefits. In additional the European countries should be able to reduce 
defence expenditures. 
• Contemporary Turkey and Turkish culture are young and vigorous, but also have deep 
cultural and historical roots. Turkish society offers Europe as blend of centuries of 
experience and accomplishments combined with the principle of openness, pluralism and 
cosmopolitanism. 
• The admission ofa stable, secular and prosperous Turkey will have important consequences 
for Turkey's relationship with Islam. it will !essen polarization and reduce existing cultural 
tensions. it will show that a modem and a European destiny is conceivable for Islamic 
countries. 
4.5 Attitudes 
In accordance with the three possible futures that can take place, there are three 'camps' in the 
EU-Turkey debate: 1) the ' for' accession camp, 2) the 'against' accession camp and 3) the 
'privileged partnership camp'. Tekin adds another important position, namely that of the 'wait 
and see' camp. 110 According to Friss and Murphy, the 'wait and see' attitude is typical of 
decisions that are taken on the intergovemmental level, such as those relating to en largement. 111 
In this setting, the decision-making procedure creates an inbuilt tendency to postpone decisions 
to the very !ast minute or until crisis occurs. Accordingly, the big decision of 'yes' or 'no' to 
Turkey is deconstructed into smaller stages. Two example of the 'wait and see' attitude, which 
according to Tekin is prevalent with regard to Turkish accession, are the decision at Nice to omit 
Turkey from the calculation of voting power in an enlarged Union and the fact that Turkey was 
not considered in the formation of the budget until 2013. 112 Grabbe argues that the EU secretly 
hopes that Turkey's accession negotiations will take a very long time, allowing the Union to put 
off the difficult issues implied by Turkey's membership . 113 The 'wait and see' attitude has some 
benefits over the ' no' camp, because by not closing the door on membership, the EU remains 
110 Tekin, A. (2005). Future ofTurkey-EU relations: a civilisational discourse. Futures, 37, pp. 287-302. 
111 Friis, L.,& Murphy, A. ( 1999). 'The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Govemance and 
Boundaries'. Journal ofCommon Market Studies, 37, 2, pp. 211-232. 
112 M. Müftüler-Bac. (2002). Enlarging the European Union: Where does Turkey Stand? Istanbul: TESEV 
Publications. p. 13. 
113 Grabbe, H. (2004). 'When Negotiations Begin: the Next Phase in EU-Turkey Relations'. Center for European 
Reform Essays. Landon. p. 2. 
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able to exert an influence on the candidate and export its model of political and economic 
standards. in the case of Yugoslavia and Albania, the Commission stated that 'the European 
U nion can best contribute to stability in the region by drawing it closer to the perspective of full 
integration within its structure'. 114 The same argument might apply here. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to bring forward the chronology of Turkey-EU relations leading up to the 
current state of negotiations, as well as to give an insight into the most important considerations 
that play a role in the debate on Turkish accession. The most important documents in the dossier 
can be considered the Ankara Agreement (1963), the Additional Protocol (1970), the 
Commission opinion on Turkey, the Commission Regular Reports, and the Accession 
Partnership Documents. Turkey has recently embarked upon the first stage in its accession 
negotiations, based on the Commission conclusion that it met all of the Copenhagen Criteria. 
This negotiation-process if open-ended, meaning that no obligations arise on the side of the 
European Union. The debate on Turkish accession takes place on a variety of levels, and focuses 
to a large extent on public concems. 
On the basis of the issues described in this chapter, some choices can be made with regard to the 
study at hand. Firstly, this chapter has illuminated that it is yet unclear if and when Turkish 
accession will take place. in our search for ' thinking about the future ' bluntly stated, any 
document about Turkish accession could therefore qualify as a long-term policy-document. 
Allowing this would blind our view for more valuable <lata. Therefore, the choice has been made 
to focus on those policy-documents which take a long-term perspective on Turkey or the EU 
individually, or elaborate on the long-term effects of accession specifically. 
Furthermore, as has been shown in this chapter, Turkey in October 2005 embarked upon a new 
stage in Turkey-EU relations, namely that of accession negotiations. For that reason, it seems 
logical to take this date as the end-date of our investigation, since the stage embarked upon since 
then has not been closed yet. The chapter on methodology will further elaborate on this. 
On the hasis of the above, a number of small questions may be considered when analyzing the 
date, in order to shed an extra light on the findings of this study: 
114 European Commission. ( 1999). Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession by each of 
the candidate counties. Brussels: European Commission. 
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1. Are the challenges of Turkish enlargement as conceived in the overall debate addressed 
by 'thinking about the future'? This question can also be reversed (knowing that the 
conceived 'challenges/ arguments against have not always been the same): to what extent 
do considerations ( explorations and thoughts) about the long-term future reflect the 
concems in the accession debate? 
2. What role did 'future exploration' and 'thinking about the long-term future' play in the 
course of the Turkey-EU accession dossier, especially with re gard to the important 
decisions made, such as acceptance or rejection of Turkish applications for association 
and membership? 
3. Are future explorations specifically or predominantly used to sustain arguments in favor 
or against membership? 
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5. METHODOLOGY 
The previous chapters ha ve set the scene of the research. This chapter comes to the practical 
research itself. The main aim ofthis chapter is to describe the methodology of the research, thus 
the way in which it went about getting an answer to its objectives. The research itself formed the 
bigger part of this study, so the methodology needs ample explanation. 
5. 1 Research questions 
The grand aim of this study is to gain more insight into the use of future explorative studies in 
the European Union. To that end, it will attempt to investigate and describe the following: 
l. The role of future explorative studies in policy-making 
2. The long-term ' future ' as it is being considered within the European Union 
5. 2 Link to existing theory 
The core of this study concems empirical qualitative research. This definitely does not mean that 
the research is a-theoretical. The conclusions will be translated into or connected to earlier 
theoretical work. in fact , the theoretical framework will serve as a way to interpret the findings 
and position them against and within earlier research. The aim of this study is not to test a 
hypothesis, but rather to explore a phenomenon which has not been much researched. Hence the 
research questions are open-ended, and were open for change in the course of the study, as was 
the research approach itself. 
Existing theory on the topic of future exploration and policy-making, served to establish a hasis 
for this study. in particular, it created a prior understanding of the fact that future exploration 
may be conducted both by the policy-maker oran extemal agency. The research approach was 
thus adapted to locate future explorations in both these cases. 
Furthermore, personal prior research on the topic was not considered a framework of reference, 
but rather an idea in the making, which could be further supported or contradicted by the 
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findings of this research. This was considered especially relevant in relation to the model 
implying a cyclical relationship between the EU policy-making and future exploration. 115 
5.3 The case study 
An attempt will be made to answer the above questions on the basis of the Turkey-EU accession 
dossier, and possibly draw conclusions which are meaningful for EU policy-making in general. 
The case of Turkish accession provides an interesting case study for a number of reasons: 
• The dossier dates back to 1963 and is stili on the EU political agenda today. This allows fora 
long term spectrum of research. 
• The Turkish accession as such is and has always been a point in the future. 
• A longer time-frame would be hard to sustain in this case, because before the 1960s the 
practice of future exploration as a policy-support activity had not developed as such. This 
would hamper the research from a different side. 
As shown by the short chronology of Turkey-EU relations since 1963 in the previous chapter, 
enlargement has not always been a priority in the relationship between the two. Especially at 
times when progress towards accession ceased such as in the 1970s, the relationship fell under 
the EU foreign policy rather than enlargement. Considering ali relationships between the EU and 
Turkey is beyond the scope of this research. Instead it will focus on the EU-Turkey accession 
dossier, which as has been established in the previous chapter, was initialled in 1959 and is stili 
on the agenda today. In this study, the terms 'EU-Turkey dossier' and ' EU-Turkey accession 
dossier' will be used alternately and will in ali cases refer to the accession relations between 
Turkey and the European Union. 
The specificities of the case study asked fora number of choices in relation to the research. Some 
of these were stipulated by earlier chapters, but it is useful to rephrase them here. 
Apart from the three 'main' European institutions, European Commission, European Parliament, 
and the European Council, there are a large number of sub-institutions involved in the policy-
115 See chapter 2, Future exploration and policy-making; Prior insights. 
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making on the EU-Turkey dossier. The choice was made on the basis of Sedelmeier's theory to 
focus on the macro-structures only. 
Note should be taken of the fact that much of the decision-making with regard to enlargement is 
of an intergovemmental nature and takes place in the Council. it is here that Member States 
exercise their national foreign policies, if necessary through veto-right. The scope ofthe research 
does not include politics in the EU Member States. it will consider the state a 'black box', not 
taking into consideration the ways in which it came to its national decision. What is of interest is 
the way in which on the !eve! of the Council, reference is made to future explorative bodies. it is 
imaginable that here reference is made to national future explorative bodies. These national 
future explorative bodies themselves, however, will not be investigated as such. 
Since Turkish accession has not taken place yet, there is no real natura! end to the period under 
consideration. Therefore a pragmatic decision was made to delineate the period of research 
between two path-breaking events in the dossier, namely from the conclusion of the Turkey-EEC 
Association Agreement in 1963, until the opening of accession negotiations on 5 October 2005. 
Furthermore, and most importantly, one should be aware that Turkish accession is nota defined 
date. Therefore, one could, on the bas is of the assumption that this is a long-term goal, designate 
ali documents focussing on Turkish accession and the short, medium and long-term effects 
thereof as long-term explorative. This would blur the picture of what this study is looking for. 
Hence this study will not take into consideration explorations of the short and medium-term 
effects of enlargement, even though these may take place only in 20 years or so. lnstead, the 
study focuses on 1) long-term future explorations in general; 2) explorations of the long-term 
effects of enlargement, irrespective of when this is to take place. 
Apart from the EU institutions, there is also a Turkish side to the Turkish accession dossier. in a 
study which would seek a balanced analysis of each of these parties, this Turkish side would be 
indispensable. However, since this study aims to make more general statements about use of 
future exploration in the European Union, this time it was deemed less relevant. For this reason, 
none of the documents produced by Turkey were analysed. 
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5.4 Definitions 
it is important to define what is meant by future exploration. In relation to both research 
objectives, the research was be limited to those future explorative practices which take a long-
term perspective, meaning beyond 15 years ahead. 
As said above, the Turkey-EU dossier refers to Turkey-EU accession relations in the period 
1963-2005. 
5.5 Research methodology 
In principle, one should imagine the following picture when considering future exploration and 
in policy-making. 
Fig. 5.1 Preliminary overview 
, 
I 
Body of future 
explorations outside 
of EU structures 
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\ _____ ...,.. 
Policy-making unit 
Policy decision 
Research objective 1 can be divided into the fo llowing sub-questions: 
• Is future exploration conducted on EU !eve!, and if so, how? 
• What is the relationship between future exploration bodies and policy-makers on the EU 
!eve!? What are the incentives for future exploration? 
• How are future explorative studies integrated into policy-making? 
The first research objective thus refers to the role of future exploration in policy-making as well 
as the question whether future exploration is conducted. Literary review shows that future 
exploration may well be conducted by the policy-making himself or by an external agency. 
Evidently, not ali future explorations conducted by external agencies end up in the policy-
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process. Therefore, in order to get a proper insight into the existence of future exploration on 
EU !eve!, as well as their use in the policy-making process, two perspectives are needed: 
1) üne needs to investigate the policy-process for the use of future explorations and the 
possible production ofthem. This does however not exclude the existence of future 
explorations (which, if these cannot be located in the policy-process, alsa provide 
important information to the nan-role of future explorations in policy-making). Hence a 
second perspective is needed: 
2) üne needs to investigate the wider extemal context for the existence of future 
explorations, among which those which do not end up in the policy-process. 
From research objective 2, the following sub-questions can be derived: 
• What role does the future play in the minds of the European bureaucrats? 
• When does it appear as a topic in discussions? 
• What is said about the future when it is brought up? 
The research methodology was designed transverse to the research objectives, meaning that 
instead of developing a different step for each of the objectives, one step was designed to cover 
both objectives, while another was designed to give a more elaborate answer to research 
objective 1. 
Fig. 5.2 Questions and answers 
Research step 1 Research step 2 Research step 3 
1 OBJECTIVE 1 
- - o Output-focus 
-
Input-focus 
-
Interviews 
~---------
1 OBJECTIVE 2 o 
5.5.1 Research step 1 
Research step 1 was focused primarily in the output of the policy-making process, the policy-
documents. Here (references to) future explorations served as a main indicator of establishing 
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the relationship between policy-making and future exploration (internal or external) in the EU 
structures. 
The policy-maker 
For both research objectives it was essential to define what was meant by the 'policy-maker' in 
the European Union. Factual research served as the most important basis for determining the 
decision-making structure with re gard to Enlargement, in principle consisting of the European 
Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. It also highlighted the 
complicated nature of the EU Enlargement policy, as has been described in an earlier chapter. 
The macro structures in the enlargement policy process, namely the European Council, the 
European Commission and the European Parliament, as well as their enlargement-specific sub-
units, were deemed the most relevant in this case. 
For the European Commission, this meant that the focus was on the European Commission as an 
entity in itself, as well as the DG Enlargement, and the Commission Delegation in Turkey. 116 
The other DGs, which were designated earlier as meso-structures, were not considered. 
With regard to the European Parliament, the macro-structures employed in enlargement were the 
European Parliament as an entity in itself, its Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, 
Common Security and Defence Policy, and the EP Delegation to the EU-Turkey Joint 
Parliamentary Committee. Not considered were the other EP committees and the political parties. 
The European Council, as an intergovemmental body, consist of the member states 
representatives. These representatives were ignored as individual entities. Instead the focus was 
in the European Council as a whole, as well as its sub-constellation in the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council (GAERC). 
The focus of the study is on the European Union and its policy-making structures. It cannot be 
ignored that enlargement policy, as has been described earlier, contains a very large element of 
intergovernmental decision-making. it was nonetheless maintained throughout the study that the 
116 The Commission Delegation does not produce any policy-papers on its own, but rather functions as an arm ofthe 
Commission. 
61 
actual content of the decision was less relevant than that decision-making procedure. Therefore, 
the considerations of the Member States as individual en ti ti es were not regarded. 
The policy-documents 
Not ali documents of the European Union are publicly and easily accessible. 117 The publicly 
accessible documents are spread between archives in Brussels and the Union's directories on the 
İnternet. The research was based on the latter, mainly due to practical considerations. Using the 
İnternet however implied access to an extensive body of documents from 1990 onwards, but only 
very limited documentation on the period before that. Those documents available for the period 
1963-1990 were taken into account, allowing for a ' thin ' analysis of the early stage, and the 
extensive body of younger documents allowed fora 'thick', more thorough analysis on the later 
stage. This limitation restricted the potential of the study to make a comparison between the 
earlier and later period of the dossier, or throughout the entire dossier. 
In attempting to provide a (partial) answer to research objective 1 and 2, research step 1 used a 
single body of policy-documents. 
in locating the relevant policy-documents, a wide scope was taken asa point of departure, 
initially leaving as little as possible outside of the field of vision. In a number consecutive steps 
the irrelevant documents were taken out again. 
The en tire body of available documents of the three institutions (and their subunits) was taken as 
a point of departure. The search strategy sought to establish an exhaustive a list as possible of ali 
documents relating to the Turkey-EU enlargement dossier and an orientation towards the long-
term future. This it did according to a number of steps. 
1. The first step was to create as exhaustive a list as possible of documents on Turkey produced 
by the indicated policy-makers. This was done by searching ali available documents for those 
which contained 'Turkey' or ' Turkish' in the text. A two fold approach was taken to have the 
best result: 1) first the individual pages of the sub-units (such as AFET and the DG 
117 Article 255 ofthe Treaty establishing the European Comrnunity says that 'Any citizen ofthe Union, and any 
natura( or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to 
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents' . This is not necessarily untrue, but this right is limited. 
The right of access may for example be restricted if public or private interests could be affected. Furthermore, access 
to documents is spread between archives (which are often only fully accessible if older than 30 years) in Brussels 
and the İnternet (which usually contains no documents older than approximately 15 years). 
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Enlargement) were searched, listing ali documents available on the pages; 2) second, the 
search engin es of the various institutions were employed, searching ali documents for 
'Turkey' and 'Turkish' in the text. The lack of one single search engine for the entire EU 
directory, and the variety of search strategies employed by the search engines of the 
individual policy-making bodies occasionally required slight adaptations in the approach. 
Fig. 5.3 European Parliament search engine Fig. 5.4 European Council search engine 
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Where the search engine did not allow fo r a search fo r 'Turkey ' or 'Turkish' in the text, the 
entire directory was searched ' by hand' through opening every document individually and 
searching these fo r 'Turkey' and 'Turkish' . Where the number of documents in the directory was 
too large for this (400 or more) instead the documents were selected on 'Turkey' or 'Turkish ' in 
their tit!e . 
Where the outcome ofthe word selection was too large (400 or more), a second search was 
employed for 'Turkey ' and 'Turkish' in the text. 
Where the only search term was 'Turkey' as a topic, and the number of documents was too large 
to search by hand, this search strategy was employed. 
The following documents were excluded by definition from the list of documents: 
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• Press releases 
• Agendas 
2. As a second step those documents which were not related to Turkish accession were omitted 
from the list. This concerned only those documents which had a clear lack of relation to the 
dossier. The following documents were omitted: 
• Those relating to EU foreign policy toward other countries than Turkey or the Turkish 
regıon. 
• Those conceming European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), based on the fact that Turkey 
is not involved in the ENP. 
• Those related to arms exports and weapons of mass destruction 
• Those related to the Turkish-Cypriot Community 
The definition of documents related to Turkish accession was kept rather broad. Theoretical 
knowledge of the Turkey-EU dossier and the issues that play an important role in it serves as 
ajustification to keeping the following documents on the list: 
• Those related to human rights 
• Those related to the European Defence Strategy 
• Those related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
• Those related to EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus or the Mediterranean 
regıon. 
it does not need explanation that ali documents relating to enlargement, Customs Union, and 
pre-accession, and accession were left on the list. 
3. In the third stage of the selection process, the documents ofreal interest to the research were 
selected on the bas is of their association with the long term future, and thinking about the 
future. The quantity of documents remaining, 359 in total, and hence the fact that this process 
of selection would take several days, asked fora systematic approach to guarantee 
objectivity. The choice was made to subject ali documents to a number of search terms, in 
order to select the relevant ones. Search terms would help in keeping the search consistent 
over a number of days, applying the same standards over time, without running the risk of 
slacking attention or different interpretations as would be the case in subjective selection. 
64 
Some of the remaining documents showed to ha ve been captures twice, due to the fact that 
they had been mentioned in more than one directory. Double documents were taken out at 
this stage as well. 
Intuitively 'future' and 'long-term' were identifıed as search terms. In order to check whether 
these search terms were representative, or so to say bound to 'cover the load', fırst a sample of 
documents was taken to test them. Fi ve documents of which their orientation to the future has 
already been established, namely the Ankara Agreement (1963), the Additional Protocol (1970), 
the 2003 Strategy Paper ofthe Commission, the Negotiation Framework, and the European 
Council Conclusions of 17 December 2004, functioned as a sample. The two documents 
recommended by the interviewees as the most future oriented in the dossier, namely the Issues 
Paper of the Commission, and The European Transformation of Modern Turkey, the latter of 
which was a non-policy, were also added. These documents were fırst read and then ' checked ' 
with the search terms. Both the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol were not 
highlighted on the basis of these terms. The conclusion was that the search vocabulary had to be 
expanded to cover ali relevant documents. On the basis of the above mentioned sample, the 
following list of words was compiled. 
- Future - Effect(s) -Wi il/ would - Strategy 
- Long-term/ long term - Development - Mayi might - Approach 
- Achieve(d) - Expect(ation) - Period - Perspective 
- Transition -View - Timetable - Potential 
-Recommend - Process - Objectives - Estimate/ion 
- Framework - Progress(ive) - Outlook - Forthcoming 
- Confıdence - Years - Decade - Growth/ decline 
- Impact - Shall/ should - Long run/ long-run - Project(ion) 
- Predict(ion) - Challenge(s) - Pace - Attain(ment) 
- Scenario - Increase/ decrease - Become - Likely 
For practical reasons, this list was reduced to four search terms, keeping in mind the following: 
• Search terms would have to cover the entirety of relevant documents, but not much more, 
thus not cause too many 'irrelevant hits'. 
• The fact that different types of documents were under consideration, and that these may have 
a different use of language (e.g. legislative documents tend to use ' shall' rather than ' will') 
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• Some search terms overlap, i.e. they always appear in the same documents, or when one 
appears, the other one does as well (such as 'perspective' and 'future') 
The final four search terms became: 
• Future 
• Long ('long term' did not show any hits for 'long-term' and vice versa, and 'term' had too 
many irrelevant hits, such as 'determine'; moreover 'long' covers 'long term' and 'long run' 
at the same time). 
• Timetable 
• Outlook 
It needs to be noted here this approach, although perhaps more systematic, excludes sensitivity to 
particular dates, which in case of individual review of ali documents would be possible. 
Although in most current policy-documents oriented towards the future with a quantitative 
orientation, 2025 and 2030 seem to be the years of focus; this of course is not applicable for 
documents which were produced ata much earlier stage. The number of documents however 
made it impossible for each document to be reviewed on its own, and hence the systematic 
approach of search terms was preferred. 
it is important to understand here that fırst the documents with a relation to the Turkey-EU 
dossier were selected, and secondly, among those the documents with an orientation to the future 
were sought. The emphasis was clearly on future exploration within the EU-Turkey dossier, 
rather than the EU-Turkey dossier within the realm of future exploration or thinking about the 
future. 
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Fig. 5.5 What 1 do and what 1 don 't do 
The documents that had no relation to the future were grouped in category A. 
The remaining documents were further distinguished on the basis the kind of future they 
focussed on. Documents related only to the short or medium term were added to those in 
category A. 
Analysis 
Based on the strategy employed, the following was true for ali remaining documents: 
• Ali hada role in the Turkey-EU accession dossier 
• Ali had an orientation to the long-term future 
The remaining documents were subjected to an analytical scheme. The main aim of this scheme 
was to distinguish between the future explorative documents, and those speaking about the future 
in a different method. 
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Fig. 5.6 Table of documents analyzed per institution 
lnstitutionl sub-unit Selection criterion in step 1 Documents leftfor analysis 
European Commission 37 
European Commission (directory) 'Turkey'/'Turkish' in text 
Del. Of European Commission in Ankara 'Turkey'/'Turkish' in text 
European Parliament 191 
(term 1999-2004 and 2004-2009) 
'Turkey'/'Turkish' in text 
EP Reports (AFET only) 'Turkey ' as subject 
EP Joint motions of resolutions 'Turkey' /'Turkish' in title 
EP Minutes 'Turkey' /'Turkish ' in title 
EP Debates 'Turkey' /'Turkish ' in title 
EP Texts adopted 'Turkey ' /'Turkish' in title 
EP Common positions ' Turkey'/'Turkish ' in text 
EP Resolutions 
No selection 
JPC Minutes No selection 
JPC Recommendations 
'Turkey' / 'Turkish' in text 
AFET Reports 
'Turkey'/ 'Turkish' in text 
Taskforce Enlargement 
European Council 131 
Presidency Conclusions 'Turkey' /'Turkish ' in text 
Council Acts 'Turkey' / 'Turkish' in text 
European Coııncil (directory) 'Turkey' as subject 
As said before, the selection of documents was meant to include ali EU-Turkey related 
documents prepared by the main EU body (European Council, European Commission and 
European Parliament) as a whole, as well as the documents by the enlargement-specific sub-units 
of each of these institutions. For the European Commission and the Council, this did not result in 
any difficulties. With regard to the European Parliament, however, a different approach was 
needed, because of the decision-making procedure within in the Parliament. in the EP, the 
different committees prepare reports, which are approved by the en tire EP, and then further 
referred to as EP policy-document. Thus, 1) the EP does generally not bring forward documents 
which did not originate in one of the committees, and 2) the committees do not bring forward 
documents as individual entities. The second point did not pose a problem as such, because the 
fact that a sub-unit should have a role in the decision-making itself was not a requirement for this 
study. However, the first point would mean that the output of ali committees in the EP, and 
approved and forwarded by the EP, could be considered part of the policy-documents that should 
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be analysed. This would involve analysing hundreds of additional documents. Therefore, a 
choice was made to involve only those EP policy-documents which originated in AFET, based 
on the reasoning that those documents originating in other EP committees would most likely be 
more relevant to meso-policies of enlargement, and thus find no reflection in the rest of the 
documents analyzed. 
The role of individual parties in the European Parliament was purposely left aside. Consequently, 
motions ofresolutions were not analysed, and the analysis of the written reports of the debates 
and EP meetings did not pay consideration to the parties' standpoints, but instead treated these as 
EP discourse asa whole. 
69 
Fig. 5. 7 Scheme of analysis 
The document 
Policy issue? 
Explorative? 
YES/ Category D 
Nü/ Category B 
Type of exploration? 
Short description of item 
a) Forecast (quantitative) 
b) Scenario (qualitative, broad) 
c) Other, namely 
Produced by whom? a) Policy-maker 
b) Extemal entity, namely ... 
Methodology? e.g. a) Extending trends 
b) Combing trends 
c) Other. . . . .. . 
How far ahead? a) Long tenn, but vague when 
b) Tenn (e.g. 20-30 years) 
c) Specifıc date/ point in time 
Who' s future? a) EU 
b) Turkey 
c) Common future 
What about the future? a) Objectives 
b) Expectations 
c) Requirements 
d) Wishes 
Solutions for not knowing the future? 
+ 
General picture about the future? 
Other comments 
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The aim of the above scheme for analysis was not to divide the body of documents into boxes, 
but rather to function asa scheme of thought, in order to ask the same questions with regard to 
every document, and assist in the systematic analysis of every document. 
Asa definition of 'explorative' the rather wide definition of Van Asselt was maintained, namely 
that future explorations try to imagine the uncertain and unknown future in a consistent 
manner. 118 This definition was left open for adoption or further specification in the course of the 
research, but this was deemed unnecessary. 
5.5.2 Research step 2 
It is not possible on the bas is of the first research step alo ne to give an answer as to the existence 
of future exploration on the !eve! of the European Union. As has been shown by the literature, 
future exploration can be conducted by the policy-making body oran external entity. Although 
research step 1 can be expected to provide a rather exclusionary answer as to the existence of 
internal future explorations, making similar assumptions on the bas is of these findings about 
extemally produces future explorations would imply that all future explorations end up in the 
policy-process, which Iogically is not the case. 
The second research step thus aimed at establishing whether future explorations are actually 
conducted. The rationale at the basis of this step was that if future explorations are not produced 
at all , the policy-making cannot (be expected to) incorporate those into the policy-decisions. 
In allocating extemally produced future explorations on the Turkey-EU dossier, the following 
steps were taken: 
Meeting docııments: The meetings of the EU institutions and their sub-units are prepared by their 
General Secretariats. For each meeting a number of meeting documents is assigned beforehand. 
Only in the case of the European Parliament sub-units AFET and JPC are these meeting 
documents public. In evaluating the meeting documents individually and in combination with the 
agenda of the meeting, it was assumed that these meeting documents were 'on the plate' of the 
policy-maker as part ofa decision, as the forma! input. A meeting document can thus be assumed 
118 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Van Asselt, M. (2005). Houdbaarheid verstreken: 
Toekomstverkenning en beleid. Den Haag. p. 11. 
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to be taken into account in the policy-making. in analysing the meeting documents, the following 
questions were answered: 
1) Are there any meeting documents that are future explorative? 
2) Are there any documents retrieved from extemal advisory agencies? 
Of course, it can not be assumed that meeting documents alone form the in put for policy-making. 
However, what can be said is that meeting documents create a shared base of knowledge among 
ali the policy-makers in a certain body, and that if the policy-maker is to seek his knowledge 
outside of the regular meeting documents, this knowledge is less likely to be shared by ali. 
Moreover, it is likely that an extra effort would be required to gather this knowledge then. 
Awareness: The interviews served to give an indication of to what extent there is an awareness of 
future explorations outside ofthe European Union. Here, the word 'indication' needs to be 
stressed, because the number of interviews was very limited and not suited to make any 
generalization. The interview with Mr. Missir di Lusignano was used to provide and indication 
of future explorative studies known to the DG Enlargement and used in the dossier and well as a 
short-list of extemal advisory bodies to the Commission. 
By comparison, the interview with Emerson was used to give an indication of extemal bodies 
that were involved in the Turkey-EU dossier, and possibly has future explorative capacities as 
well. 
E U internal advisory bodies: A step to evaluate the future explorative capacities and output of 
the EU' s was implemented as well. Here, the bodies indicated by the EU itself as official 
advisory bodies of the European Union institutions were taken asa guide. For the EU asa whole, 
these are the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Committee of the 
Regions (CoR). In addition, the official advisory bodies of the individual institutions were 
located on the basis of what they indicated themselves. Official advisory body was understood 
here asa body with no legislative power. Only in the case of the Commission could such a body 
be located, namely the DG Bureau for Economic and Policy Analysis. Further research into the 
DG BEPA showed an earlier advisory body by the name of Forward Studies Unit, and GOPA. 
These were also included in the analysis. The documents of ali these advisory bodies were 
evaluated to see whether they were future explorative. 
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It is important to establish here that the original research approach was maintained, meaning that 
future explorative documents were sough within the realm of Turkey-EU policy-making. In 
practice this meant that the following selection steps were applied: 
1. Selection of advisory documents related to the Turkey-EU dossier 
2. Among documents resulting from 1, selection on the bas is of future exploration. 
EU external advisory bodies: Here, again the original research approach was maintained, 
implying that future exploration was sought within the Turkey-EU dossier and not vice versa. In 
relation to the EU external advisory bodies, this complicated matters somewhat. Most likely, 
focussing on future explorative advisory bodies first, and then selecting those that might have a 
relation to the Turkey-EU dossier would have been easier, but this would have raised the chance 
ofa too wide interpretation of 'relation to the Turkey-EU dossier' . For example, in essence even 
future explorations about the EU in general, ora specific meso-policy could have been 
interpreted as such. If this approach had been taken, it would have been needed to approach ali 
the other steps in the same way as well to make an ample comparison. 
Thus, first the extemal advisory bodies which have a role in the Turkey-EU dossier were 
determined, and then their future explorative capacities were located. The difficulty here lay in 
the large number of potential advisory bodies. Instead of searching ali advisory bodies on the 
European level, a sample was taken on the bas is of the following: 
1. Extemal advisory bodies revealed in the meeting documents of AFET and JPC. 
2. Extemal advisory bodies referred to in the interview by Missir di Lusignano 
The rationale behind these steps was that these bodies were already known to the EU institutions 
and used for their expertise. In the steps referred to as Meeting documents and Awareness, İt was 
already established whether these bodies were used for their future explorative expertise or 
referred to in a more general manner. This step served to answer the following questions: 
1. Do these bodies create future explorations in relation to the Turkey-EU dossier? 
2. Could these ha ve been used by the EU (if they were referred to in a general manner)? 
On the basis of the advisory bodies brought forward in relation to the meeting documents and the 
interviews, the following extemal advisory bodies were investigated: 
• Independent Commission on Turkey 
• Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
73 
• Center for European Reform 
The focus here was on extemal agencies on the European level. 
By comparison, the future explorative agencies mentioned by Emerson were also investigated. 
Although these were mentioned by Emerson on the bas is of their presumed future explorative 
capabilities, the research method was maintained stili, by fırst establishing their relevance to the 
Turkey-EU dossier, and secondly their input in terms of future exploration in relation to this 
dossier. Again, the focus was on the bodies on the European !eve! Emerson referred to. 
The aim of the second research step was thus by no means to give an exclusionary overview of 
future explorative agencies on the European level in the Turkey-EU dossier, nor of the actual 
future exploration, but rather to give an indication ofthe availability of future explorations in 
relation to this dossier in general, as well as to establish to what extent ties between the EU and 
such agencies have been established already. 
5.5.3 Research step 3: Interviews 
In addition to the analysis of policy-documents ofthe EU and advisory bodies to the EU, 
interviews were conducted with a number of officials to get a better insight into both the forma! 
and informal ways in which future exploration plays a role in the Turkey-EU dossier. The 
number of interviews was limited due to time-constrains. Their results are therefore not suited to 
be translated into representative data on 'what officials think' . Nevertheless, keeping in mind 
that these interviews concem a mere random and small sample of people involved in the 
European policy-making process, they were used asa reflection for findings and possible 
explanations for data acquired. 
The interviewees were selected on their involvement in the EU-Turkey dossier, either asa 
policy-making, or as an extemal advisor in the process. 119 The people interviewed were: 
• Mr. A. Missir di Lusignano, Desk officer for Turkey in the DG Enlargement, European 
Commission. (Date of interview: 30 March 2006) 
11 9 Logically, availability played an important role as well. Apart from the eventual interviewees, the following 
people were contacted: Mr. Y. Devuyst- Author ofbook 'The European Union Transfonned'; Mr. C. Danielsson -
DG Enlargement Turkey specialist; Mr. M. Leigh - Director General DG Enlargement; Mr. O. Rehn - Enlargement 
Commissioner; Mr. G. Bertrand - former Forward Studies Unit/ Commission. 
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• Mr. M. Emerson, Senior Research Fellow at the Center of European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
in Brussels. (Date of interview: 4 April 2006) 
• Mr. F. Öztürk, Undersecretary of the Turkish Delegation to the EU in Brussels. (Date of 
interview: 4 April 2006) 
All of the interviewees were interviewed in person, allowing for the conversation to be recorded. 
In retrospect one can say that the interviews provided especially revealing results in relation to 
the first research objective. 
The interviewees were ali subjected to the interview guide below. Depending on the role of the 
interviewee, or in a single case time constraint, a number of questions were omitted from the 
interview guide to make the interview best serve its purpose. 
Fig. 5.6 Interview guide 
BLOCK I - INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction of the research project. 
a. Aims and objectives 
b. Specifıc interest in the interviewee 
2. Positioning of the interviewee 
a. Introduction of the interviewee 
b. Day-to-day activities 
c. Role of the interviewee in the 'actor' 
BLOCK il - TURKEY-EU RELA TIONS 1963-2005/ ANKARA AGREEMENT 
In the Ankara Agreement ( 1963), three goals were mentioned with regard to the future. 
1. Membership of the European Communities. 
a. What role has this goal played in the relations to Turkey? 
b. What was the picture of the future when this goal was agreed upon? 
c. What was the idea of the road to membership? 
d. What were the reasons that this goal was not specifıed further? 
2. The establishment of free movement of persons by 1986. 
a. What were the considerations about 1986 in 1963? 
b. Why did this not occur? Could these reasons have been/ were they anticipated? 
3. The establishment ofthe Customs Union by 1995. 
a. What were the considerations about 1995 in 1963? 
b. What were the considerations about this 30-year period in between? 
c. What were the expectations in 1963 of the Turkish economy in 1995? 
BLOCK III- ROLE OF THE ACTOR/ RELA TIONSHIP WITH EU INSTITUTIONS 
l. Relationship of the actor to the European institutions 
a. What is the position of the 'actor'? 
b. What has been its influence on the policy-making process in the Turkey-EU dossier? 
c. Has the relationship changed since the beginning ofthe dossier in 1963? 
d. What is the relationship with the other actors in the Turkey-EU dossier? 
BLOCK iV- EXPERTISE/ ADVISORY BODIES 
1. The use of expertise 
a. What kind of expertise does the 'actor' have with regard to future exploration? 
b. Has this expertise changed in the past 40 years? 
2. Extemal expertise of the 'actor' 
a. Does the 'actor' use extemal expertise with regard to future exploration? 
3. The European institutions 
a. Do the European institutions make use of external expertise with regard to future 
exploration? 
b. How is this expertise commissioned; what are the incentives for it? 
c. Where does the European Commission find the long-term expertise which forms the 
basis on its reports in Turkey-EU relations? 
BLOCK V-FORWARD STUDIES UNIT/BEPA 
l. Role of the former FSU in the Turkey-EU dossier 
a. What has been the role of the FSU in the Turkey-EU dossier? 
b. What happened to this function when it was incorporated into the BEP A? 
2. Role of BEPS in the Turkey-EU dossier 
a. What is the role ofthe BEPA in the Turkey-EU dossier? 
b. What is its relationship to the policy-making bodies of the EU? 
BLOCK VI- FUTURE EXPLORA TION IN GENERAL 
l. The implicit role of the future in EU policy-making 
a. Is the long-term future a topic of discussion in the European institutions? 
b. What does this future look like? 
c. Is an idea of the long-tenn future incorporated in the Commission policy towards 
Turkey? 
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2. Systematic future explorative practices in the EU institutions 
a. Is there a need within the European institutions for a systematic long-term explorative 
practice as a hasis for its policies? 
b. Is this need specifically apparent in the Turkey-EU dossier, or for policy-making in 
general? 
c. What type of policy-issues would be suitable for more long-term exploration of the 
future? 
3. Future oriented documents 
a. What are the most future-oriented policy-documents in the Turkey-EU dossier? 
The findings of the three research steps will be further elaborated upon in the next two chapters. 
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6. FINDINGS - P ART 1 
The following two chapters will present the findings of this study in a systematic manner, based 
on the methodological steps taken to acquire them. This section will elaborate on the first 
research step, involving the analysis of the policy-documents. As described in the previous 
chapter on methodology, the relevant documents of the European Council, European 
Commission, and European Parliament, were subjected to a number of search terms and then 
classified into three categories, namely A, B, and C. Accordingly, the documents in the !ast two 
categories were further studied on the basis ofa ' scheme of analysis' consisting of twelve 
questions relating to the 'future' in those documents. These questions (depending on their 
relevance) will be answered in this section. In addition, further observations on the basis of the 
analysis will be presented. The findings of the second research step will be presented in the next 
chapter. The results of the third step, namely the interview, will be interwoven in both these 
chapters to complement the findings. 
6.1 Findings according to institution 
In general the overall numbers of documents per category do not give specific indications about 
to what extent ' the future' is considered, or explored. It becomes clear that the number of 
documents in category C is very limited, and within the total of the 359 documents analysed 
sufficiently small to say that in these documents, there was almost no tendency towards future 
exploration. The numbers in category A and B are equal for two of the institutions, meaning that 
a mention about the long-term future was made in as many documents as it was left out. The 
findings per category do give an indication of what type of documents are most relevant in future 
exploration or future thinking. 
6.1.1 European Commission 
Table 1: Overview of analysed documents -European Commission 
Category A Category B Category C Total 
Reports 3 8 o 11 
Proposals 8 o o 8 
Minutes 2 2 o 4 
Communications 1 4 o 5 
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1 Working 
documents 
Total 
in general , three types of documents can be distinguished: the ' legislative ' documents, thus those 
involved in the legislative cycle (proposals, amendments, regulations, agreements and decisions), 
the ' communicative' documents, thus those which do not aim at policy directly, but are meant to 
inform to the benefit of policy (reports, communications, working documents), and the ' speech ' 
documents, thus reports of spoken events (minutes, statements, speeches). 
In the European Commission, the only category C document is a working document. 
Furthermore, none of the legislative documents fail in category B. With regard to the category A 
documents, the largest portion of these is located in the ' communicative ' documents, namely 
among reports, and communications. For working documents and minutes, the spread between 
category A and B is equal. 
6.1.2 European Council 
Table 2: Overview of analysed documents - European Council 
Category A Category B Category C Total 
Statements 14 8 o 22 
Presidency 7 7 o 14 
Conclusions 
Agreements l 4 o 5 
Proposals 5 o o 5 
Common 10 o o 10 
positions 
Decisions 19 2 o 21 
Overviews 16 4 o 20 
Minutes 15 9 o 24 
Report 5 1 o 6 
Ot her 4 o o 4 
Total 96 35 o 131 
The European Council is the only institution of the three in which approximately three quarters 
of the documents make no relevant mention ofthe long-term future and which contains no 
category C document. it would be too easy to conclude, however, that the European Council 
thinks about the future the least. The types of documents of which almost ali are located in 
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category A are ali legislative, namely the proposals, common positions, and decisions. 
Agreements are the only type of which a larger portion in located in category B than in A. 
Furthermore, with regard to minutes and statements the division is more balanced, stili leaving 
about two-thirds of these documents in category A. The balance within the Pres iden ey 
Conclusions is equal. 
6.1.3 European Parliament 
Table 3: Overview of analysed documents - European Parliament 
Category A Category B Category C Total 
Reports 25 26 3 54 
Common 3 4 o 7 
positions 
Joint motions for 3 o o 3 
resolutions 
Resolutions 33 19 o 52 
!Jriefing papers 8 13 1 22 
Debates o 25 o 25 
Minutes 9 o o 9 
Minutes Joint 5 6 o 11 
Par! iamentary 
Committee 
Proposals 7 o o 7 
Working papers o o 1 1 
Total 93 93 5 191 
The European Parliament had by far the largest number of publicly accessible documents, as 
well as the largest variety of documents. The research found five category C documents among 
them, ali of them among the ' communicative' documents, namely reports, one briefing paper, 
and working paper. Of the joint motions for resolution, the EP minutes and the proposals not one 
document is located in category B. Interestingly, in comparison to the minutes; ali of the reports 
of the debates were category B documents, meaning that in the debates, the long-term future was 
indeed a topic of discussion. The minutes ofthe Joint Parliamentary Committee and the common 
positions are spread equally between category A and B. Of the resolutions, a large majority was 
situated in category A, and the briefing papers were for the majority category B documents. 
Overall the largest part of category A documents consisted of reports and resolutions. 
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it is difficult to draw conclusions from these <lata as to which type of document is most likely to 
'explore' or 'consider' the future. Ali category C documents, thus ali documents of an 
explorative nature were found among the communicative documents. 
Table 4: Overview of ali documents in three categories 120 
Category A Category B 
Legislative 89 29 
Communicative 46 56 
Speech 45 50 
This !ast overview shows that as far as communicative and speech documents are concemed, 
there is an equal spread between category A and B. However, the large majority of legislative 
documents do not contain a relevant reference to the long-term future. From this table it can be 
derived that future considerations are least common in legislative documents. 
6.2 Category A 
The documents in category A, as can be seen in the scheme for analysis, are those that contain 
either no reference to the future, or one to the short or medium term. The analysis showed that in 
many cases, the ' future' is used without specific mention ofa timeframe, but in fact asa rather 
empty word. Without resorting too much to discourse analysis, a number of observations can be 
made. Firstly, the concept of ' future' is used as ' from here on' . This is best illustrated by 
sentences such as ' the committee asked for future reports to elaborate more on ... .. ' and ' the Joint 
Customs Union Committee should meet more frequently in the future ' . 121 Secondly, the ' future ' 
is used as ' who knows when'. 'The prospect of future accession' 122 is a frequently occurring 
phrase in the documents, as well as 'the EU's future strategy policy' and ' future treaty 
amendments ' . Thirdly, the ' future' is often used in a possessive sense such as in ' the future of 
Europe', 'if we want a better future ... ', 'the future ofTurkey lies in Europe' , 'to build a peaceful 
120 The European Council Overviews and Presidency Conclusions were not taken into account here. The Overviews 
contain a list of legislative acts by the European Council, hence including them would mean a double count of some 
legislative documents . Furthermore, the Presidency Conclusions were not included because they are ofa debatable 
nature, and can be classified as 'speech', 'legislative' and 'communicative'. 
12 1 Council ofthe European Union, Presidency. (2005). Report: Turkey: Preparation of EC-Turkey Association 
Council, Luxembourg, 11 April 2000 - Draft common position of the EU. 7495100 . Brussels. 
122 European Parliament. (2004). Debate, Tuesday 16 November 2004, Strasbourg- Written report. 
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and prosperous future'. 123 These !ast phrases give the idea ofa future that is a creation. in a 
similar vein, the 'future' is often used in an ideological way. This partly overlaps with the future 
asa possessive, such as in 'enlargement is a moral, political and economic challenge for the EU 
and presents an historic opportunity to shape the future of Europe' . üne of the reports of the 
European Parliament states that 'At the end of the twentieth century, the European Union took a 
far-reaching decision on its future by opening the accession process with ( ... ) Turkey'. 124 
Another ideological use of 'future' is ' hope ofa betler future after years of suffering'. 125 in his 
speech at the start of negotiations with Turkey, British minister of Foreign Affairs Straw stated 
on behalf of the Council that 
'lt's going to be a long road ahead but I'm in no doubt that bringing Turkey in to the 
European Union is a prize worth striving for and if the sentiment that has been around today, 
positive sentiment of co-operation continues which 1 think it will do then I think the future is 
good' .126 
Lastly, one can see that ' future' is a trigger word, a word that it used to engage people in debate. 
This can apply to the previously mentioned phrases as well, but also to phrases such as ' future 
generations ' and 'the consumers of the future' .127 
6.3 Commonalities in categories B and C 
Before going into the specific characteristics of the different categories, it is important to stress 
that the documents in these categories have a number of characteristics in common. Not only do 
123 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence 
Policy. (2004). Report on the 2003 Regular Report of the Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession. 
(FfNAL A5-0204/2004). Brussels. 
124 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. 
(2000). Report on the enlargement of the European Union: part 1 -Motionfor a resolution. (FINAL A5-
0250/2000). Brussels. p. 83 . 
125 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. 
(2000). Report on the cornrnunication from the Commission on the stabilisation and association process for 
countries of South-Eastem Europe. (FfNAL A5-0069/2000). Brussels. 
126 Straw, J.,& Rehn, o. (2005, 3 October). Turkey's accession to the European Union and Croatia's 
co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague. Speech presented at the 
European Council in Luxembourg. Luxembourg. 
127 European Parliament. (2000). Debate, Tuesday 11 April 2000, Strasbourg - Written report. 
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they have an orientation towards the long-term future, but also do they bring forward similar 
conviction with regard to the task of future exploration and the need for it. 
Exploring the future is in general considered a difficult endeavor, even more so in relation to 
Turkish accession. The Commission Working document on the Issues Arisingfrom Turkey's 
Membership Perspective states the uncertainties that are involved in the assessment of (long-
term) effects of Turkey's accession. 
• The future evolution ofthe Union's policies, the possible creation of new ones, and the 
degree of further deepening of integration that might occur. 
• Economic and structural developments both in Turkey and in the EU during the next 
decade, as well as exogenous factors, such as energy prices and the intemational 
economic environment at large 
• The expansion ofthe Union to 27 members 
• The timing and scope of the future enlargement process 128 
Nevertheless, it is recognized that exploration, or at least consideration of the long-term future is 
wished for. About this Commission representative Missir di Lusignano states that, 
' In order to know the medium term priorities, you need to be aware of the long-term 
perspectives. For example with regard to the Turkey-EU dossier, in terms of energy and 
political criteria, it is important to know what you can expect of what time; when 
circumstances are expected to change or not' .129 
European Parliament documents seem to stress a similar need for future exploration: 
'Europe, more than anyone else, has to ask itself what kind of diplomacy must be practiced 
in the future and how intemational relations will be ordered in the twenty-first century' .130 
128 Commission ofthe European Communities. (2004). Commission stajf working document: Issues Arisingfrom 
Turkey's Membership Perspective. (COM(2004) 656 final). Brussels: European Commission. 
129 A. Missir di Lusignano, personal interview, March 30, 2006. 
130 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. 
( 1997). Report on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy - (January to December 1996). 
(A4-0193/97). Brussels. 
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'The failure to look to the future has at times raised concem that the pending Member States 
may not have an equivalent commitment to ensure a high !eve! of environmental 
protection' .131 
'Proposes therefore that the Member States assess their long-term needs, distinguishing 
between the short (2003/2005), medium (2010/2012) and long term (2020/2025) so that the 
necessary strategic, industrial and budgetary options may be taken up when appropriate' .132 
Most clearly the demand for future explorations is exemplified by this actual question of the EP 
to the Commission: 'Has the Commission drawn up forecasts or studies on the sectoral and 
regional impact of future enlargement in terms of its effects on production and employment? 
And sometimes the question is raised whether the EU should not look ahead a little further: 
' It must therefore be asked whether this distribution of seats would gradually be readjusted 
with each further enlargement or whether there should be an adjustment which would !ast for 
al! enlargements in the foreseeable future.' 133 
Some documents go as far as to criticize lack of future perspective. it is said that 
'Agenda 2000 is an interesting, accurate document, but one which lacks the vision required 
to sketch out the Europe of the future, together with that form of dynamic vision required to 
understand how the Union and its policies will change once enlargement has taken place' .134 
131 European Parliament, Directorate General for Research. (2003). Working paper: The Enlargement Process of the 
EU: Consequences in the field of Environment. Luxembourg: European Communities. 
132 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence 
Policy. (2000). Report on the process achieved in the implementation of the commonforeign and security policy. 
(FlNAL AS-034012000). Brussels. 
133 European Parliament, Secretariat Working Part Taskforce 'Enlargement'. (1999). Briefing paper: Briefing No. 
15, The institutional aspects of enlargement of the European Union. (PE 167 .299/rev.l ). Luxembourg. 
134 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. 
( 1997). Report on the Communicationfrom the Commission 'Agenda 2000 -fora stronger and wider Union'. (A4-
0368/97). Brussels. 
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in one of the interviews, Öztürk even suggests that not exploring the future may have negative 
effects: 
' ...... And this is where the projections come into the equation. These 1 think we lack at this 
moment. lf you just look at Europe; after globalization now we are seeing a clash between 
globalization and protectionist measures coming from the Member States, and sometimes 
they even cali it economic patriotism, because they cannot make projections for the long 
run'. 135 
As can be seen from the raw data the general tendency is not to explore the future. However, 
ev en the documents in category B make sense of the long-term future, although through other 
means than exploring. The following sections, among other things, will show how the two 
categories aim to 'satisfy' the need for future thinking while countering the difficulties involved. 
6.4 Category B 
The documents in category B make a clear reference to the long-term future but cannot be 
designated as future-explorative. 
Two important points can be made on the bas is of the analysis: 
• Focal points: the documents almost ali have a tendency to have a focal point in relation to 
their considerations about the future. These two focal points are the attainment of the 
Customs Union and Accession ofTurkey to the European Union. The main difference and 
similarities between these two focal points will be outlined below. 
• Anticipation and planning: the documents have two main methods of dealing with the long-
term future, namely through anticipating it, or through planning. This will be elaborated upon 
further down. 
6.4.1 Focal points 
135 F. Öztürk, personal interview, April 4, 2006. 
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The achievement ofthe Customs Union 136 was first set asa goal in the Ankara Agreement of 
1963, and was further elaborated upon in the Additional Protocol, which stipulated that exactly 
22 years after it entered into force (in 1973) the Customs Union was to be achieved. The CU 
point was thus a tangible date in the future. 
The accession of Turkey to the European Union asa Member State has been equally present 
from the beginning of the dossier, as was mentioned in Art. 28 of the Ankara Agreement: 
' as soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging 
ful! acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the 
Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey 
to the Community' .137 
The reference to future membership of Turkey is very vague here. in the light of current events, 
knowing that future membership was discussed as early as 1963, and not been achieved to date, 
raises the question why it was mentioned at ali. Was it really meant to take this long, or did the 
signatories at the time perhaps have a more concrete vision to accompany the vague wording of 
the article? 
About this, Missir di Lusignano says: 
' The reference included in article 28 was nota promise in the vacuum, it was really 
something hard, and it you read the statement by the then Commission President Walter 
Hallstein, which was issued at the time, you see how much of an importance he attached to 
the evolution, into the deepening of this relation, which in his mind had no altemative but to 
evolve to an ever closer relations leading to accession'. 
'it was remote, it was very remote. it was a perspective, but it was not something towards 
which the country was striving as an immediate objective. it was like an overarching 
strategic objective, long-term, as it is right now in terms of its concrete achievement, but now 
136 1 will refer to this from here on as CU point to avoid confusion with the Customs Union as a stage. 
137 European Council. ( 1963). Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community 
and Turkey, signed at Ankara 12 September 1963. Official Journal ofthe European Communities, 24.12.73. 
Brussels. Art. 28 . 
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it has really become pressing, more narrowly defined, because we have a strategy and we 
have an institutional framework' . 
'Now people argue 'that was the European Community but now we've moved to the 
European Union, which was ofa different nature, we do not consider ourselves to be bound 
by that'. Some people ha ve dug into the archives of that peri od and you see that even de 
Gaulle himself had favoured an article 28 reference, in so far as to him the Turkey to the EU 
accession was a necessity, because of its strategic importance, so there is an indication that 
right from the start, accession was indeed something contemplated by the signatories of this 
treaty'. 138 
Öztürk adds to this that: 
'If a date were to be fixed beyond the Customs Union, this would necessitate the planning of 
a time span of almost 40-50 years. That is neither rational, nor doable in intemational politics 
( ... ) but 1 do not think that it was anticipated that it would take this long at that time' . 139 
The above partly explains why the goal of membership was kept vague, namely because at the 
time it was not an immediate objective, and planning so far ahead was not deemed appropriate. 
Yet, in later documents the goal of membership remains vague. Firstly, in relation to the start of 
negotiations, for which meeting the Copenhagen criteria was a prerequisite, it is stressed that: 
'Meeting the Copenhagen political criteria remains a long-term project whose outcome is 
stili uncertain and which will require the combined efforts of ali the social and economic 
players and Turkish society asa whole'. 140 
Even closer to the actual negotiations on accession, the vagueness of this future is maintained. in 
the negotiation strategy proposed on 3 October 2005, the Council stresses that 'These 
negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed 
138 A. Missir di Lusignano, personal interview, March 30, 2006. 
139 F. Öztürk, personal interview, April 4, 2006. 
140 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence 
Policy. (2004). Report on the 2003 Regular Report of the Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession. 
(FINAL AS-0204/2004). Brussels. 
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beforehand'. 141 The negotiation process may thus well not lead to the envisaged future of 
accession. This raises another interesting point, namely that thefocal point ofTurkish accession 
is not only vague but may also not exist at ali. 
The policy-documents do, however, not sustain this possibility, as the very large majority of 
them remains focused on Turkish accession and rather puts questions with regard to when rather 
than if accession takes place. Moreover, only three documents make a reference to a future were 
accession not to take place. The 2005 Negotiation Strategy states that 
' If Turkey is not in a position to assume in full ali the obligations of membership it must be 
ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest 
possible bond ' . 142 
Here privileged partnership is referred to. 
A 2001 AFET report stresses the need fora strong civil society irrespective of membership: 
' ( . . . ) to raise awareness ofthe European Union amongst civil society and thus win its 
backing fo r the reforms from which it will benefit, irrespective of possible EU membership 
in the future ' . 143 
Altematives to Turkish membership are thus not evident. This is endorsed by Olli Rehn, who, at 
the 2004 Council, declared that ' there is no place B for Turkey .. . we have the responsibility to 
accept the country as a member if it fulfills the criteria' . 144 
There seems to be a clear consensus among the three institutions that Turkish accession, largely 
dependent on the implementation ofthe acquis, is a long term objective. in 2001 , the EP notes 
that the ' necessary reform of the Turkish state and society will be a painful and long-lasting 
141 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. 
( 1997). Report on the Communicationfrom the Commission 'Agenda 2000 - fara stronger and wider Union'. (A4-
0368/97). Brussels. 
142 European Council. (2005) . EU-Turkey Negotiation Framework, Luxembourg 3 October 2005. Brussels. p. 1. 
143 European Parliament. (2001) . European Parliament resolution on the 2000 Regular Report from the Commission 
on Turkey's progress towards accession. (COM(2000) 713 - CS-0613/2000 - 2000/2014(COS) )/ (AS-0343/2001). 
Strasbourg. 
144 O. Rehn. No ' Plan B' for Turkey. 7 December 2004. 
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process'. And the European Council 'realizes that this is a long process of reform in which 
Turkey is faced with crucial choices, and that European help will be necessary in this process'. 
The Commission, in its 1998 Regular Report says: 'In any case, complete adoption ofthe acquis 
is stili only a long-term prospect and will entail large-scale investment for which detailed 
estimates are currently lacking' .145 
Nonetheless, the documents in category B give an indication of the timeframe within which 
Turkish accession can or cannot be expected. The 2005 Negotiations strategy paper states that 
'the negotiations can only be concluded after the establishment of the Financial Framework for 
the peri od from 2014'. 146 This idea is stressed throughout the category B documents. 
The accession of Turkey thus remains a rather vague point in the future. The achievement ofthe 
Customs Union was on the contrary more concrete from the beginning. Not only are these two 
points clear focal point in the long-term future, but in addition they indicate a path break, a 
change in the status quo. 
6.4.2 Anticipation and planning 
The analysis of the documents in category B shows that, short of exploring the future , they have 
two different ways of considering it, best described as anticipation and planning. The latter 
method is by far the most prevalent, and will be elaborated upon first. 
Planning 
Planning the future can best be understood as policy-making towards the future . In planning the 
future, the two focal points seem to play an important role: 
• Firstly, the CU point and the point of Turkish accession are not random focal points, but clear 
path breaks, changes in the situation ofboth Turkey and the European Union. The CU point 
indicates the start of liberalized trade between both parties. The accession of Turkey indicates 
a different intemational reality, and has received sufficient attention in previous chapters. 
• Secondly, thefocal points are the aiming point for policy documents. This is important to 
understand. They are thus not final stages of policy by random pick, but rather the long-term 
145 Commission ofthe European Communities. (1998). Regular Reportfrom the Commission on Turkey's Progress 
towards Accession. Brussels: European Commission. 
146 European Council. (2005). EU-Turkey Negotiation Framework, Luxembourg 3 October 2005. Brussels. p. 1. 
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climax at which policy should be focused. The focal point is thus determined prior to the 
policy. 
• Thirdly, a note: the combination of the above two points builds the understanding that the 
focal points, thus the Customs Union and Turkish accession to the EU, are, whether vague or 
tangible points in time, important in planning the long-term future. They serve as a 
framework, and are both path breaks in policy, and the aim of policy. 
These focal points, or path bre aks form the bas is of the policy directed towards the future. The 
principle premise underlying this type of thinking about the future is that these goals are to be 
attained, either in a given period or at some point in the future. The time in between today and 
one of these focal points is often referred to as the transitional or preparatory stage. The 
transitional stage serves to secure the actual occurrence of the path break. In relation to this, the 
documents serve a number of purposes. 
First they establish what is needed for the path break to occur. 
In relation to the Customs Union, this is the topic of the Ankara Agreement, which stipulates that 
a Customs Union between the two parties requires the complete removal of barriers to trade, 
such as tariffs and quantitative restrictions, as well as measures having equivalent effect. 
The point of Turkish accession to the EU is mentioned in the same document, but the 
requirements are best described by the Copenhagen Council in 1993, which sets the fulfillment 
of the Copenhagen criteria147and complete alignment ofthe candidate's legislation with the 
acquis communautaire as the most important requirement for membership. 148 
In addition, a number of more detailed requirements are given in the documents: 
147 See chapter 4 
148 Here an important note should be made: In the case ofTurkish accession, meeting the Copenhagen criteria was 
determined as a requirement for the start of accession negotiations. The implementation of the acquis consequently 
is a requirement for the accession of the country as a ful! member. Given the scope of research, consideration was 
given by the author to establishing the start of accession negotiations asa thirdfoca/ point in the documents . 
However, the issue ofTurkish accession is often treated by the documents asa single issue, not differentiating 
between the Copenhagen criteria and the acquis, and moreover, often adding alternative requirements. 
Consequently, the more logical choice was made for treatment of the ' start of negotiations' point as a point in the 
process towards accession. Asa result, the two requirements will be used interchangeably in the remainder ofthe 
chapter. 
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'The Commission underlined the importance of effectively incorporating Community 
legislation into national legislation, and the even greater importance of implementing it 
properly in the field, via the appropriate administrative and judicial structures. This is an 
essential pre-condition for creating the mutual trust indispensable for future membership.' 
Furthermore 'Turkey must accept the results of any other accession negotiations as they stand at 
the moment of its accession '. And another eri teri on lies in the development of the civil society 
dialogue, which is also designated by the Commission asa ' long-term process'. 149 
A number of requirements are long-term, and even reach beyond the focal point, but cannot be 
seen independently of it. Such as the case ofthe environmental acquis, ofwhich it is indicated 
that ' Complete adoption of the environmental acquis remains a long-term prospect' that 
according to the rest of the Report, may well extent beyond the actual point of accession. 150 The 
same goes for the abolition of the National Security Council in its current form and position in 
order to align civilian control of the military with practice in EU Member States. 15 1 
Second they establish how today 's situation is different from what is envisaged at the time of 
path break. 
With regard to this a Turkish delegate says the fo llowing in re lation to the CU point: 
' lf you j ust look at the conditions at that time, the Westem countries, at that time the EEC 
countries were much more developed than Turkey. The industrial development of Turkey 
was not at this point. That is why there were some periods given for harmonisation, lowering 
the customs tariffs for both sides' . 
And 
149 Commission ofthe European Communities. (2005). Communicationfrom the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Civil 
Society Dialogue between the EU and Candidate coııntries . COM(2005) 290 final. Brussels: European Commission. 
15° Commission ofthe European Communities. (2000) . 2000 Regular Reportfrom the Commission on Turkey 's 
Progress towards Accession. (8 November 2000). Brussels: European Commission. 
151 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence 
Policy. (2003). Report on Turkey 's appl ication for membership ofthe European Union. (COM(2002) 700 - CS-
0104/2003 - 2000/2014(COS))/ FINAL AS-0160/2003 . Brussels. 
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'Turkey's economy then was very far from being capable of withstanding the competitive 
pressures that would arise out of membership. A transition period was therefore foreseen in 
the Agreement, to permit Turkey to bridge the gap between its economy, and that of its 
partners in the Community'. 152 
And from the Commission perspective it is similarly stated that 
'in 1963 the status ofthe Turkish economy was not ready. The Association Agreement was 
signed back in 1963 with a country that had a very strong state sector. The country was 
almost a centrally planned economy, hada very strong state sector, and took basically from 
1963 to 1983 to dismantle progressively this state sector, to introduce gradual liberalization, 
to restructure the different aspects of the economy, to reduce the funds of the agriculture, and 
to basically move towards a more open, more flexible economy that would parallel what was 
done at the level of the EU'. 153 
The extent to which Turkey has met the Copenhagen criteria and implemented the acquis as a 
requirement for membership is the main focus of the Commission Regular Reports. 154 According 
to the 1998 Regular Report, 
' in making its assessment of the economic situation and outlook in Turkey the Commission 
has been guided by the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council which specified 
that accession to the Union called fora functioning market economy as well as the capacity 
to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union ' . 155 
And based on the current state of affairs in Turkey, a 2001 AFET reportjudges that there are 
incompatibilities between the objectives and Turkish situation. 
152 F. Öztürk, personal interview, April 4, 2006. 
153 A. Missir di Lusignano, personal interview, March 30, 2006. 
154 After the start of negotiations, the Commission Regular Reports are referred to as Progress Reports. These reports 
have not been considered in detail, as they are beyond the scope ofthis research, but a general reading shows that 
even though at the start of negotiations, meeting the Copenhagen criteria should no longer be an issue, the Progress 
reports stili give in depth consideration to them. 
15 Commission of the European Communities. ( 1998). Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey 's Progress 
towards Accession. Brussels: European Commission. p. 22. 
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'U nderlines in particular that the structure of state and institutions in Turkey as such 
constitutes a barrier to implementation of the IHA acquis; therefore notes that the necessary 
reform of the Turkish state and society will be a painful and long-lasting process' .156 
Furthermore, the documents list the requirements on Turkey in order to attain the objectives: 
'Turkey needs to increase its !eve! of investment in science and research to !ay the foundation for 
the future competitiveness of its economy and to contribute rapidly to job creation' .157 
Third, they establish a method of getting ready for the requirements. The policy-documents show 
that this is a very precise process, regulated on the basis of 1) timetables or roadmaps, or 2) 
transitional periods to the conditions needed for the path break. 
Timetables 
The Additional Protocol to the Ankara agreement establishes the timetable according to which 
the Customs Union is to be attained. The document envisages several stages in which tariffs are 
to be lowered by Turkey, in a period of 22 years. 
' The timetable for the reductions to be effected by Turkey shall be as follows: the first 
reduction shall be made on the entry into force of this Protocol. The second and third shall be 
applied three years and fıve years later. The fourth and subsequent reductions shall be made 
each year in such a way that the final reduction is made at the end of the transiti o nal stage. 
( .. . ) Each reduction shall be made by lowering the basic duty on each product by 10 %. 158 
Council Decision 1195 on the Customs Union calls on the Association Council to determine the 
timetable and rules for the progressive abolition of restrictions remaining at the time. 159 
156 European Parliament. (2001). European Parliament resolution on the 2000 Regular Report from the Commission 
on Turkey's progress towards accession. (COM(2000) 713 - CS-0613/2000 - 2000/2014(COS) )/ (AS-0343/2001). 
Strasbourg. 
157 Commission ofthe European Communities. (2003). 2003 Regular Report on Turkey 's Progress towards 
Accession. (SEC(2003) 1212/ COM(2003) 676 final) .Brussels: European Commission 
158 EC-Turkey Association Council. ( 1970). Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol, signed at Brussels, 23 
November 1970. Official Journal ofthe European Communities, 24.12.73. Brussels. Art. 10. 
159 EC-Turkey Association Council. ( 1995). Council Decisi on no. 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 
December 1995 on implementing the final phase ofthe Customs Union. (96/1 42/EC). Official Journal ofthe 
European Communities, 13.2.96. 
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According to the timetable specified in the Customs Union Decision of 1 January 1996, Turkey 
needs to have aligned itself with ali the preferential agreements concluded between the EC and 
third countries and EC autonomous preferential regimes by 2001. 
But the complete abolition ofrestrictions on trade took somewhat longer than expected as the 
documents show that discussion about timetables in relation to the Customs Union reaches well 
into 2002, when the main unsolved issues [ were] the scope of the agreement, the type of service 
providers to be included and the timetable for liberalization. Consequently, the Association 
Council, according to its minutes stresses that 'a clear timetable for the full liberalization of the 
market should be established without any further delay'. 160 
in relation to Turkish accession, the Accession Partnership states that 
' in order to prepare for membership, Turkey should prepare a national programme for the 
adoption of the acquis. This programme should set out a timetable for achieving the priorities 
and intermediate objectives established in the Accession Partnership. 161 
The Turkish Natianal Pragramme far the Adaptian far the Acquis (NP AA) sets out how Turkey 
envisages dealing with the Accession Partnership, the timetable for implementing the 
Partnership's priorities, and implications in terms of human and financial resources. The 
Accessian Partnership and the NP AA are revised in response to one another, with the mutual aim 
of setting a schedule according to which Turkey is to implement the acquis. Although the NP AA 
was not subject to the analysis, EU documents show that the burden of adaptation lies with 
Turkey in this case. The Council states in 2004 that 'the dialogue with the Turkish administration 
to promote alignment is taking place, and the EU has requested a timetable for full alignment 
with the EC directives'. 
The emphasis on timetables becomes clear from the only point of critique that the EP voices on 
the NPAA's in 2001, namely that ' the NPAA's are 'useful asa beginning ofthe vast 
160 European Commission. (2002). Minutes of the l JOth meeting ofthe EC-Turkey Association Committee Brııssels, 
24 January 2002. (11859/02). Brussels. 
16 1 European Council. (2001 ). Council Decisi on of 8 March 200 J on the principles, priorities, intermediate 
objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic ofTurkey. (2001 /235/EC). 
Offıcial Journal ofthe European Communities, 24.3 .2001. 
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transformation needed for the modemization of Turkey, but unfortunately without a clear enough 
'road map' and timetable' 162 as well as in the 200 l Regular Report, which states with regard to 
visa policy that 'steps have been taken to gradually come into alignment with the acquis and, in 
particular, the Common Cansular Instructions and the relevant EC Regulation. However, there 
are no indications on precise targets and timetables' .163 in the same report it is stated that 
'Although combating regional disparities in Turkey should be a major objective for 
strengthening intemal socio-economic cohesion as well as preparing for accession, there is 
still no comprehensive, long-term strategy to address such issues' .164 
N ote should be taken here of the fact that the Accession Partnership and the NP AA focus 
primarily on the implementation of the Community acquis. üne the basis of the documents, this 
seems to be not the only formalized timetable of achieving accession. Two points come to the 
fore: 
1. The achievement of the Customs Union is a prerequisite for the accession ofTurkey. 
This, as has been shown above, is subject to a different timetable. 
2. The implementation of the Copenhagen criteria is a prerequisite for the start of accession 
negotiations. The Copenhagen criteria are not the subject of the Accession Partnership 
and the NP AA, but they do form a step in the overall timetable to accession. 
Timetables are thus a way of anchoring the road to the future. 
Transition periods 
in short transition periods are timetables that can reach beyond the focal point, thus for example 
beyond the moment of accession. 
Although the documents in category B state the possibility of establishing transiti on periods fora 
number of chapters of the acquis, the scope of the research did not reach into the actual 
162 European Parliament. (2001). European Parliament resolution on the 2000 Regular Reportfrom the Commission 
on Turkey's progress towards accession. (A5-0343/2001). Strasbourg. 
163 Commission ofthe European Communities. (2001). 2001 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards 
Accession. SEC(2001) 1756. Brussels: European Commission. 
164 Commission ofthe European Communities. (2001). 2001 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards 
Accession. SEC(2001) 1756. Brussels: European Commission. 
95 
negotiation phase, during which this is actually determined. Furthermore, the EP stresses that 
'the Union may allow for transitional measures, provided that they are limited in scope and time 
( ... ) Transition periods should be short and few'. 165 Transition periods are thus always 
determined closer to accession, and are short; they do not really qualify as 'long term' planning. 
Not knowing 
Exploring the future does not become less uncertain as it is explored, but definitely remains 
uncertain when it is not explored, as is the case for all documents in category B, of which none 
include or make a reference to a future explorative practice as the basis for policy. In some 
documents this is made explicit. Especially in the documents which are oriented towards 
planning the future, attention is paid to 'what if events do not or cannot unfold as planned'. The 
ways in which this scenario is dealt with differs for each of the focal points, or rather for the 
vague and tangible future, and are referred to as re-evaluation and see you when you get there 
respectively. 
Re-evaluation: With regard to the CU point, it has been described already that the Additional 
Protocol to the Ankara Agreement establishes a time-table for progressively lowering tariffs in 
order to meet the focal point, the installment of the Customs Union. The Protocol gives no 
indication of an exploration of the economic future of either the EU or Turkey as a possible base 
for the different stages. This gives reason to assume that exploration of what can be expected of 
the economies of either party does not lie at the basis of determining these various stages. lt is 
implicitly assumed that the economies will be able to cope with the various stages of the 
timetable when they approach. The protocol itself recognizes that it is uncertain whether this will 
be the case. On how this is dealt with, Art. 22 states: 
'Six months before each of the dates of the !ast three increases the Council of Association shall 
review the consequences for the economic development of Turkey of increasing the degree of 
liberalization and shall, if this is necessary for achievement of an accelerated development of 
the Turkish economy, decide to postpone the increase fora period which it shall determine '. 166 
165 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. 
(2000) . Report on the enlargement of the European Union: part l - Motionfor a resolution. (COM(l 999) 500 - C5-
034l/2000 - 2171/2000 (COS))/ FINAL A5-0250/2000. Brussels. 
166 EC-Turkey Association Council. (1970) . Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol, signed at Brussels, 23 
November 1970. Offıcial Journal ofthe European Communities, 24.12.73. Brussels. Art. 22. 
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See you when you get there: With re gard to the goal of Turkish accession, a different approach 
becomes evident from the documents. In short, if the requirements for the path bre ak are not 
met, the accession will merely not take place, and the path break will move further into the 
future. This is best described in the 2005 Negotiation strategy: 'The negotiations will be based 
on Turkey's own merits and the pace will depend on Turkey's progress in meeting the 
requirements for membership' .167 The European Parliament stresses that 
'European Parliament noted the decision to consider Turkey an applicant country and 
reiterated that negotiations could not be opened as Turkey fell well short of meeting the 
political criteria laid down in Copenhagen'. 
and at a later stage 
'The Union side, for its part, will decide in due course whether the conditions for the 
conclusion of negotiations have been met; this will be done on the basis ofa report from the 
Commission confirming the fulfillment by Turkey of the requirements' .168 
'The Commiss ion shall monitor this capacity during the negotiations, encompassing the 
whole range of issues set out in its October 2004 paper on issues arising from Turkey's 
membership perspective, in order to inform an assessment by the Council as to whether this 
condition of membership has been met ' . 
And with re gard to the opening up of borders, one of the aspects of membership, it is said that 
'Turkey will not accede to the Schengen zone upon or for some time 169 after its accession, 
but ata later date to be determined by the Council following a stringent evaluation of its 
border management practices' . 170 
167 European Council. (2005) . EU-Turkey Negotiation Framework, Luxembourg 3 October 2005. Brussels. p. l. 
168 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. 
( 1997). Report on the Commıınicationfrom the Commission 'Agenda 2000 -fara stronger and wider Union'. (A4-
0368/97). Brussels. 
169 Emphasis added by author. 
17
° Commission of the European Communities. (2004). Commission staff working document: /ssues Arisingfrom 
Turkey 's Membership Perspective . (COM(2004) 656 final) . Brussels: European Commission. p. 9. 
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The Commission can, on its own initiative or on the request of one third of the Member States, 
recommend the suspension of negotiations and propose the conditions for eventual resumption. It 
can thus postpone the focal point, or eliminate it entirely. This is what is often referred as the 
'emergency brake' ora 'guarantee against any deviation'. 171 
Here two important notes should be made: 
• With regard to the point of Turkish accession, the burden of adjustment to the requirements 
seems to be on Turkey primarily. This is an important aspect in the see you when you get 
there-approach towards not knowing the future. 
• A slight difference can be detected in the rigidity of the approach in relation to the 
Copenhagen criteria and the implementation of the acquis. The documents referring to the 
Copenhagen criteria seemed to be more stringent, whereas in respect of the acquis transiti on 
periods are brought forward as a way of attaining the focal point before ali requirements have 
been met. This can be a way of softening the rigidity of the approach, based on a degree of 
confidence in the future. in the same vein it should be stressed again that transition periods 
usually do not apply to the long term. 
The see you when you get there approach is not the same as the wait and see attitude described in 
earlier chapters . This is made explicit by one of the AFET reports on Turkish accession, which 
states that 
' (The EU) does not adopt wait-and-see' approach but (supports) the govemment in actively 
fulfilling the political criteria of Copenhagen. This approach means that work on compliance 
with the criteria must not be postponed to some date in the future. The EU should not be a 
passive observer but should give the necessary assistance. in order for this approach 172 to be 
effective it is necessary that no problems should be swept under the carpet, particularly not 
the most fundamental problems: it should be stated clearly where the problems lie' . 
17 1 Missir di Lusignano, A. (2005). EU-Turkey relations after 17 December 2004: the beginning ofa new era? 
European Commission: Directorate General for Enlargement. 
172 Here the document does not refer to the see y ou when you get there approach. 
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Indeed, the EU, through actively pushing for the compilation ofa timetable, and for example the 
pre-accession assistance does take an active role in determining the road to the path break. The 
see you when you get there approach stresses basically that this road is for the candidate to walk. 
Furthermore, the documents showed that the see you when you get there approach with regard to 
not knowing the future is not usually combined with future anticipations. The approach is based 
on the evaluation of the status quo, and does generally not anticipate the long term future asa 
basis for decisions. The 1998 Regular Report of the Commission states that: 
'While Turkey has undeniably shown that it has the administrative and legal capacity to 
apply the acquis in the context of the customs union, it is not possible at this stage to offer 
an opinion on its future capacity regarding other areas of the acquis which have not yet been 
transposed'. 
Ali of the Regular Reports make a number of statements about the short and medium-term 
future, but no not touch upon long-term expectations. 
On the bas is of the documents, among those focused on planning the future a difference can be 
established between what can be called policy-making for the long-term future and long-term 
policy-making. This mainly has to do with the existence ofa certain focal point in the future, it 
seems. The previous paragraphs described how a point in the future can serve as a focus for 
policy-making. This pol icy-making as such does not necessari ly have to be long-term. A long-
term focus can be complemented by short-term policy-priorities. 173 A clear example of this is the 
EU role in the Middle East, in which it says to have ' assumed a diplomatic mediation role with 
the aim of linking short-term operational crisis management measures to long-term prospects' .174 
The other way of planning the future is by means of long-term policy-making, meaning policy 
that is sustained fora longer period of time. Examples ofthis are for example the twinning policy 
as part of the Phare accession assistance, which involves the long-term secondment of civil 
servants to Turkey in the light of adaptation to the acquis communautaire, as wel as the EU' s 
173European Parliarnent, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence 
Policy. (2003). Report on Turkey's applicationfor membership ofthe European Union. (COM(2002) 700 - CS-
0104/2003 -2000/2014(COS))/ FINAL AS-0160/2003. Brussels. 
174 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. 
(2001). Report on the progress achieved in the implementation of the commonforeign and security policy. 
(200 l/2007(INI))/ (FINAL AS-0332/2001). Brussels. 
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'long-term programme of enhanced, concerted and multilateral economic assistance for the 
reconstruction of the region'. 175 Here it involves a long-term commitment of the EU. 176 The 
difference between these two aspects of planning the future can be very subtle, and the 
documents show that in many cases they overlap. 
Some of the long-term planning of the future is not directly related to one ofthefocal points. 
Some of the tasks or objectives established are not requirements for the achievement of one of 
the path breaks, but for success in general. For example in relation to education policy, it is said 
that participation by countries and people in the region itself remains a key factor in achieving 
positive outcomes in the medium and long term. 177 And with regard to the same policy, an 
example can be found of an objective which is not directly related to afocal point: 'The aim in 
the long and medium term is to increase the educational standard of the population, to support an 
active employment policy, employability, lifelong leaming'. 178 
Anticipation 
it has been stressed earlier that the documents in category B and O have a commonality in 
stressing the difficulties involved future exploration. In the category B documents, such 
statements are usually used as an explanation of why such an endeavor is not pursued. 
Nonetheless, short ofa real future exploration, the documents in category B ha ve a way to go 
about this without leaving the future asa black hole. 
Many documents list the uncertainties involved in exploring the future, giving some indication of 
what could be expected in the future. 
175 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. 
(1997). Report on the Commission report on 'Prospectsfor the development of regional cooperationfor the 
countries of the former Yugoslavia and what the Community could do to foster such cooperation '. (SEC(96)0252 -
C4-0274/96) and the Commission report on 'Common principlesfor future contractual relations with certain 
countries in South- Eastern Europe ' (COM(96)0476 - C4-0644/96). PE 220.776/fin./ (A4-0127/97). Brussels. 
176 Commission ofthe European Communities. (2001). Commission stajf Working Document: Annex to the 2003 
Report on Phare and the pre-accession instrumentsfor Cyprus, Malta and Turkey- Country sections and additional 
information. ( COM(2005) 64 final) . Brussels. 
177 Council ofthe European Union, President. (1999). Note: Preparationfor the Can/erence of European Ministers 
for Educationfrom 24 to 26 June 1999 in Budapest. (8947/1/99). Brussels. 
178 Commission ofthe European Communities. (2001). Commission stajf Working Document: Annex to the 2003 
Report on Phare and the pre-accession instruments for Cyprus, Malta and Turkey - Country sections and additional 
information. ( COM(2005) 64 final) . Brussels. 
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Others list a general expectation. Such is the case with the Commission report on enlargement 
which states that 'impacts so far on the economy, society and the environment have been more 
marginal, more socio-economic impacts can be expected in the longer terrn'. ı 79 The same is true 
for the Regular Report 2000, which indicates that 
'Privatization in the telecommunications and energy sectors are expected to improve the 
business environment for Turkish industry in the future, provided that they are also 
accompanied by a lifting of monopolies and market liberalization. ıso 
Here no reference is made to a future exploration or any other source on which this expectation 
is based. Furthermore, in many such documents, the expectation of the future is based ona 
current trend: ' If one takes a long-term view it is apparent that the world is moving to a more 
interdependent system in which issues of global govemance become ever more pressing '. ısı 
Another example is: 
Or 
' recognizing the special part immigration has played in the past in securing mutual 
understanding, and considering that immigration will continue to occupy a prominent 
position in Euro-Mediterranean relations in the future ' .182 
'A high, persistent !eve! of inflation is sapping the strength of the Turkish economy by 
discouraging investment and hence future production potential '. ı 83 
The most important example of expectations about the future on the hasis of current trends is 
voiced in a number of documents, specifically by the Council, in which it voices its confidence 
about the reforms in Turkey: 
179 Commission ofthe European Communities. (2001). Commission staff Working Document: Annex ta the 2003 
Report on Phare and the pre-accession instrumentsfor Cyprus, Malta and Turkey- Country sections and additional 
information. ( COM(2005) 64 final) . Brussels. 
18
° Commission ofthe European Communities. (2000). 2000 Regular Reportfrom the Commission on Turkey's 
Progress towards Accession. (8 November 2000). Brussels: European Commission. 
181 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human R.ights, Common Security and Defence Policy. 
( 1998). Report on the role of the Union in the world: lmplementation of the common foreign and security policy far 
1997. PE 226.282/fin ./ (A4-0169/98). Brussels. 
182 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. 
(1997) . Report on thejoint report by the Presidency ofthe Council and the Commission on Mediterranean Policy-
follow-up to the Barcelona conference. (7987/96 - C4-0414/96)/ PE 218 .799/fin ./ (A4-0027/97). Brussels. 
183 European Parliament, Secretariat Working Part Taskforce 'Enlargement' . (2000). Briefing paper: Briefing Na. 7, 
Turkey and relations with the European Union . (PE 167.407/rev.3). Luxembourg. 
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'The European Council welcomed the decisive progress made by Turkey in its far-reaching 
reform process and expressed its confidence that Turkey will sustain that process of 
reform' .184 
Some documents, short of making an exploration, list concrete variables on which the future 
depends. The future may be uncertain, but the documents go as far as to state what will 
determine the future. With regard to an exploration of the farming sector it is said that 'European 
farming sector will come under two types of competing pressures'. 185 
in relation to the energy sector, the following variables are stipulated: 
' While future demand for electricity will be shaped by the overall economic growth, (the 
demand for electricity should grow at about the same rate as the general economic growth) 
predictions about economic growth in the transitional economies are highly uncertain'. 
Lastly, a large number of documents contain what van Asselt refers to as diagnoses of toda/86, 
indicating the trends and main developments that play a role today. Here it is not made explicit 
that these trends will continue in the future , but implicitly, by using the current status of events 
as a bas is of policy, it is assumed that there will be some continuation in the future. 
6.5 Category C 
The documents in category C are those which either are, contain, or refer to a future explorative 
study. Although this seems like a broad definition, only six documents were designated as such. 
These were: 
184 European Council. (2005) . Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels 16-17 December 2004. (16238/ 1104). 
Brussels. 
185 firstly from US agricultural policy and the CAIRNS Group which would like to see a total liberalization of 
agriculture based on the RlCARDO principle of comparative advantage; secondly, as demonstrated by the European 
Parliament ' s recent adoption ofa resolution against the use of hormones in beef production, there is a counter 
pressure based on environmental, economic, social and cultural considerations which would like to reverse this 
trend. 
186 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Van Asselt, M. (2005). Houdbaarheid verstreken: 
Toekomstverkenning en beleid. Den Haag. 
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1. Commission of the European Communities. (2004 ). Commission staff working document: 
Issues Arisingfrom Turkey 's Membership Perspective. (COM(2004) 656 final). Brussels: 
European Commission. 
2. European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and 
Defence Policy. (2000). Report on the enlargement of the European Union: part 1-Motion 
fara resolution. (COM( 1999) 500 - C5-0341/2000 - 2171/2000 (COS))/ FINAL A5-
0250/2000. Brussels. 
3. European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and 
Defence 
Policy. (2004). Report with a proposal fara European Parliament recommendation to the 
Council on EU policy towards the South Caucasus. 2003/2225(INI))/ FINAL A5-0052/2004. 
Brussels. 
4. European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and 
Defence Policy. (1997). Report on the Communicationfrom the Commission 'Agenda 2000 -
fara stronger and wider Union'. (COM(97)2000 - C4-0371/97)/ PE 224.339/fin./ A4-
0368/97. Brussels. 
5. European Parliament, Secretariat Working Party Taskforce 'Enlargement'. (1999). Briefing 
paper: Briefing No. 3 7, Enlargement and external economic relations. (PE 168.062/rev.1 ). 
Luxembourg. 
6. European Parliament Working paper: The Enlargement Process of the EU: Consequences in 
the field of Environment. Luxembourg: European Communities. 
Since the number of future explorative documents is limited it is best to consider them each 
individually before attempting to draw more general conclusions from them. 
Commission staff working document: Issues Arising from Turkey 's Membership Perspective. 
The Commission's Issues paper seems to enjoy a somewhat special place in the Turkey-EU 
dossier, judging by the fact that it was recommended by two of the interviewees as ' the most 
future oriented document in the dossier' and is situated at the top of the 'most important 
document list' on the Commission webpage on Turkish accession. 
The document was produced by the Commission on request by the European Parliament. As 
such the Commission performed its role within the policy-making cycle of providing the other 
institutions with reports and information as the basis for policy decisions. The fact that this 
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document was commissioned outside ofthe regular system of Regular Reports also shows the 
role that the Commission can fulfil as an advisor on request. The report was presented in parallel 
with the Regular report and the Commission Recommendation. As such it was meant to serve as 
a hasis for further policy-decisions, thus to inform for better policy. The paper positions itself 
within the policy-making field by stating that it does not include additional criteria or criteria to 
be fulfilled, but can be considered relevant in the light of the fourth Copenhagen criteria, namely 
the capacity of the European Union to absorb new members. 
The aim of the document as stated in the introduction is to 'conduct an assessment of the effects 
of Turkey' s possible accession'. The assessment primarily addresses the effects ofTurkey's 
integration in EU policies. It does so by subsequently investigating the following aspects: geo-
political dimension, economic dimension, intemal market and related politics, agriculture and 
fisheries, regional and structural policy,justice and home affairs, and budgetary issues. Many of 
these anticipated effects are short- and medium term. The paper establishes a number of 
expectations with regard to the long-term. 
• There will be a relatively small, but positive long-term economic benefit of Turkish 
accessıon. 
• Some labor migration from Turkey is to be expected. Here the report refers to 'available 
studies giving varying estimates of expected additional migration following Turkish 
accession'. Estimates of the long-term impact, according to the report are based primarily on 
expected income difference and give very varying figures (ranging from 0.5 to 4 million 
potential Turkish immigrants). Here the study makes a reference to a number of extemal 
studies, conducted by the Dutch Planning Office, and the Osteuropa-Institute in Munich as 
well as the Eurobarometer. 
• Furthermore, it is anticipated that this migration might have a contribution to offsetting the 
ageing of EU societies, hereby also making an assumption about the future of European 
countries. However, in the long run, the declining trend in Turkish population growth rates 
will tum the population structure into that similar to a Westem European society. The 
estimation of population prospects here is based on the UN World Population Prospects 2002 
Revision. 
• Energy demand has grown at 4-5 percent per annum over the past three decades and will 
continue to grow rapidly, which will require enormous investments in coming years. Imports 
of solid fuels and hydrocarbons are expected to nearly double between 2000 and 2020. 
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• Provided that ambitious reforms can be sustained over the medium-term, Turkey's accession 
could have a positive effect on the intemal market by enhancing access to a potentially large 
and fast growing banking, insurance and investment market. 
• Among the expected positive effects resulting from possible Turkish accession are the 
reduction of cross-border air pollution and the improvement of Black Sea water quality. 
• In the longer term, Turkish accession can be expected to lead to an increase of trade in both 
directions. 
A number of expectations about the future are in first instance short or medium term but can also 
be applicable for the longer term. 
• Turkey is expected to develop further asa major oil transit country. 
• Water in the Middle East will increasingly become a strategic issue in the years to come. 
• The shift in employment and value added away from the agricultural sector to the service 
sector can be expected to continue and generate additional productivity increases. 
Furthermore, the paper establishes a number of objectives and requirements in order to avoid 
some negative consequences in the long run and thus allow for success. 
• Turkey would need time to make a number of agricultural sectors more competitive. Turkey 
would need considerable time to restructure its agricultural sector and avoid substantial 
income losses for Turkish farmers. 
• Given that Turkey faces the increasing threat of tobacco-related cancers and other health 
risks related to tobacco consumption continued efforts in transposing and implementing the 
Community acquis and activities aiming at controlling tobacco consumption are essential. 
The above expectations about the future show that report considers the future of Turkey, that of 
the EU, and that of the both combined. Furthermore, it considers long-term events that are a 
consequence of accession, as well some events that would evolve independently of accession, 
but would play a role in the process. 
It has been stipulated in an earlier section of this chapter already that overall, it is recognized that 
exploring the future is a difficult task. The Issues paper, after setting out the challenges which 
ha ve been described at the beginning of this chapter, takes the following two steps to make 
exploration of the future doable: 
• The assessment is based on existing policies. 
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• The implications of possible accession of the Westem Balkan countries are not considered. 
Furthermore, the evaluation is based on the extension of existing trends. 
European Parliament. Report on the enlargement of the European Union: part 1 - Motion fora 
resolution .. 
The European Parliament report on enlargement has a similar approach, covering a range of 
areas, but only stipulates a long-term expectation with regard to the environment. The document 
considers the long-term effects on the environment of Turkish accession: 
• air quality and pollution, climate change and ozone depletion: very high emissions of 
polluting substances and greenhouse gases from increased traffic and bad quality of fuels 
• water pollution: a heavy load from agricultural , urban, suburban, and industrial sources, 
lack of sewage water treatment, eutrophication of fresh waters and pollution of river and 
marine waters 
• soil depletion and degradation: increased use of chemical fertilisers, pesticides, 
herbicides, nitrates and sewage sludge on agricultural land; acidification and 
desertification, serious risks from insufficiently controlled human and industrial activities, 
including sports and mass tourism; 
• waste management: increased quantities of domestic and industrial waste, very low level 
of recycling and re-use; 
• industrial pollution and risk management: inadequate management of hazardous waste, 
high-risk substances and nuclear material. 
These expectations are based on the current legislative situation in Turkey, and what effects it 
would have on the European environment if it is not changed before accession. Clearly in this 
case it thus concems the future of the European Union including Turkey, and the exploration of 
the future after accession. The document as such does not make a reference to an extemal source 
to support these expectations. 
in the same document, these expectations are used to word a number of policy objectives: 
• Emphasis on compliance with the EU environmental acquis. 
• European, regional and sectoral co-operation and the building of strong networks including a 
programme of active co-operation 
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European Parliament. Report with a proposalfor a European Parliament recommendation to the 
Council on EU policy towards the South Caucasus. 
The recommendation on the South Caucasus, is related primarily to the EU's foreign policy 
towards this area. it makes a statement about the long-term future in relation to energy policy, 
which is that the EU will become increasingly dependent on energy supply from neighbouring 
countries in the future. This expectation serves as the hasis for the rest of the policy-paper, which 
argues for closer ties between the South Caucasus and the EU, especially in the field of energy. 
in this case it concems the future of the European Union only. Asa hasis for this expectation, the 
document refers to the following document: 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
Development of the Energy Policy for the Enlarged European Union, its Neighbours and Partner 
Countries (COM (2003) 262final/2). 187 
European Parliament. Report on the Communicationfrom the Commission 'Agenda 2000 -fora 
stronger and wider Union'. 
The report on the Commission's 'Agenda 2000', is primarily concemed with the previous 
enlargement of the CEEC countries. Stili, it makes a number of statements with re gard to 
Turkey. The Report states: 
• Speedy and full accession of ali candidate Member States will, in the long term, improve the 
environment throughout Europe, assuming a more intensive approach to important policy 
areas such as the environment, transport and energy. 
• Some experts estimate short-term job losses in farming and the rural economy at one million. 
Here no reference is made to any report supporting this number, nor is it stated who the 
experts are. 
• At ali events it can be assumed that, even with long-term transition rules on personal freedom 
of movement migration pressure will increase. 
• Studies of the long-term impact of growth in trade point to anot inconsiderable increase 
in potential. They also show, however, that it is the northern EU states that derive the greatest 
advantages, while the southem ones are unevenly exposed to stronger competition. Again 
here it is not indicated which studies are meant. 
187 This document was not accessible for further research. 
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• in the long term it may be expected that the new Member States, as they gradually grow 
more prosperous themselves, will increase the EU's development cooperation resources. 
European Parliament. Briefing paper: Briefing No. 37, Enlargement and external economic 
relations. 
The EP briefing paper was produced by Parliament Secretariat's Task Force on Enlargement, 
which no longer exists as such. The Briefing focuses on the relation between enlargement and 
extemal economic relations. The paper states a number of relations with regard to the future: 
• it is likely that the new countries will have to take on further moves towards trade 
liberalization within the framework ofthe WTO. By doing so and through a gradual 
integration of the new Member States into the EU, they will contribute to the expansion of 
the trade and economic stability in today's global economy. 
• The prospective EU members can be expected to become even more attractive hosts of FDI 
in the future. 
Here again, no reference is made to extemal sources to support these expectations. The paper as 
such seems to have a rather informative nature, and does not really elaborate on policy 
objectives. The document focuses on the long-term future before and after enlargement, as a 
consequence of enlargement policy. 
European Parliament Working paper: The Enlargement Process of the EV: Consequences in the 
field of Environment. Luxembourg: European Communities. 
The !ast paper in category A is one that is referred to a number of tim es in the European 
Parliament reports on Turkey-EU relations, but does not have a relationship to Turkish accession 
directly. This paper was requested by the European Parliament's committee on Environment, 
Public Health and Consumer Policy and conducted by an extemal agency, namely Milieu Ltd. in 
Brussels. The paper focuses on the environmental consequences of accession of the CEEC 
countries, especially in the long term. The paper argues that the short-term costs of compliance 
with the acquis will in the long-run be compensated by long-term benefits such as reduced 
pressures on the environment through diminished pollution emissions and depositions. To 
support this it makes long-term estimations of the financial benefits from compliance. The paper 
thus primarily focuses on the post-accession period. Due to its limited scope, the paper can be 
considered a forecast rather than a scenario. 
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üne should be careful not to make too many generalizations on the bas is of the mere number of 
six future explorative documents. Nevertheless, it is possible to list some general observations: 
1. There seems to be a tendency to intertwine policy-making and future exploration. This is 
based on three observations: 1) Four of the documents were policy-making documents by 
nature, and used the future exploration asa method of sustaining the proposed policy. 
Especially in the policy-documents policy-objectives were phrased alongside the future 
exploration; 2) Fi ve of the documents were produced by an institution in the policy-
making cycle; 3) All documents were produced on the basis of an incentive originating in 
one ofthe bodies in the policy-making cycle as part of the policy-making process, and 
thus in general aimed as assisting in policy-making as such. 
2. There seems to be a tendency to produce the future exploration inside of the policy-
making process. Only with regard to the last item on the list was the future exploration 
produced entirely by an extemal body. The other five documents were produced by the 
policy-maker ora sub-unit thereof. in a small number of cases a single statement or 
paragraph was referenced to a second source. In one case this was a Commission paper. 
The other references to extemal sources were made only in relation to quantitative <lata, 
thus statistics, and referred to the UN World Population Prospects, Eurostat, Euro-
barometer, as well as national entities such as the Dutch Planning Offıce and the 
Osteuropa-Institut in Munich. in most cases, these were related to economic <lata such as 
labor migration and demography. 
3. There seems to be an emphasis on explorative statements in the field of environment. The 
second most prominent topic seems to be economics. Even the papers which have the 
topic of Turkish accession asa whole seem to be most explorative in these two fields. 
4. There seemed to be afocal point in Turkish accession. A large portion of the documents 
explores the long-term consequences of accession, either for Turkey, the EU, or the 
combination of the two. in addition, some expectations about Turkish accession are based 
on an exploration ofthe Turkish future, or that of the EU. In this case the future 
exploration did not necessarily take into account accession, but was rather a base for 
policy-objectives for accession, for example in the case of enlargement. Furthermore, a 
small number of documents explored the future independent of Turkish accession. 
5. There seems to be a tendency to focus on forecasts rather than scenarios. In fact not one 
document in category C created one or multiple scenarios. 
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Furthermore, the documents give rise to the assumption that there is not a specific body either 
within the Commission or the European Parliament that systematically explores the future as a 
hasis for policy. Instead, it seems like such exploration is conducted and incorporated into the 
policy 'when it comes up'. This assumption is sustained by Commission representative Missir de 
Lusignano who states that: 
'There is not specific body which has it as its task to explore the future. Instead it is integrated 
into everyone's work, within the separate fields. The experts on energy supply explore the 
future in this area, and the same applies to civil-military relations. There is nota single person 
or body responsible for this. Asa whole the exploration of the long term is mostly based on the 
internal expertise of the DG Enlargement' . 
It has been stated earlier that the documents in category C, similar to those in category B, !ay 
emphasis on the difficulties involved in exploring the future. Contrary to the category B 
documents, they explore the future nevertheless. The documents show a number of ways in 
relation to how the future is explored. In general, there is an emphasis on the extension of current 
trends. Especially when the exploration of the future does not incorporate a path break, the 
inclination is to prolong current trends into the future. This is not only the case in relation to 
statistical data, but also with more qualitative situations, such as for example when a policy has 
been put into place 'positive effects are expected in the future'. 
Those documents aiming to consider the long-term effects of enlargement asa path break ali 
took a similar approach. Firstly, they recognized the uncertainties involved in assessing these 
effects, due to the effect that accession of Turkey is a point in the future , and that both the EU 
and Turkey will evolve until then. The Issııes paper contains an example of this, as has been 
shown above. Secondly, they emphasized that Turkish accession is not a determined point in the 
future, and that consequently anticipation of Turkey's and the EU's situation at the time of 
accession is impossible. Based on this, the documents go on to limit their scope, as to not include 
any changes in the status quo of either party in their analysis. The Issues paper states that: 
' Although significant policy development can be expected in several areas over the next 10-15 
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years, the assessment is based on existing policies .. [and] .. the implication ofthe possible 
accession of one or several of the Western Balkan countries are not considered' .188 
By accepting these assumptions, the exploration of the future becomes workable by limiting the 
number of options. Consequently, the underlying thought of these explorations is Turkey (status 
quo) + EU (status quo) = (long term) effects of enlargement. The basic premise ofthese papers is 
basically 'what if Turkey were to join the European Union today?' By evaluating the effects of 
Turkish accession based on the status quo, a concession is made in terms ofrelevancy of the 
documents. it is a given that Turkey will not accede at this moment. For example by evaluating 
the effects on the environment if Turkish legislation would not be changed is somewhat 
irrelevant, because the mandatory implementation of the acquis will change Turkish legislation. 
6.6 Thinking about the future 
Based on the analysis of category B and D, three types of 'thinking about the long-term future' 
can in general be sustained: 
• Exploring / anticipating the future (expecting) 
Anticipation or exploration of the future is related to the future of ' today'. it can be based on 
current trends that are extended, or on the reasoning through of current policies. 
• Exploring the future ofa path break (reasoning) 
A path break can be considered a radical policy change, as clear discontinuity of the status 
quo . Such is the case with the accession of Turkey to the European Union. 
• Determining the future (planning) 
This is done by setting objectives to be attained for the future , and toplan how to reach them 
accordingly. 
in general some inclination to these three types of thinking about the future is evident in 
categories B and D. A number of documents aim ata combination of two or ali three types. The 
documents showed that a combination oftwo ways of thinking about the future was always 
problematic. 
188 Commission ofthe European Communities. (2004). Commission stajfworking docııment: lssııes Arisingfrom 
Tıırkey 's Membership Perspective . (COM(2004) 656 final) . Brussels: European Commission. p. 4. 
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üne such combination was to explore the long-term effects ofa path break, not today, but in the 
future. The most prominent example of this is the effects of Turkish accession to the European 
Union. This implies having to first explore what the situation of Turkey and the EU will be like 
at the time of accession, before 'combining' those and constructing the long term effects of this 
path break. There was not a single document that took on this challenge. Instead, the documents 
of category B and D had different ways to work around it. 
The category B documents simply did not go beyond the path break in terms of long-term 
exploration. Instead, their focus was on the anticipation and planning of the future before the 
path bre ak, and at the most listing the variables that would be at work at the time of the path 
bre ak. The category C documents focussed on not exploring the future of the path bre ak, but 
rather doing so after the path break. This required ruling our change before the path break, such 
as by stating that 'policy changes are not taken into consideration' and the idea of 'what if 
Turkey were to join the EU today'. 
Furthermore, a combination of exploring the future and planning seems to be a difficult one, 
although the reasons far this are not entirely clear. In the category C documents that explored the 
future, even though the majority was part ofa policy-cycle, the focus seemed to be on objectives 
rather than a timetable far the achievement of such objectives. in those documents planning the 
future from category B, explorations of the future could not be detected. In fact, the method 
prevalent in category B with regard to dealing with not knowing the future seemed to rule aut the 
necessity for knowing the future. 
The data give the impression that consideration of the long-term effects of enlargement is 
limited; in fact that long term thinking about the future in general is very limited. In this respect 
it is interesting to point to an AFET report, which states that 
'Nar must any form of window-dressing be resorted to, with attention being drawn only to 
the long-term advantages; rather, it must alsa be acknowledged that, great as the need for 
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enlargement to the East undoubtedly is, we shall, at least in the medium term, have to face up 
to powerful restrictions' .189 
it is interesting to see that such clear 'attention to the long-term advantages' could not be 
detected in the policy-documents. This leads to the question of 'if there are such long-term 
advantages, why is not more attention drawn to them?' 
6. 7 The role of previous enlargements 
In the Council minutes, it is stated that 'a !ot of the considerations in the recommendation and 
strategy paper were outcomes of lessons learnt from the most recent enlargements' . More 
documents showed a relation between policy in relation to the Turkish accession and previous 
experiences with enlargement. For example: ' As witnessed by the ten new Member States, which 
joined the EU in May 2004, the perspective of EU membership triggers substantial FDI by EU 
companies' .190 Also, the working paper on enlargement stresses that 
'Previous steps towards closer EU integration have promoted FDI in EU member countries 
in several instances. Spain, for example, emerged asa major host country of FDI after the 
country joined the EU in l 986' .191 
in relation to the expected migration flow from Turkey to the EU, emphasis is laid on studies 
recalling the developments observed over time in Spain and Portugal, where initial immigration 
was subsequently reversed. 
Furthermore, based on earlier cost estimates for other candidate countries, the Issues paper 
estimates that 'the overall costs of public and private investment related to Turkey's full 
compliance with the environmental acquis is likely to reach several tens of billions of euros' . 
189 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. 
( 1997). Report on the Communicationfrom the Commission 'Agenda 2000 - fara stronger and wider Union'. 
(COM(97)2000 - C4-0371/97)/ PE 224.339/fin ./ A4-0368/97. Brussels. 
19° Commission ofthe European Communities. (2004). Commission staff working document: lssues Arisingfrom 
Turkey's Membership Perspective. (COM(2004) 656 final). Brussels: European Commission. p. 15 . 
191 European Parl iament, Secretariat Working Party Taskforce 'Enlargement'. (1999). Briefıng paper: Briefing No. 
37, Enlargement and external economic relations. (PE 168.062/rev. l) . Luxembourg. 
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Moreover, the sixth document in category C is alsa an important example of how even 
explorations from the previous enlargement are used in the Turkey-EU dossier. 
The use of experiences with farmer enlargement as a base far expectations about Turkish 
accession is to some extent logical, and may be a substitute far future explorations of the topic. 
Why explore the future when you have factual knowledge to build on? it may alsa point to the 
EU's nature of 'best practices', meaning that the EU continuously adapts its policies on the basis 
of past (rather than future) knowledge. 
6.8 Thinking about Turkey when thinking about the future 
This study, as has been pointed aut several times, is concemed with the role of thinking about the 
future in the Turkey-EU dossier. During the research however, some impression about the role of 
Turkey in the EU's ways of considering the future alsa came to the fare. It is worth pointing to a 
few findings which would come in handy in an up-side-down version ofthe study. 
Turkey participated in the discussion on the future of Europe within the European Convention, 
which concluded its work with a proposal fara Treaty establishing a Constitution far Europe 
submitted to the European Council with a view to the Intergovemmental Conference on the 
future institutional architecture of the Union. The minutes, especially ofthe Joint Parliamentary 
Committee continuously stress 'the importance attached by the EU to the participation of Turkey 
in the debate on the future of Europe'. 192 This is especially interesting compared to a statement in 
the Issues paper, namely that 'it is assumed that the Constitution will be adopted and in farce by 
the time of possible Turkish accession'. 193 
In some cases thinking about the future can obstruct Turkish accession. Far example in the case 
of the French and Dutch ' no' to the Constitution which had been prepared by the Convention on 
192 European Parliament, Delegation to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. (2003). Minutes 50ttı meeting 
ofthe EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, Istanbul 16-17 June 2003. Brussels. 
193 Commission ofthe European Communities. (2004). Commission staff working document: Issues Arisingfrom 
Turkey's Membership Perspective. (COM(2004) 656 final). Brussels: European Commission. p. 15 . 
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the Future of Europe, these public statements were interpreted asa 'no' to the totality of the 
project by the govemments of the Member States. 194 
Similarly, not thinking about Turkey when thinking about the future also makes an interesting 
point. This is the case in relation to the EU budget, which was determined until 2014, without 
taking into consideration Turkish accession. As a result, the budgetary impact, and thus the 
entirety of Turkish accession can only be contemplated from 2014 onwards. 
6.9 Political vs. economic criteria 
A close look at a number of documents related to the Copenhagen criteria gives rise to a remark 
on the different nature of political and economic criteria in the light of Turkish accession. This 
kind of comparison is outside the scope of the research, and the observation is very subtle, 
demanding more research would be needed to sustain it fully, but it is nevertheless worth 
mentioning. Having treated the transition periods with regard to planning the future, and the see 
you when you get there approach in terms of meeting the requirements for membership, as well · 
as the documents exploring the future , the following can be carefully speculated: 
There seems to be a relation between the exploration of the future, the rigidity ofthe 
Copenhagen criteria, and the willingness to allow transition periods. 
First of ali , there seems to an emphasis on exploration ofthe economic situation ofTurkey rather 
than its political prospects, as can be seen from the documents in category C. 
Secondly, statements with regard to the see you when you get there aspect of accession, seem to 
be aimed more toward the political than the economic Copenhagen criteria. 195 
With regard to economic criteria, there seems to be a quest rather for ensured prospects rather 
than an attained situation. The Council for example states ' despite the progress achieved, 
194 European Parliament, Delegation to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. (2006). lnformation note on 
the work of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. Brussels. 
195 European Parliament, Delegation to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. (2000). Minutes 45ıh meeting 
of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, Brussels 5-6 June 2000. (PE 291 .076). Brussels. 
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economic stability and predictability have not yet been achieved to a suffıcient degree to ensure 
Turkey's longer-term growth prospects' .196 
Thirdly, there seems to be a tendency to refer more to the possibility of transiti on periods in 
relation to economic criteria. 
'The European Parliament reaffırms that there can be no transitional period for democracy' .197 
This observation is somewhat arbitrary, but it may suggest that in the case of economic accession 
criteria, the EU tends to be more lenient and willing to allow transition periods on the basis of 
expectations about the future and confidence, whereas a stricter approach in applied with regard 
to political criteria. lfthis is true, in the case of Turkish accession, this may be explained by the 
tied economic bonds that already exist between the EU and Turkey asa result of the Customs 
Union. 
6.10 Conclusions 
This chapter has elaborated on the findings of the first step of the research, namely the analysis 
of policy documents . Among its most important intermediate findings were that l) there was 
only a very small share of future explorative documents among the policy documents; 2) there is 
a tendency to produce those future explorations as part of the policy-making process and by the 
policy-maker; 3) the documents asa whole showed three ways of thinking about the future, 
namely through exploring the future in general, exploring the future ofa path break, and 
determining the future by planning it; 4) planning the future was the most prevalent method in 
which the documents dealt with the future; 5) planning the future occurred in three stages: 
objectives, requirements and timetables. 
196 Council ofthe European Union, Southeast Europe Working Party. (2003) Note: Relations with Turkey - Approval 
ofthe EU position for the 42d meeting ofthe EC-Turkey Association Council (Luxembourg, 15 April 2003). 
8003/03. Brussels. 
197 European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. 
(1997). Report on the Communicationfrom the Commission 'Agenda 2000 -fara stronger and wider Union'. 
(COM(97)2000 - C4-037l/97)/ PE 224 .339/fın ./ A4-0368/97. Brussels. 
116 
in the next chapter the second part of the findings and analysis will be presented. These will 
complement the findings mentioned above, and allow for a balanced view as a basis for further 
conclusions. 
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7. FINDINGS-PART 2 
The following chapter will present the findings and intennediate conclusions on the second step 
of the research, which aimed at answering research objective 1 by further investigating the 
fonnalized way offuture exploration inthe European Union. The second step involved an 
' outside-in' approach, inquiring whether exploration of the future in relation to the Turkey-EU 
dossier actually takes place. The rationale behind this second step was that 'what does go into the 
policy-process can also not be reflected in the policy-paper' . To establish what goes in, the study 
looked at meeting documents, awareness of the policy-maker himself, the official advisory 
bodies of the European Union institutions, and external advisory bodies with a link to the policy-
making in the Turkey-EU accession dossier. 
7.1 Meeting documents 
Analysis of the meeting documents is the most direct way of establishing what a policy-maker 
takes in as part of the decision-making on the EU-Turkey dossier. The meetings documents of 
the EP Committee on Foreign Affairs and Extemal Relations and the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee were searched in combination with their agendas. 
In general the lists of meeting documents for every meeting of AFET and JPC primarily 
contained documents which were part of the policy-making cycle, by the other institutions. 
For the JPC, it was assumed that Turkey was always on the agenda, and that ali meeting 
documents hada relation to the Turkey-EU dossier. No meeting documents were found that 
originated in a meso- or macro structure of the European Union and explored the future. 
Only a small number of external documents were found. 
• Centre for European Policy Studies, Aydin, S. (2005). Progress Report on Turkey - Problems 
and Prospects. Brussels: CEPS. 
Although the name of this document may suggest differently, this CEPS article by Aydin is a 
summary ofthe 2004 Regular Report. 
• Turkish State Institute for Statistics. (2005). Attitudes of Individuals towards European 
Union Membership in Turkey. Ankara: Prime Ministry. 
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This document describes the public support for Turkish membership of the EU in Turkey. 
The majority of questions focus on what people would vote in case there was a referendum. 
There is only one question which refers to whether people believe their lives would be 
positively affected by membership. it does not become clear from this document whether this 
entails the long term future. Even if it does, the votes of the public in Turkey could be 
considered long-term consideration, but the document in itself is stili a record of the moment. 
• Center for European Reform, Grabbe, H. (2004). When negotiations begin: the next phase in 
EU-Turkey relations. London: CER. 
The scope ofthis paper is short-term, focused on the implications ofthe start of negotiations 
on Turkey, and the Copenhagen criteria. 
For the analysis of meeting documents for AFET, all meeting documents were searched for 
'Turkey' or 'Turkish' in the text, even for those meetings during which Turkish accession was 
not an agenda-point. The only extemal paper found was: 
• EuroMeSCo. (2005). Barcelona Plus: Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of 
Democratic States. Lisbon: EuroMeSCO. 
This report focuses on the EU Euro-Mediterranean Policy. It evaluates the current situation 
and established a number of objectives for the short-term. EuroMesCo is located in ltaly. 
This paper was brought forward fora meeting during which Turkish accession was not on the 
agenda. It is thus questionable whether, even if it had concemed the long-term future, it would 
have played a role in the decision-making in the EU-Turkey dossier. 
Turkish accession was an AFET agenda-point on seven occasions during the 2004 and 2005. 
None ofthe meeting documents for any of these meetings are future explorative. 
From the analysis of meeting documents of AFET and JPC, the following becomes clear: 
• Future explorative documents (produced within or outside of the EU structures) were not 
brought forward by the General Secretariat as meeting documents for any of the meetings in 
2004 and 2005 . 
• There is in general a very small tendency to refer to documents produced outside of the EU 
structures as meeting documents. 
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it is difficult to fully evaluate where the policy-maker receives the input he needs for decision-
making. The fact that future explorative documents are not formally made part of the decisi on 
does imply that the policy-maker, if he wishes to be informed about future exploration in relation 
to the Turkey-EU dossier, will have to seek this knowledge himself. Furthermore, future 
explorations are thus unlikely to be part of the general knowledge base that is shared by ali 
members of AFET and JPC. 
Although the number of meeting documents produced outside of the EU structures was low, the 
findings do show that on some occasions, input is sought from CER, CEPS and EuroMeSCo, as 
well as from national authorities. 
7.2 Awareness 
The interview with Commission representative Missir di Lusignano gives an indication of how 
future explorations and the use of external advice are perceived by the Commission. in general, 
the Commission makes extensive use of external advisory bodies, 
' including information received from the Turkish government, the Member States, our own 
diplomatic channels such as our delegation in Ankara, the embassies, NGOs, international 
NGOs, loca! NGOs, and other European and international organization, like the United 
Nations, the Council of Europe. These are ali sources of experience and expertise that we of 
course consider very much. And then you have the information available at large like papers 
which are published at times by independent think-tanks, like the Crisis lnternational Group, 
which has recently published something on Cyprus, and like the lndependent Commission on 
Turkey which produced a document on Turkey in the EU, on the eve ofthe decision made in 
2004. 
An additional source of information Missir di Lusignano refers to is the Independent 
Commission on Turkey, which produced a document on Turkey in the EU, on the eve ofthe 
decision made in 2004. 
in relation to the future explorative study lssues Arising from Turkey's membership perspective, 
Missir di Lusignano says its contents was inspired by a number of different sources, 
120 
'including intemational and European think-tanks such as the Centre for European Policy 
Studies, such as the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris ... [as well as] ... 
the Stiftung fur Wissenschaft und Politik in Germany, you have a number of institutions in 
the Netherlands'. 
A further analysis of the extemal advisory bodies on the European !eve! referred to here will be 
elaborated upon ata later point in this chapter, and will show whether the contributions of these 
organizations to the Jssues paper could have been future explorative. 
When asked directly, however, Missir di Lusignano says: 'the exploration of the long terrn is 
mostly based on the intemal expertise ofthe DG Enlargement'. 198 
The scope of the study does not allow for further elaboration on the nationally based institutions 
which contribute advice to the Commission. The fact that they are names however shows that 
when seeking extemal advice, the Commission does not limit itself to the European level. 
When asked about future explorative institutions on the European !eve!, Emerson referred to the 
following list of institutions: 
• The European Policy Centre 
• ' The Centre ' 
• The Bertelsmann Foundation 
Beyond the scope of this research, but nevertheless worth mentioning, are IFRI and the Centre 
for Applied Policy Research, which according to Emerson plays an important role in future 
exploration on the national !eve!, and the German Marshall Fund of the United States, which 
plays a marginal role when it comes to the Turkey-EU dossier, but is explorative rather in the 
realm of transatlantic relations. 
198 A. Missir di Lusignano, personal interview, March 30, 2006. 
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For the sake of completeness these will also be elaborated upon as part of the 'extemal advisory 
bodies' section of this chapter to establish to what extent future explorations, in particular in 
relation to the Turkey-EU dossier as actually available. 
7.3 EU Internal advisory bodies 
The official services of the European Union indicate three bodies as official advisory bodies: The 
Economic and Social Committee, The Committee ofthe Regions, and the Bureau for European 
Policy Analysis, into which the former Forward Studies Unit was integrated. 
7.3.1 Economic and Social Committee 
The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) is a consultative body that gives 
representatives of Europe's socio-occupational interest groups, and others, a forma! platform to 
express their points of views on the EU issues. lts opinions are forwarded to the larger 
institutions - the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. The ESC was set up by 
the 1957 Rome Treaties in order to involve economic and social interest groups in the 
establishment of the common market and to provide institutional machinery for briefing the 
European Commission and the Council of Ministers on European Union issues. The 317 
members ofthe EESC are drawn from economic and social interest groups in Europe. Members 
are nominated by national govemments. The members of the EESC are drawn from one ofthree 
groups: employers, employees or various interests. The EESC issues opinions on matters of 
European interest to the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. These can be 
opinions in response to a referral , own-initiative opinions, or explorative opinions. 199 
Consultation of the EESC by the Commission or the Council is mandatory in certain cases; in 
others it is optional. The Committee has six sub-committees, among which one on External 
Relations. 
A search of the EECS opinion directory on documents related to Turkey yielded 20 documents. 
The majority of these opinions are based directly on policy documents produced by European 
Parliament, European Council, or European Commission. ln those documents, the EESC does 
not take a wider perspective than the document it refers to ; hence it does not introduce the long-
199 European Economic and Social Committee. (2004) . The EESC: A bridge between Europe and organized Civil 
Society. Brussels: EESC. 
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term asa new perspective. in the other ' own initiative' opinions, no reference is made to a long-
term exploration of the future. This is emphasized by the fact that another search on ' Turkey' 
and ' future' yields no results. 
It is worth noting here that, whether future explorative or not, none of the documents produces 
by the EECS was mentioned as a meeting document for JPC or AFET. 
The added value ofreports by EESC, according to one Commission representative is small: 
' Occasionally they publish reports on specific subjects. The information on which these are 
based is largely drawn from the DG Enlargement. The DG Enlargement is often consulted, 
because it has the expertise. in the end all the institutions tum to the Commission for 
information' .200 
7.3.2 The Committee of the Regions 
The Committee ofthe Regions (CoR) is the political assembly that aims provides loca) and 
regional authorities with a voice in the European Union. The Treaties oblige the Commission and 
Council to consult the Committee of the Regions whenever new proposals are made in areas that 
have repercussions at regional or loca) level. The Maastricht Treaty set out 5 such areas -
economic and social cohesion, trans-European infrastructure networks, health , education and 
culture. The Amsterdam Treaty added another five areas to the list - employment policy, social 
policy, the environment, vocational training and transport.20 1 
Outside these areas, the Commission, Council and European Parliament have the option to 
consult the CoR on issues if they see important regional or loca) implications to a proposal. The 
CoR can also draw up an opinion on its own initiative, which enables it to put issues on the EU 
agenda. The Committee organizes its work through six specialist committees, among which one 
for topics related to Extemal Relations (RELEX). Similar to the EESC, the CoR issues opinion 
as a method of informing the European Union structures. in addition, it adopts resolutions and 
publishes studies on specific topical issues.202 
200 A. Missir di Lusignano, personal interview, March 30, 2006. 
201 Committee ofthe Regions. (2006). Presentation, role: The Committee of the Regions, members and mandate. 
Retrieved May 1 O, 2006, from http://www.cor.europa.eu/en/presentation/Role.htm. 
202 Committee ofthe Regions. (2006). Presentation, role: The Committee of the Regions, an introduction. Retrieved 
May 1 O, 2006, from http: //www.cor.europa.eu/en/presentation/member mandate.htm. 
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A search of the CoR's documents on those relating to Turkey yields only one result. This is an 
draft opinion ofthe Commission for External Relations on the Recommendation ofthe European 
Commission on Turkey's progress towards accessİon. Here no future explorative approach is 
taken. The document merely states the areas in which the CoR deems regional bodies capable in 
assisting Turkey in preparing for membership. 
7.3.3 The Forward Studies Unit and the Bureau of European Policy Advisers 
The European Commission Forward Studies Unit was established as a Commission service in 
1989. The Forward Studies Unit was especially active in the field of European integration, in 
areas such as culture, governance, and economic, social and technological innovations. On the 
Forward Studies Unit Webpage, which stili exists, it is stated that many of the documents 
published by the unit found their way into the mainstream ofthe Commission's work.203 
The Forward Studies Unit was incorporated into GOPA and later the Bureau for European Policy 
Advisors in 2001. Only recently, BEPA became a Directorate General ofthe European 
Commission, reporting directly to the President and under his authority.204 The BEPA consists of 
policy-analysts and advisors, and is headed by a Director, which is appointed by the Commission 
President. lts aim is to ' provide professional and well-informed advice to the President and the 
Commissİoners and to formulate recommendatİons on İssues regardİng the polİcy of the EU' .205 
In doing so İt pays special attention to po!İcy İssues ofa strategic or structural nature. The 
missİon statement of BEPA states that İt shall ' concentrate on forward looking analysis at the 
early stages of the policy-planning cycle, and on the development of polİcy options for 
consideration by the President and by Members of the Commission ' . 
The activity ofthe DG Bureau of European Policy Advisers is organised into three main policy 
areas: economic, socİetal , and polİtİcal. In two of these areas the DG has established a group of 
experts during the past year. In the economİc area, this group is called the Group of Economic 
Policy Analysis (GEPA). The aim of GEP A is to 'to ensure a debate on economic policy issues 
between the European Commission and top European economists from academia and the 
203 Forward Studies Unit. (2005) . Mission and Projects. Retrieved August Ol, 2005 from 
http: //europa.eu.int/comm/cdp/mission/index en.htm. 
204 Bureau of European Policy Advisors (2005). Who are we? Retrieved June 25, 2005 from 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/policy advisers/mission statement/index en.htm. 
205 Bureau ofEuropean Policy Advisors (2005) . Who are we? Retrieved June 25, 2005 from 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/policy advisers/mission statement/index en.htm. 
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business sector'. 206 Its political counterpart is established the Group of Political Analysis 
(GPA).207 The overall aim of the expert groups is 'to stimulate an ongoing dialogue between the 
European Commission and European experts from academia, business and civil society and to 
provide the President and Commissioners with objective, expert and impartial advice in the 
formulation ofrecommendations on policies of the European Union' .208 
During the term of Commission President Prodi, DG BEP A was called Group of Policy Advisers 
(GOPA). This unit incorporated a Group of Economic Analysis (GEA) anda number of other 
expert groups, such as the Michalski Group, which was concemed with the spiritual and cultural 
dimensions of the European Union, and the Strauss-Kahn Group, which was active in the 
political realm. in its list of activities, GOPA shows to have been active in a number ofpolicy 
areas, such as economy, foreign affairs, extemal relations, institutional affairs and religion.209 
GOPA was established in May 2001, and restructured at the initiative of President Barroso at the 
beginning of his term. A number of GOPA units, such as the Strauss-Kahn group are no longer 
active. GOPA was turned into BEPA and GEA became one ofthe BEPA expert groups under the 
name ofGroup of Economic Policy Analysis. 
in the GOPA archives, the following future explorative studies can be found : 
• An Agenda for Growing Europe - Making the EU economic system deliver (Sapir Report) 
• Building a Political Europe: 50 Proposals for Tomorrow' s Europe (Kahn Report) 
• Globalisation Study 
These studies do not have a direct link to the Turkey-EU dossier. 
Among the future explorative working papers of the FSU are: 
• Scenarios Europe 201 O, Five possible Futures for Europe, 
• The Union we Need 
206 Bureau ofEuropean Policy Advisers. (2005). Group of Economic Policy Analysis. Retrieved June 25, 2005 from 
http: //europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/policy advisers/experts groups/gepa/index en.htm. 
207 European Commission (2005). Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEP A) sets ııp new advisory "Group of 
Political Analysis" with leading political scientists and researchers. MEMO O 1/ 128, 15 April 2005. Retrieved June 
25 2005 from http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/policy advisers/press release bepa/index en.htm. 
208 European Commission (2005). Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEP A) sets ııp new advisory "Group of 
Political Analysis " with leadingpolitical scientists and researchers. MEMO 011128, 15 April 2005. Retrieved June 
25, 2005 from http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/policy advisers/press release bepa/index en.htm. 
209 Group of Policy Advisors. (2005) . Activities. Retrieved August 1, 2005 from 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/policy advisers/activities/index en.htm. 
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• Some Unpleasant Arithmetics of Regional Unemployment in the EU 
Turkish accession does not play a role in these scenarios and in that regard their direct 
applicability to the dossier may be limited. However, especially the fırst study explores fıve ways 
in which Europe might develop in the future. These could be considered relevant from a 
European perspective on the dossier. Along these lines, it could be argued that all future 
explorations about Europe have an implicit relation to the Turkey-EU dossier. It is however 
beyond the scope of this research to further elaborate on all more general future explorations of 
Europe, and their potential applicability for the EU-Turkey accession dossier. 
With regard to foreign policy, Commission representative Missir di Lusignano feels that the 
added value ofthe FSU was limited: 
' the studies conducted by the Forward Studies Unit are limited to examples about Russia, the 
Islam ete. and their added value in terms of policy-making is hard to detect. They are not 
really policy recommendations, and I feel they could have been conducted by universities or 
other external bodies ' . 
The list ofpublications of BEPA only consists ofthree publications, ofwhich none are related to 
the Turkey-EU dossier, and moreover, all three are evaluative of the current situation rather than 
future explorative. The publications focus primarily on citizens' attitudes and enlargement in 
retrospect. This gives rise to the idea that the new DG BEPA does not make future exploration a 
priority. This is supported by the website of the FSU, which gives an interesting hint is given as 
to what happened to the practice of future exploration after the incorporation of the FSU into 
GOPA. It states that 
'the futurological function has gradually developed outside the Unit, within several of the 
Commission's Directorates-General which are keen to adopt a strategic approach. The Unit 
serves as a point where all these various future-oriented think tanks inside the Commission 
can meet together' .210 
2 10 Forward Studies Unit. (2005) . Mission and Projects . Retrieved on August Ol , 2006 from 
http: //europa.eu.int/comm/cdp/mission/index en.htm. 
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Based on the fact that the FSU was incorporated into GOPA and then into DG BEPA, this 
statement gives support to the assumption that DG BEPA now functions as ground for exchange 
of ideas between conductors of future exploration within the DGs rather than a future explorative 
body itself. The actual practice of future exploration is rather to be found within the policy-
making DGs, at least according to this statement. 
From a first inquiry, BEPA thus seems to not play a large role in the Turkey-EU dossier. This is 
sustained by Turkish diplomat Öztürk, who says he 'heard about it for the fırst time' and 
Emerson, specialist on the topic of EU-Turkey relations, who suggested that not only does BEP A 
not play a role in the Turkey-EU dossier, but even in general the impact of BEPA on policy-
making is limited: 
'I'm not really aware of the output and impact there. These are people who get highly 
bureaucratized, and the institutions get driven by immediate policy-priorities and the 
segmentation of policies in different DGs and under different Commissioners, and each 
Commission has its lobby and power groups, so it' s very difficult indeed fora unit like that 
to really have leverage on the system unless they have a ' hot-line ' with a very strong 
president. lts role depends largely on the Commission president'. 2 11 
About the loss of the function of future exploration after the incorporation of the FSU, Emerson 
states: 
'it [the FSU] was a unit that started under Jacques Delors, who was a very intellectual and 
strong leader ofthe Commission, and indeed in the European Union asa whole, and he knew 
how to commission and to use heavy analysis on long run issues. Since then, 1 would say, the 
presidents of the Commission ha ve not been in the same league again. And asa result this 
policy un it and the leadership of the policy unit has been used at times as dumping ground 
for cabinet members who went quite right but still had to be treated nicely' .212 
2 11 M. Emerson, personal interview, April 4, 2006. 
212 M. Emerson, personal interview, April 4, 2006. 
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Along the same lines, a Commission representative says that 'As far as [BEPA's] function is 
concerned, there is little indication that the Commission leadership after Delors has wanted to 
use this expertise in the same way'. 
7.4 External agencies 
The list of agencies which potentially could function as an external advisory body to the 
European Union institutions is endless. The following inquiry is aimed at establishing whether 
future explorative studies are actually conducted in relation to the Turkey-EU debate. The list of 
organizations is based on 1) those of which (non-future explorative) publications were referred to 
as meeting documents of AFET and the JPC; and 2) those which were referred to as advisory 
bodies by the policy-makers in one of the interviews. The rationale behind this is that these 
institutions thus apparently already have a link with the EU and are considered for other issues. 
This makes it easier to establish whether potential future explorative studies they produce as well 
are not used because of choice or rather because of the fact that the agency is unknown within 
the EU institutions or has not established itself as an external advisory body. For the sake of 
completeness, a third group of external organization was investigated, namely those which were 
referred to as Michael Emerson as future explorative agencies on the European level. 
7.4.1 Independent Commission on Turkey 
The Independent Commission on Turkey was formed in March 2004 on the initiative of ' a group 
of concerned Europeans, deeply committed to the European integration process and having held 
high public office, fornıed the Independent Commission on Turkey' .213 Among its small group of 
members are former Commissioner Hans van den Broek, former President of Finland Ahtisaari, 
and former prime minister of France Rocard. The Commission aims to contribute to a more 
objective and rational debate on Turkey' s accession to the European Union, which it considers 
one of the major challenges for Europe in the coming years, by exploring the major challenges 
and opportunities connected with Turkey's possible accession to the European Union. 
In 2004, the Commission produced its only report, Turkey in Europe: more than a promise? The 
aim ofthe report is to inform the public ofthe challenges of Turkish accession in the light ofthe 
2 13 lndependent Commission on Turkey. (2006). Why an /ndependent Commission? Retrieved on May 1 O, 2006 
from http ://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org. 
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Council Decisi on of December 2004. Throughout the report a somewhat positive stance toward 
Turkish accession is maintained, depicted best by the conclusions which state that: 'The 
lndependent Commission on Turkey is of the view that accession negotiations should be opened 
as soon as Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria' .214 
The report as such is highly descriptive of the status quo of Turkey and the EU. Nonetheless, 
there are two instances of clearly defined long-term future exploration. First of ali, the report 
elaborates on the changes that Turkey and the EU will experience before accession, and 
consequently what their situation will be like at the time of accession. The report thus does not 
depart from the status quo, but shortly explores the future of Turkey and EU independently. 
Furthermore, the report elaborates on the expected migration from Turkey to the EU. Here it 
makes combination of expected migration flows and changes in birth rates to give an estimation 
of the migration that is expected as well as the total population in 2050. For this it refers to 
quantitative data from the UN Population Division. At a third point, the report refers to the 
economic situation of Turkey, and claims that in the short run, the Turkish economy will benefit 
from accession talks, while in the long run, further stabilization of the economy can be expected. 
The report clearly addresses a number of issues of public concem in relation to the Turkey-EU 
debate, such as migration and economic stability. The overall premise is that 'it will not be as 
badas you think'. 
7.4.2 Center for European Policy Studies 
The Center of European Policy Studies is an independent policy research institute dedicated to 
producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing 
Europe today '.215 The research by CEPS is funded by membership fees and contributions from 
official institutions, multilateral and international institutions and national grants. CEPS conducts 
research in ali areas of EU policy-making, among which EU extemal relations and 
enlargement.216 it inhabits a staff of 30 experts. 
214 Independent Commission on Turkey. (2004). Turkey in Europe: More than a promise? Brussels: The British 
Council. 
2 15 Centre for European Policy Studies (2005). About CEPS. Retrieved June 20, 2005 from 
http://www.ceps.be/wAbout.php?article id=l . 
216 Centre for European Policy Studies (2005). Research areas. Retrieved June 20, 2005 from 
http://www.ceps.be/ Article.php?article id=7. 
129 
The research produced by CEPS is aimed at informing anyone that has an interest in it, ranging 
from EU institutions, the Member States, to the governments of the European neighbourhood 
states. The relationship between the EU structures and CEPS is not institutionalised. CEPS is 
politically independent and financially independent of the EU. 
The incentive for its research originates within the institution itself, or through tender. The latter 
occurs occasionally and means that the European Commission puts out to an open competitive 
tender the production ofa study. CEPS then tenders for it, and is sometimes awarded the 
contract. 
The principle method of working according to one CEPS senior research is as follows: 
'(We) assemble what we hope to be good quality policy-oriented analyses, which we publish, 
first of ali on our website and also in printed publications. And our principle technique really 
is to establish that that website is a knowledge source fora continuing flow of relevant 
analyses, such that people go to it, and notice it, and take it into their work, including of 
course in ali of the European institutions. So this is a very online model of an independent 
think-tank contributing to the policy-shaping process' . 217 
There is thus no direct !ine between CEPS and the EU institutions, and the extent to which the 
reports are used in policy-makers depends entirely on the policy-maker. 
' We simply don ' t have time in our work to go running after all ofthese people, so the 
method is simply to write what we think is good, and to publish it, and to Jet them take it 
from there'. 
Furthermore, Emerson emphasize that CEPS is ' not in the advocacy business. We're in the 
clarification business as to what the issues are and provide a well-informed hasis for political 
decisions and public opinion formation'. 
2 17 M. Emerson, personal interview, April 4, 2006. 
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The Centre for European Policy Studies was founded in 1983, primarily because twenty-three 
years ago there was no single European think-tank. There was no institution comparable to CEPS 
before neither in Brussels or anywhere else. The demand for the think-tank came interactively 
from the role of the founding director, who is called Peter Ludlow, who was an entrepreneur as it 
were and wanted to get it going, and he interacted with influential individuals in the Commission 
and on the Member State level.218 
When asked whether the relationship between the EU institutions and CEPS changed since 1983, 
senior researcher Michael Emersen answered: 
' in any forma! sense, I would say no, because there is not real relationship there except that 
we are located in the same town and interested in the same subjects. I guess the main thing 
that has changed is that this institute has gradually built up analytical capacities, numbers of 
people working here, volume of published output has been building up, and 1 would say 
certainly with the İnternet revolution and the business of İnternet diffusion, a website with 
material , this has hugely increased. The other thing that has been happening is that CEPS has 
been acquiring, building reputation, like geological sediments, layer upon layer, year after 
year, of this project, that project which form part of the institutional memory, institutional 
reputation, so that's a built up of strength 1 would say' .219 
CEPS produces a number of different types of documents. The Paperbacks present analysis and 
views of the CEPS experts on important questions in the arena of European public policy. These 
documents are written for policy-makers, corporate executives and government offıcials alike. 
The second type of document produced by CEPS is the Task Force Report. According to CEPS 
itself, task force reports contain the conclusions and policy recommendations that result from 
intense discussion, debate and analytical presentations made in the course of CEPS Task Force 
sessions. The !ast type of document published by CEPS is the Working Document. These 
working documents ' are intended to give an early indication of work in progress within CEPS 
research programmes and to stimulate reactions from other experts in the fıeld ' .220 
2 18 M. Emerson, personal interview, April 4, 2006. 
219 M. Emerson, personal interview, April 4, 2006. 
22° Center for European Policy Studies. (2006) . Publications. Retrieved May 10, 2006 from 
http://www.ceps.be/ Article.php?article id=34. 
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An orientation of the research towards the future becomes clear from the slogan, 'Thinking 
ahead for Europe'. The largest part of the research hasa medium-term focus. in relation to the 
Turkish case, the time-horizon is 1 Oto 20 years.221 
A search of publications on Turkey yields a long list of working papers, briefings and 
commentaries, among which the following future explorative studies: 
• Growth and Immigration Scenarios for Turkey and the EU 
• Turkey's Energy Prospects in the EU-Turkey context 
• Turkey's Performance in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment: Implications of Enlargement 
• Turkey's Strategic Future 
The most relevant publication by CEPS is The European Transformation of Modern Turkey, by 
Kemal Derviş, Michael Emerson, Daniel Gros and Sinan Ülgen. This study is a compilation of 
the findings and recommendations of ajoint project ofthe CEPS and the Economics and Foreign 
Policy Forum (EFPF) oflstanbul.222 The publication is supported by thirteen CEPS Working 
Papers. Ali of these papers have a long-term time horizon, of approximately 20 years. 
The starting assumption of the publication asa whole is that the Turkish membership perspective 
will start materializing only in the long term, in at least 10 to 15 years. On the basis ofthat, ali 
papers take a long-term approach in evaluating to what extent to the parties could cooperate in 
the long-term in between. Furthermore, the book emphasizes, somewhat comparable to the 
publication by the Independent Commission on Turkey that Turkey and the EU will have 
changed dramatically before accession will take place. To that end, the first objective of study is 
'which Union would Turkey enter?' A number of possible ' visions ' are elaborated upon, such as 
Europe as a super-state, Europe as a community of traditional nation states, and Europe as a 
multi-layered system of governance. Subsequently, the same is asked for Turkey: ' Which Turkey 
would enter the Union?' The publication as such deals with not only the long-term perspective 
towards Turkish accession and how each of the en ti ti es will change until then, but also the 
consequences of Turkish accession on both parties.223 
22 1 M. Emerson, personal interview, April 4, 2006. 
222 The EFPF recently changed its name into EDAM. 
223 Center for European Policy Studies. Derviş, K. , Emerson, M., Gros, D., & Ülgen, S. (2004). The European 
Transformation of Modern Turkey. Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies. (This book is also available in 
Turkish). 
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7.4.3 Centre for European Reform 
The Centre for European Reform is a think-tank devoted to reforming the European Union. it is a 
forum for people with ideas to discuss social, political and economic challenges facing Europe. It 
seeks to work with similar bodies in other European countries, in North America and elsewhere 
in the world. The CER calls itself 'pro-European but not uncritical'. 224 It regards European 
integration as largely beneficial but recognizes that in many respects the Union does not work 
well. The CER is financially independent ofthe European Union. The CER therefore aims to 
promote new ideas and policies for reforming the European Union. Expertise is diffused through 
pamphlets, essays, working papers, policy briefs, briefing notes, opinion papers and the CER 
bulletin. The CER's work program is centered on seven themes, among which 'Enlargement of 
the European Union', which inhabits a special unit on the EU and Turkey. 
it is difficult to determine whether the publications of CER are really future explorative. To a 
large extent, these are opinionated analytical papers by academics, among which Grabbe and 
Barysch. A small number of working documents may be classified as future explorative, e.g: 
• The Constellation of Europe: how enlargement will transform the EU 
• The Economics of Turkish accession 
The remainder of the working papers is more an analysis of the current state of affairs, much in 
line with the paper by Grabbe used as a meeting document by the JPC. 
7.4.4 The Centre 
The Centre, referred to by Emerson as a future explorative body on EU level , refers to itself as 
' Brussels' first think-do tank, operating at the interface of European public policy and 
communications' .225 Its aim is to pioneer new forms of dialogue and promote betler 
communication among business, civil society and public policy leaders in Europe. The Centre 
operates two complementary spheres of activity: 1) a forum for developing, exchanging, and 
driving forward ideas on European and global policy issues, and 2) an intelligent 
communications consultancy. The Center cooperated with think tanks, foundations and other 
thinking communities around Europe and globally to produce new research and 
224 Center for European Reform. (2006). Objectives. Retrieved May 1 O, 2006 from 
http://www.cer.org.uk/about/index.htm 1. 
225 The Centre. (2006). Brussels 'jirst Think-Do Tank. Retrieved May 1 O, 2006 from 
http://www.thecentre.eu.com/site/index.cfm?BID=26&SID= 1&TID=1&MID= l&ART=11 &LG=2. 
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recommendations to provide a different perspective and revitalize debate on topical issues. The 
list of publications ofThe Centre entails a number of studies which are (at least partially) future 
explorative, such as A postcard from the EU, a study which explores the gains to be expected 
from the European-Latin American free trade area for the telecommunications sector. However, 
none of the articles seem to have a relation to the Turkey-EU dossier. 
7.4.5 The European Policy Centre 
The European Policy Centre (EPC) is an independent, non-profit think tank, committed to 
'making European integration work'.226 The EPC works at the 'cutting edge' ofEuropean and 
global policy-making providing its members and the wider public with rapid, high-quality 
information and analysis on the EU and global policy agenda. it aims to promote a balanced 
dialogue between the different constituencies of its membership, comprising aspects of economic 
and social life. Members of the EPC comprise companies, professional and business federations, 
trade unions, diplomatic missions, regional and loca! bodies, as well as NGOs representing 
society interests, foundations, international and religious organizations. The EPC's method of 
working is similar to that of CEPS. it provides accessible analysis and reflection on its website 
and in print. The EPC produces Working Papers, Issue Papers and shorter Policy Briefs. The list 
of publications of the EPC reveals a number of long-term explorative studies, among which The 
Strategic Impact of Turkey 's bid, Turkey and the European Union: seeking an illusion, and 
Turkey, yes or no?. 
7.4.6 The Bertelsmann Foundation 
The Bertelsmann Foundation, initially a German initiative, has recently lifted itself to the 
European level. it aims to identify social problems and challenges early on in order to develop 
and implement model solutions. The Bertelsmann Foundation is structured according to subject 
areas, namely Education, Health, Economics and Social Affairs, International Relations, 
Corporate Culture and Promoting Philanthropy. One of the projects of the foundation is Enlarged 
Europe, in which it attempts to combine international and interdisciplinary analyses with 
proposals and recommendations for political implementation. The project also focuses on 
communicating its findings and proposals to policy makers and the public. None of the 
226 The European Policy Center. (2006). Mission statement. Retrieved May 1 O, 2005 from 
http: //www.theepc.be/en/ae.asp?TYP=ABOUT&LV=224&PG=AE/en/direct in&AI=l&see=n. 
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publications of the foundation are available on the İnternet. Their descriptions however imply a 
long-term approach. 
7.5 Conclusions 
Before continuing, it is useful to summarize the ideas that emanate from the findings in this 
chapter. 
1. Among the meeting documents of AFET and the JPC, no future explorative documents could 
be located. From this, the idea arises that, at least on the !eve! of the European Parliament, 
future explorations are not presented to the policy-maker as part of the policy-decision. Not 
only does this partially reveal how future exploration is not part of the forma! decision-
making, but also it may imply an extra effort from policy-makers to involve future 
explorations in their decisions. The lists of meeting documents do however show that 
occasionally, AFET and JPC may inquire information from extemal sources, such as CEPS 
and CER. Interestingly, the meeting documents of AFET and JPC did also not include a large 
number of documents from different policy-areas, such as Commission DGs or EP 
Committees active on the meso-level ofEU enlargement policy. 
2. The evidence shows what could be called a slight tendency toward 'inbreeding' of 
information. This becomes clear from the lists of meeting documents of AFET and JPC, 
which consist primarily of documents produced by other EU institutions, and not even the 
sub-units in a different policy-fıeld. Furthermore, about the EESC, it is said that is gathers its 
knowledge primarily from the Commission. The EESC opinions indeed do not show a large 
body of knowledge additional to that circulating as part of the policy-making process. The 
Commission on the other hand seems to place more emphasis on the consultation of intemal 
and extemal sources. 
3. The Commission especially seems not reluctant to gather knowledge from extemal bodies. in 
reference to the Issues Paper, a large number of extemal bodies were mentioned from which 
expertise was drawn. Closer investigation of these bodies shows that ali, except CEPS, ha ve 
no relationship to future exploration, and thus it is likely that their expertise was not used for 
the future explorative elements of the report. This idea is further sustained by the statement 
that 'the exploration of the long term is mostly based on the intemal expertise of the DG 
Enlargement'. 
4. The intemal advisory bodies ofthe European Union, DG BEPA, the EESC, and the CoR do 
not engage in structural exploration of the future. The former Forward Studies Un it, as well 
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as GOPA, did play a role in this regard. According to Emerson, the role of intemal bodies in 
exploration of the future is highly dependent on the role of the Commission President. 
5. A number of European advisory bodies referred to implicitly in relation to meeting 
documents or as advisory bodies on other topics seem to have future explorative capacities as 
well. Among these bodies are the CER, the CEPS, and the Independent Commission on 
Turkey. it needs to be said here that none of these bodies have a forma) relationship with the 
European Union institutions, and the usage of their expertise thus depends entirely on the 
willingness of the policy-makers. In the case of the Independent Commission, the future 
exploration was an occasional endeavor, more like a project, and although it was mentioned 
by the Commission as source of reference, it clearly was a document aimed at the European 
public, and not really suit for reference by policy-makers. 
6. A number of institutes referred to by Emersen also showed to inhabit future explorative 
expertise in relation to the Turkey-EU dossier. 
Furthermore, it can be observed from a number of reports, among which the one by the 
Independent Committee on Turkey, as well as the publication by CEPS, that similar to the 
policy-paper, a large emphasis is placed on thefocal point of Turkish accession. A major 
difference seems to be however that in both these extemally produced documents, an attempt is 
made to combine an exploration of Turkey and EU before accession , and after accession, while 
in the policy-papers examined in the previous chapter, this combination was no found. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
The aim of this study was to look in detail as the role of long term future exploration and 
thinking about the future in the European Union. In doing so it focused on the Turkey-EU 
accession dossier in the period between 1963 and 5 October 2005. This final chapter seeks to 
draw conclusions from the findings of this study, as well as position them within the framework 
of earlier academic research, and further discuss them. 
8.1 Summary of most relevant findings 
The research was divided into three main steps, consisting respectively of 1) analysis of policy-
documents, 2) location and analysis of future explorative practices in relation to the dossier, and 
3) interviews. 
• The analysis of policy-documents revealed a very low number of papers which were either 
(partially) long term future explorative or referred to a future explorative paper.227 A second 
category, consisting of documents which made a clear reference to the long-term future but 
could be designated as explorative, was larger, comprising approximately half of ali the 
documents. Documents with a reference to the future were spread rather equally over 
different types of documents as well as the three institutions, but were least likely to be found 
among those that were part of the legislative cycle. 
• The six future explorative policy-documents were ali found among working documents, 
briefıng papers or reports by the European Parliament or the Commission. Ali but one of 
these documents were produced by the policy-making body, and as part of the policy-making 
cycle ona specifıc topic. Furthermore, there was a tendency to integrate the future 
explorative part into the policy-paper, using it asa hasis for policy-proposal or change. The 
field of exploration was in most cases environment or economy. Turkish accession formed a 
focal point in most ofthe explorations. The possibility of non-accession of Turkey was by no 
means considered in an exploration. In addition, the explorations were forecasts rather than 
scenarıos. 
• The second category of documents showed, short of exploring the future, two main lines 
along which the long-term was considered, namely through 1) the focal points of Customs 
227 Only six out of 391 papers in total met this requirement and were located in category C. 
137 
Union and the Turkish accession to the EU; and 2) through planning and anticipating the 
future. The focal points were path breaks in policy, moments at which the status quo was 
expected to change. They served as an aiming point for policy. Thefocal points were used in 
order to establish objectives to be met at the time of path break, requirements for policy, and 
time-tables toward the path-break. Anticipation, thinking about the future short of exploring 
it happened by listing the uncertainties in the future, or the variables that can play a role. In a 
number of cases, a general expectation was stated, oran implicit expectation based on the 
momentary situation. 
• The second category of documents also gave an indication of how 'not knowing the future ' is 
captured in policy. In relation to the vague focal point, Turkish accession, this approach was 
described as 'see you when you get there ' meaning that thefocal point in the future is 
dependent on the progress of Turkey in this case. The focal point is flexible in order to move 
if the timetable cannot be kept. in relation to the establishment of the Customs Union, the 
documents showed a method of re-evaluation according to which the time-table could be 
adjusted. 
• in general, three ways ofthinking about the future were distinguished on the hasis of the 
findings, namely 1) exploring/ anticipating the future , 2) exploring the future ofa path break, 
and 3) determining the future by planning. in the policy-documents of the European 
institutions, a combination of two of these, for example the exploration ofa path break in the 
future , seemed to pose an additional challenge. This challenge was not actually taken on, but 
rather ways were found around it, for example by omitting the possibility of change before 
the path break, even if far ahead, and answering the question ' what ifTurkey were to accede 
the European Union today'. lnterestingly, a number of extemally produced documents did 
attempt to give a picture of the long-term effects of enlargements, taking into account ev en 
the changes Turkey and the EU will experience before accession will take place. 
8.2 The research objectives and additional questions 
Two main questions lie at the hasis of this study. This section will attempt to answer them, as 
well as additional questions that were brought forward while establishing the framework, on the 
bas is of the findings. 
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Research objective 1: The role of future explorative studies in policy-making 
The forma!, institutionalized relationship between the exploration of the future and policy-
making in the Turkey-EU dossier can be considered very limited. Systematic exploration of the 
future does not seem to take place at ali, and occasional exploration is also very rare. Where 
future exploration takes place, this is closely intertwined with the policy-making process. Ali 
future explorations that were detected were commissioned by the policy-maker, and in ali but 
one case conducted by the policy-maker himself. The incentive for a future exploration thus 
seems to be rooted in the policy-making process, as is shown as well by the fact that future 
explorations in many cases were part of an actual policy-paper and thus not separate documents. 
The future exploration is thus often directly integrated into the policy-making process. 
The limited number of future explorations does not allow for general conclusions about future 
exploration and pol icy-making in the EU, but the findings are in !ine with and endorse earlier 
findings on the topic. The findings of this study provide no evidence to the contrary. For the 
moment, the cyclical model of the relationship between future exploration and policy-making is 
thus maintained. 
Institution: lnstitution: 
Policy maker Policy maker 
Process : Process: 
Policy preparation Future exploration 
Exploration document 
Where future exploration is conducted inside of the EU, this is done by the European Parliament 
and the European Commission. The official advisory bodies ofthe European Union do not seem 
to play a role in this. The <lata suggest an emphasis on quantitative <lata where intemally 
produced future explorations referred to extemal sources. 
Extemally produced future explorations do not play a large role in the policy-making in the EU-
Turkey dossier. The only case of such an extemally produced future exploration was related to 
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the environment and commissioned in relation to the previous enlargement, thus not specifıcally 
for the Turkey-EU policy-making, but nevertheless referred to. 
The limited use of future exploration in the Turkey-EU dossier could be related to a deliberate 
choice by the institutions or rather a lack of available future explorations on the topic. The latter, 
however, does not seem to be the case. Future explorations, in most cases forecasting studies, 
are conducted by a number of European agencies, among which some agencies which are 
already used by the EU as external advisory bodies for other non-future explorative advice. The 
external agencies that were found to conduct long term future explorative studies, did not have 
this as their only or main activity, but often next to, or integrated with short and medium-term 
studies. 
Research objective 2: The long-term future ' as it is being considered within the European 
Union 
Two main ways of thinking about the long-term future in a non-explorative sense are apparent 
in relation to the Turkey-EU dossier. Firstly, the focus is on twofocal points, also classifıable as 
path breaks, namely the Customs Union and the possible accession of Turkey to the European 
Union. The Customs Union is a tangible point in the future, accentuated by a specifıc date in 
time, whereas the accession of Turkey is a vague future , kept vague on purpose. Secondly, the 
methodology of thinking about the future can be based on planning of anticipation. in the case 
of planning focal points serve asa way to direct policy. They indicate a change with the status 
quo, and pose certain objectives for policy to aim for. On the basis of these objectives, 
requirements and timetables are constructed as a path to the future. Whether a focal point is a 
vague or tangible point in the future does not seem to make a difference here. They are however 
dealt with differently, in relation to the question 'what if the future turns out unlike expected?' 
in case of vague futures, the focal point can then be postponed until the objectives are met. in 
case oftangible futures , readjustment ofthe time-table takes place on the basis of re-evaluation, 
rather than future exploration. Anticipation is short of real exploration, expecting what will 
happen in the future, often on the basis ofa number of variables, or diagnoses of today. 
Placing ourselves in the mind ofthe European policy-maker, what would he think about the 
future? The analysis provokes fıve bold statements, taking the fındings a bit of the edge: 
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1. The future is my buzz word: the future is referred to in a wide variety of contexts, often in 
relation to a conception ofthe future as 'who knows when', and 'from here on' . The word 
future as such thus does not indicate a real concern with the future, especially not the long-
term future. 
2. The future is not part of my reality: the long-term future is not part ofthe day-to-day 
decisions made. These focus more on the current state of affairs, and if the future is 
concerned, is involves rather the short and medium-term. 
3. The future is unpredictable: the future is too complicated to predict; an attempt at doing so 
would be speculative, and unsuited as a basis for policy-making. The future will get here 
eventually, whether explored beforehand or not. 
4. The future is negotiable: the future is not something one is subject to, but rather it is subject 
to what we want from it. Planning the future is the best way to determine a positive outcome. 
5. The future is uncertain by choice: the future is used asa 'carrot ' for Turkey, and kept vague 
for political reasons. 
6. The future is Turkish accession: although the accession process is open-ended, alternatives 
to Turkish accession are hardly considered. 
Additional question 1: Can the relationship between future exploration and policy-making in the 
EU be described along the !ine of partners, customers or competitors? 
The three different possible relationships between expertise and policy-making can indeed serve 
here asa clarifıcation of the fındings. A distinction should be made between the future 
explorative practise within and outside of the European Union structures. The future explorations 
conducted within the EU are closely intertwined with the policy-making process. Even stronger, 
they are often conducted merely for the sake of policy. Here, one could say the relationship is 
best described as partners. 'Partners ' however assumes that the future explorative body and the 
policy-making body are two different entities. Note should be taken here that in the case of 
future exploration in the EU-Turkey dossier this if often not the case. Sometimes, the future 
exploration and the policy-document are not even different document. Rather, one could say that 
the practice of future exploration and the practice of policy-making have a partner-like 
relationship. With re gard to the relationship between future explorative practices outside of the 
EU and policy-making, one could say this is best described as 'customers'. The EU picks and 
chooses which expertise in general it wants to acquire from external agencies. In the Turkey-EU 
dossier, this relationship is not institutionalized. 
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Additional question 2: Are different forms of future exploration used differently in the policy-
process? 
There seems to be a tendency to focus on forecasts rather than scenarios. In fact, not one 
document of the future explorative documents (category C) created one or multiple scenarios. 
Generally speaking, forecasting takes as its point of departure the development ofa relatively 
small number of very issue-specific factors. In the case of the Turkey-EU dossier, these were 
often related to the environment or the economy. Also, there seemed to be an emphasis on 
quantitative data where information was acquired outside of the EU institutions. 
The limited scope of the future explorations that are produced is a point of criticism brought 
forward by Öztürk. 
' ... When these projections are made, I notice that they just focus on one element, whereas 
you cannot disregard other factors while trying to make these projections. You should know 
much more if you want to make projections' . 
Additional question 3: Do the different bodies involved in the Enlargement process de al 
differently with exploration of the future or with the long term future in general? 
The six future explorative policy-documents were ali found among working documents, briefing 
papers or reports by the European Parliament or the Commission. No future explorative 
document was thus located among the Council documents. In relation to the broader definition of 
' thinking about the long-term future' the documents were spread equally. It is, however, difficult 
to see whether one institution thinks more about the future than others. 
Additional question 4: Do considerations about the future (forma! and informal) in relation to 
earlier enlargements play a role in the current enlargement? 
The findings in the first step of the research showed that occasionally, reference was made the 
earlier enlargements for expectations about Turkish accession and policy in relation to that. 
However, in most cases these references were to actual experiences and outcomes of the 
previous enlargement, hence to factual information, rather than future explorations. An exception 
to this was the future exploration on the environment, which was conducted in relation to the 
CEEC accession but also referred to in the Turkey-EU dossier. The limited findings are 
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insufficient to support the idea of an inclination of the EU to re fer to previous experiences rather 
than explore the future, nor for a 'trade-off between the two, meaning that one would make the 
other superfluous. More research would be needed to further elaborate on this. 
Additional question 5: Are the challenges of Turkish enlargement as conceived in the overall 
debate addressed by 'thinking about the future '? 
Among the future explorative policy-papers there seems to be an emphasis on explorative 
statements in the field of environment. The second most prominent topic seems to be economics. 
Even the papers which have the topic of Turkish accession as a whole seem to be most 
explorative in these two fields. in thinking about the future in a more general sense, the policy-
papers addressed primarily economic considerations in relation to the Customs Union, 
Additional question 6: What role did Juture exploration' and 'thinking about the long-term 
future 'play in the course of the Turkey-EU accession dossier, especially with regard to the 
important decisions made, such as acceptance or rejection of Turkish applications for 
association and membership? 
The main body of available documents was located in the period 1990-2005. On the hasis of 
these documents it is not feasible to draw conclusions over the entire time-period. What can be 
said however is the following. in general the use of future explorations is rather low, and in 
relation to the Turkey-EU dossier it can be expected that this has always been the case, except 
for perhaps the time-period of the Forward Studies Unit. in the course of the dossier, the 
'potential ' of the European Union to explore the future has altered, as well as the availability of 
extemal sources for such information. During the peri od of Delors as Commission President, 
more emphasis was placed on systematic exploration of the future, through establishing the 
Forward Studies Unit. This unit was later integrated into GOPA, and then into DG BEPA, after 
which the function of future exploration was relocated to the individual DG's, which, as seems to 
be the case for the DG Enlargement, did not make it a priority. in 1983, CEPS was founded as 
the first European think-tank. Since then, a large number of other advisory bodies have been 
founded, and some of them contribute to the availability of future explorative studies. 
For the important decisions to be made in the EU-Turkey dossier, such as the start of 
negotiations, long-term expectations do not play a role. The Regular Reports of the Commission 
focus primarily on the situation of Turkey as it is, and occasionally make statements about the 
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short or medium-term. The real decision on whether for example negotiations will start is based 
on the actual facts rather than what is expected in the future. 
Additional question 7: Are future explorations specifically or predominantly used to sustain 
arguments infavor or against membership? 
The future explorations used by the European institutions were part of the policy-making by the 
European Parliament and the European Commission, and in these cases, the aim was to 
' objectively' establish the challenges ahead on the road to Turkish accession, or what could be 
expected after accession. Thus on the European !eve!, there did not seem to be a specific agenda 
in favour or against Turkish accession at the hasis of it. However, as Öztürk states rightly, 
'Asa politician, you can pick and choose any kind ofa projection which may suit to your 
own kind of policy decisi ons, and kind of aspirations, where you can disregard the others'. 
Nonetheless, there was no specific argument pursued in the rest of the policy documents which 
included future exploration which might lead one to think that this might have been the case. 
Of the extemally conducted future explorations, CEPS emphasized not to be in the 'advocacy 
business' , but this of course does not exclude the possibility that their explorations would be 
used in argument for or against accession. Furthermore, one explorative document seemed to 
ha ve a point in favour of accession, namely that of the Independent Committee on Turkey. 
Interestingly, the explorations that it made hada close relation to the general public concems of 
the public about accession. 
8.3 Possible reasons for limited use of future exploration 
The research established that future explorations play a very limited role in the policy-making of 
the European Union on the Turkey-EU dossier. Possible explanations for this are brought 
forward by the research itself as well as earlier work on the subject. 
Future exploration related reasons 
Exploration of the future may be considered too cumbersome a challenge to take on. Öztürk 
states that: 
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' It is difficult to make projections. To make a projection, you have to know what is going on, 
you have to know history and every kind of projection inherently has the possibility of 
k. . d . '228 ma ıng a wrong JU gement to ıt . 
and even argues that future exploration has become more difficult since 1990: 
' it was much easier before 1990, because the states were the main actors, decision-makers in 
this process. And (now) sometimes [future explorations] just miss the role of the NGOs, and 
the multinational companies, which may be very important. Then they just focus on a 
specific country or decision-making mechanism whereas they do not understand what is 
going on the other side' . 
Indeed, exploring the future implies making statement about something that is per definition 
uncertain and cannot be tested. It depends ona wide range of variables, and can result in 
numerous outcomes, of which perhaps one is more likely than the other, but nota single one is 
certain. A method of limiting the range of possible outcomes may be to limit the number of 
variables, by restricting the scope of the future exploration to one specific area. This may be part 
of the reason why ali ofthe future explorations found among the policy-documents were 
forecasts in certain specific areas rather than scenarios. The fact that the scope of these future 
explorations was limited also put limits on their applicability to policy. 
This brings us to the second point in relation to the nature of future explorations, namely the 
specific issue areas they were related to. The focus in the future explorations of the European 
institutions was generally on economic factors and the environment. Why other areas were not 
explored remains unclear for the moment. Among the extemally produced future explorations 
there were a number of scenarios, but the majority of documents consisted of forecasts, often in 
the area of migration, energy and economics. 
The findings of the research give rise to the idea ofa discrepancy between the topics explored by 
the EU institutions and those of concem to the public. This is an interesting point, due to the fact 
that especially since in the EU, future exploration is closely linked to policy-making, one would 
228 F. Öztürk, personal interview, April 4, 2006. 
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expect the topic of future exploration to match those of concem to the people. Here one may 
argue that the priorities in the policy process may not be those of the public. The reluctance of 
the European institutions to use future explorations might be easily explained if future 
exploration were only conducted in these areas, and thus did not serve a purpose to answer to the 
questions of the public. However, this is not the case. in fact, future explorations are available 
about issues that concem the public more. These extemal explorations are however not 
considered. Unfortunately, an answer to why this is the case cannot be provided on the hasis of 
the findings. 
System-related reasons 
in most of the policy-areas ofthe EU, the European Parliament, the European Commission, and 
the Council ali play a role in policy-making. The decision-making is often a process of proposals 
and adjustments between the various institutions. in such as process, a future exploration would 
be likely to lose momentum, especially when brought forward by only one of the institutions, 
and be snowed under by more immediate concems. 
At the same time, one sees a certain degree of ' inbreeding' of documentation. This sustains the 
idea that there is a certain ' flow ' of proposals, reports, and decisi ons going back and forth 
between the institutions, which may be un inviting to new insights such as such from future 
exploration. Furthermore, this ' inbreeding ' raises question as to the reach of future explorations 
conducted in different policy-areas. 
Or, tike Öztürk suggests, the European Union is just tike any other political system, where the 
short term concems of politicians are prioritized over long-term considerations. 
'The projections are for medium term and long term, and the longest term fora politician is 
the next election. That ' s why you don ' t see politicians making use of future projections that 
do not support their general programme, because understandably it is very difficult to make 
decisi ons which may cause a loss of votes. And very understandably they will not be taking 
those decisions for the matters sake, or the country or the people, where they will reap the 
benefits 80 years later. Because then, another govemment will reap the benefit. That's the 
difficulty at the !eve! of the projections, because the projections are for people to take the 
necessary decisions for the good of people in that sense. The politicians which will be 
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making those decisions and implementing them, do not have the time to make these kinds of 
decisions, they are more short-sighted in that respect. Political considerations play a really 
important role in the use of these long-term projections' .229 
This relates to the next point, namely that as long as the practice of future exploration is not 
institutionalized in the European Union, the emphasis placed on it will be subject to political 
preferences of for example the Commission President, as is suggested was the case with the 
establishment of the FSU and the role of Jacques Delors in this. According to Emerson it is very 
difficult fora unit like that to have any leverage on the system, unless is has a 'hot-line' with the 
President. 230 
Positivist tendencies: The fact that only one single future exploration from an extemal source 
was found among the policy-documents, as well as the fact that in the future explorations 
conducted, extemal expertise was only sought in relation to quantitative data may give an 
implication ofa tendency within the Union to not consider qualitative explorations suited as 
extemal in put. üne could speculate that the institutions think: 'if it comes to future exploration, 
we can 'make it up' ourselves ' . This speculation is not entirely ungrounded according to 
Emerson, who suggests that within the European institutions: 
'The business of futurology is thoroughly discredited as being professionally lacking in 
credibility and professionalism. it is just becoming 'do a scenario, like this or like that ' . 
The public: The European Parliament, having the premise of representing the European public, 
seeks a democratic legitimacy in the policy that it pursues. Not only does it mean that they 
should pay specifıc attention to the concems of the citizens in a certain policy-issues, but also 
that they should answer to the public with regard to the perspectives that they take. This may be 
discouraging for the use of future explorations, since those future explorations used within the 
European structures are in many cases not directly related to public concems such as religion, 
labour migrations, and identity and civilization issues. Furthermore, even is the EP would want 
to take a long-term approach and perhaps a more constructivist understanding of input from 
outside, it would have to fınd the consent of the people in doing so. in !ine with this, Belgian 
229 F. Öztürk, personal interview, April 4, 2006 
230 M. Emerson, personal interview, April 4, 2006. 
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prime mini ster Verhofstadt suggested at the latest EP debate on the future of Europe, that 
politicians would like to think more about the future, but that he sometimes had the impression 
that 'they are not allowed to'. 
Case specific reasons 
The very nature ofEU Enlargement policy may be unsuited for the integration of future 
exploration into policy. Decision-making in this realm is intergovernmental to a large extent, and 
therefore dependent on the political priorities of the different Member States. Future explorations 
ona European level would be unlikely to answer to ali these different agendas, and thus apart 
from being informative, would only play a very limited role in the actual policy-making. The 
argument may thus be that future exploration is left to the Member States in this case. In relation 
to the 'wait and see ' attitude that is apparent in intergovernmental decision-making in general, 
indicating that decisions are often taken at the !ast moment, it is worth asking to what extent this 
really happens. 
The actual impact of future exploration is difficult to determine. Emerson states that the fact that 
an external future exploration is considered by the European institutions does not mean it 
actually has an effect on the decisions. 
' Because the political positions taken by many Member States ofthe European Union are 
based on far more basic, if you like primitive, considerations. Like, 'we are Christians, and 
they are not Christians', say some'. 
And referring to an exploration on demographic change: 
'This is also used by the European institutions in thinking about policy on Turkey. In 
principle there is a pretty good fit here in complementarity of Turkish population growth and 
demographic decline or stagnation in the European Union, but go ask Mrs. Merkel or Mr. 
Sarkozy whether he ' s ready for it or not. Go and ask Mr. Balkenende, the Dutch Prime 
Minister whether he is ready to embrace this or not. 
So basically just between you and me, we can say, well, we know what the demographic 
projections are, we know about the very serious societal problems with our Muslim 
minorities, but maybe this Turkey which has been successful in democratizing, modernizing 
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and secularizing lslam, maybe this will come to be viewed as a plus rather than a threat. But, 
you can 't push that, can you? Y ou cannot ram it down people' s throats, it has to em erge. So 
this is the trump card that could be played at some point in favour of Turkey, together with 
by the way the energy security trump card'. 
The above thus suggests that even where the future explorations relate to immediate concems of 
the European Union, these may be 'overruled' by the Member States. 
Furtherrnore, the analysis showed a tendency to leave the burden of adjustment of the acceding 
state. The attitude is often best described by 'see you when you get there', meaning that steps in 
the accession process are taken according to the progress made by the candidate. There may 
therefore not be a real conception ofa need to explore the future beforehand. in focusing on 
membership, and when this to take place, one may find looking ahead further less relevant. 
8.4 Potential 
Even if exploration of the future does not play a large role now, this could change in the future. 
The upcoming debate on the future of Europe, in combination with the institutional changes 
Turkish accession might invoke, might prove an opportunity to integrate forma! structures into 
the EU policy-making cycle to explore the long-term future systematically. Of course this will 
depend on the political priorities of the moment. 
When asked whether the future should be explored more systematically, 
As to where future exploration should take place a variety of ideas exist. Öztürk says that 
' it should be done (more) in the Commission, in the Parliament, in basically every 
institution. it should be done at the state level, for example by govemment agencies, it should 
be done by NGOs, intemational institutions, and even by companies in case they want to 
understand what's going on, what will happen next. We have missed a !ot already. 
At the same time, he argues that objective future exploration by policy-making bodies might be 
hampered by political agenda's. 
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'I think that asa govemment agency, your hands are tight when making future projections. 
That's why 1 think these kinds of projections should be done by NGOs, by intemational 
companies, or think-tanks, or by academic people' .231 
Relating this to the fact that the European institutions seek limited knowledge, especially with 
regard to future exploration, outside of their own body of expertise, the question then remains 
how to get the future exploration to the policy-maker. 
Missir di Lusignano makes an interesting statement by implying that the explorations that could 
have been done by external units are of limited usability. 
' With regard to foreign policy, the studies conducted by the Forward Studies Unit are limited 
to examples about Russia, the Islam ete. and their added value in terms of policy-making is 
hard to detect. They are not really policy recommendations, and 1 feel they could have been 
conducted by universities or other external bodies ' . 
Thus a certain link between the policy-issue and the future exploration is wished for. This, 
according to Van der Staal is best maintained when the policy-maker himself conducts the future 
exploration.232 
in the current situation, it seems that the policy-maker would be the best entity to take on this 
challenge. Institutional changes have led to the allocation of at least the 'responsibility' and 
perhaps the potential within the individual DG' s of the Commission. lf the demand for future 
exploration would rise, this would be most likely to have to be addresses by the Commission. 
And if it does, the advice of Öztürk would be to approach the future in a more holistic manner, 
taking into account a wide range of topics and the interrelations between them. 
23 1 F. Öztürk, personal interview, April 4, 2006 
232 Yan der Staal , P.M. (I 988). Toekomstonderzoek en wetenschap: over de grondslagen van wetenschappelijke 
methoden en technieken van toekomstonderzoek. Delft: Delft University Press. 
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in any case, for the time being, future exploration should not be over-emphasized for the 
moment, because, according to Missir di Lusignano, 'the risk of focusing too much on the long-
term perspective is that you loose touch with reality'. 
8.5 Methodological reflection 
The method by which the <lata for this study were acquired and analysed was described in one of 
the previous chapters. In general, the research process was a constant process of back and forth 
reflection on data and methodology, adjusting the latter in the course of the research where a 
need for this was evident. There were a number of methodological decisions which were less 
easy to change in the course of the research. It is useful to reflect on these decisions in retrospect 
as a base for future research. 
Of the four search term that were used in the third shifting of documents to determine a relation 
of the document to the long-term future, namely 'future', 'long', 'timetable', and 'outlook', the 
latter did not yield any results which were not highlighted by the three other search terms. Next 
time, 'outlook' thus can easily be left out. 
ln the fırst shifting of documents, most documents were selected ona reference to ' Turkey' or 
'Turkish ' in the text. A second group of documents, for which this was not possible, was 
subjected to a search for 'Turkey' or 'Turkish ' in the title ofthe document. In a second shifting 
all ofthe selected documents were examined on their relation to Turkish accession. Most of the 
documents which had to be eliminated then were in the first group. The search for 'Turkey' and 
'Turkish' in the text was thus too broad a selection criterion. Most of the documents that were 
found here on top of those with 'Turkey' or 'Turkish' in the title were deemed irrelevant. In the 
future , selection on the title of the document may thus be expected to yield perhaps not an 
exhaustive list of documents, but an equally representative one. 
Lastly, a concern in the initial approach was that a selection of documents on the basis of search 
criteria would not allow different dates in the future to be selected as well. The analysis of the 
documents showed that dates did not play a large role in general and thus that the number of 
documents that was not selected asa result of this choice is absolutely minimal. 
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8.6 Final remarks 
Among the most important lessons 1 leamed during the past four years, is that those who think 
academic study will give ali the answers, will come out disillusioned. Academic research has 
become known to me as answering one question while generating ten new ones at the same time. 
If nothing else, this study lives up to this premise. The results ofthe study lead to some questions 
which 1 find worth sharing, such as: 
1. To what extent can these results be generalized for the whole of the EU policy-making 
process? Is there perhaps a relation between the way in which the future is explored and 
the kind of decision-making (intergovemmental/ supranational) involved? in short: can 
one expect more future exploration on the European !eve! when the decision-making is 
concentrated there as well? And: does this mean that in intergovernmental decision-
making, as is the case in enlargement, national positions do indeed get 'fed' by national 
future explorations? 
2. Can the same findings be applied to the EU structures at the meso-level of enlargement 
policy? Are future explorations perhaps more systematically conducted in more issue-
specific areas of enlargement, such as the different chapters of the acquis? 
However dissatisfactory ali these questions may seem, 1 anı happy to find that there is more to 
research. The only unfortunate fact is that time is limited as always. These questions will 
therefore be left to research another time, by me, or others, in the future ...... . 
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Proposals 7 o o 7 
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Total 93 93 5 191 
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Accession Partnership. (COM(2000) 502 - CS-0468/2000 - 2000/0205(CNS))/ (FiNAL AS-
0024/2001 ). Brussels. 
European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and 
Defence Policy. (200 l ). Report on the proposal fora Council regulation on pre-accession 
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foreign and security policy. (C5-0255/2000 - 2000/2038 (INI))/ (FINAL AS-0340/2000). 
Brussels. 
European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and 
Defence Policy. (2001 ). Report on the 2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey 's 
progress towards accession. (COM(2000) 713 -C5-0613/2000-2000/2014(COS))/ (FINAL 
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European Parliament. (2000). European Parliament resolution on the Turkish bombardment of 
northern Iraq. (,:/;-_ , ..,, , - : ', , ,-,_ ' and 'ı·''.j,J ::,ı,' ı ). Brussels. 
European Parliament. (2000) . Resolution on the Commission communication: Countering 
racism, xenophobia and anti-semitism in the candidate countries. (COM(l 999) 256 - CS-
0094/1999 - l 999/2099(COS)/ AS-0055/2000). Brussels. 
European Parliament. (2001 ). European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal fora 
Council decision on the conclusion of the agreement between the European Community and 
Turkey concerning Turkey's participation in the European Environment Agency and the 
European Environment Information and Observation Network. (COM(2000) 873 - CS-
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strategy, and in particular on the establishment of an Accession Partnership. (COM(2000) 502 -
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enlargement of the European Union. (2002/2045(INI))/ P5_TA(2002)0318/ (A5-0178/2002). 
Strasbourg. 
European Parliament. (2002). European Parliament resolution on the progress made by each of 
the candidate countries towards accession. (COM(2002) 700 - CS-0474/2002 - 2002/2160(INI))/ 
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